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ABSTRACT 
The Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Strength Army) is a Sinhalese nationalist movement 
led by Buddhist monks that recently came to international prominence following a 
2014 anti-Muslim rally that erupted into deadly violence. The Bodu Bala Sena is set 
apart from earlier nationalist movements in that its hostility is primarily directed 
towards Sri Lankan Muslims instead of Tamil separatists. Despite this difference I 
argue that the Bodu Bala Sena is best considered as a new development in this 
existing tradition of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, and that the re-orientation of 
the Bodu Bala Sena’s hostility from Tamils to Muslims reveals the extent to which 
Sinhalese nationalist conceptions of their own identity are built around various 
interpretations of a particular “identity narrative.” This identity narrative, which 
has its genesis in anti-colonial interpretations of the Mahavamsa, casts the Sinhalese 
people as defenders of a sacred island (the dhammadipa) against impious foreign 
invaders who threaten its unity and sanctity. The case of the Bodu Bala Sena 
demonstrates both the ongoing relevance of this identity narrative in the post-war 
era and, importantly, the availability of the narrative for contextual re-
interpretation. The identity narrative model, which incorporates both mythic 
origins and contextual interpretation, helps to bridge some of the existing debates 
on the nature and origins of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka which tend to favour 
either one or the other. 
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GLOSSARY OF PALI AND SINHALA TERMS 
Arahant (P.) one who has attained nibbana. 
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Sena  (S.) “army,” as in Bodu Bala Sena. 
Yakkha  (P.) non-human being of great power, spirit or demon. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Each chapter of the Mahavamsa, the “great chronicle” of Sri Lanka, ends by asserting 
that it was “compiled for the serene joy and emotion of the pious.”1 Over the last 
150 years this text has become a central legitimisation for nationalist ideology 
among Sinhalese Buddhists, raising the question of whether the many violent and 
heinous acts committed by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists were similarly “for the 
serene joy and emotion of the pious.” Is this is useful way of thinking about 
Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka? While much has been written in answer to this 
question, and on the interaction between religion, politics, and violence during Sri 
Lanka’s Civil War period (1983-2009), the end of hostilities between the state and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) does not mean the end of Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalism, or of religious legitimisations for violence against Sri Lanka’s 
minorities by state or non-state actors.2 
I am interested in how some nationalists have attempted to deal with a very specific 
problem: if a group defines its own national identity through violent alterity, how 
can it respond to the loss of that alterity? Leading up to and during the civil war, 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists constructed what I call an “identity narrative” that 
characterised the Sinhalese nation as historic defenders of their sacred homeland 
from impious Tamil invaders. In many ways, the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 
represented the conclusion of this narrative: the Tamil threat was destroyed, Sri 
                                                             
1 The Mahavamsa: The Great Chronicle of Ceylon, trans. Wilhelm Geiger (London, UK: The Pali 
Text Society, 1980). This edition is used for all references to the Mahavamsa, abbreviated as 
Mhv. 
2 The consideration of state actors is important, as Patrick Mason argues in "Religious 
Violence and State Violence," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, 
ed. R. Scott Appleby, Atalia Omer, and David Little (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2015). He claims that too much of the existing literature on religion and violence assumes 
that “the state is a neutral or unmarked category, while non-state activists are the religiously 
motivated purveyors of violence” (248). Sri Lanka may be an exception to this, with much of 
the literature focussing on how religious actors treated state violence during the Civil War; 
see for one such example Daniel Kent, "Onward Buddhist Soliders," in Buddhist Warfare, ed. 
Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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Lanka was saved, and Sinhalese Buddhism remained, victorious, in its “foremost 
place.” However, with the conclusion of this narrative, the narrative itself became 
irrelevant. How were nationalists to define Sinhalese identity if they had no threat 
to defend against, and thereby to define themselves against? Some nationalists, 
including a monk called Galagoda Gnanasara, saw the solution to this problem in the 
identification of a new threat. While the substance of this new threat (the manner in 
which it threatens Sinhalese Buddhism) may be different from that posed by the 
LTTE, it would serve the same function of providing an “Other” against which pious 
Sinhalese Buddhists could defend their homeland. By constructing a new 
interpretation of the identity narrative that targeted this new threat in place of the 
LTTE, these nationalists are attempting to remake existing violent Buddhist 
nationalism into a form suitable for the post-war era. 
I focus on a relatively new (and ongoing) development in Sinhalese Buddhist 
nationalism, a group founded in 2012 called the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power 
Army). The Bodu Bala Sena, a splinter group of the nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya 
(JHU), is led by monks and considers itself to be a religious organisation that is also 
active in politics, as have many Buddhist nationalist groups in Sri Lanka. What 
differentiates the Bodu Bala Sena from existing nationalist movements is their 
insistence that in the post-civil war era the most salient threat to Sinhalese 
Buddhism is not the Tamil separatists of earlier years but rather extremism among 
Sri Lanka’s minority Muslim population.3 The Bodu Bala Sena initially campaigned 
on issues like the abolition of halal certification and the banning of headscarves as a 
security risk, but came to international prominence in 2014 when an anti-Muslim 
                                                             
3 The long history of Islam and Muslims in Sri Lanka is covered by Lorna Dewaraja, The 
Muslims of Sri Lanka: One Thousand Years of Ethnic Harmony 900-1915 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: 
The Lanka Islamic Foundation, 1994). It should be noted that attacks on Muslims by 
Sinhalese nationalists is not novel in itself: K.M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Colombo, Sri 
Lanka: Vijatha Yapa Publications, 2005). Rather, it is the Bodu Bala Sena’s focus on Muslims 
as the primary threat to Sinhalese Buddhism that makes them unique. 
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rally near Aluthgama turned violent, leading to several deaths and considerable 
destruction of property. 
1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
My study has two main objectives, which I refer to as the particular and the broad. 
The particular objective is to present an explanation for the case of the Bodu Bala 
Sena and their fixation on a new threat to Sinhalese Buddhism when, with the 2009 
defeat of the LTTE, the nationalist agenda had effectively been concluded. 
While much has been written on the nature, history and future of Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalism generally, the Bodu Bala Sena is a recent enough development 
to have so far had little written substantially on its position within this nationalist 
tradition and its relationship with its forebears. Nira Wickramasinghe has 
mentioned the group in her two most recent “year in review” articles for Asian 
Survey, both times in a fairly descriptive (if characteristically detailed and 
informative) manner. 4 Ameer Ali goes further, arguing that the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
antagonism towards Muslims is driven by the “validation” for Sinhalese nationalism 
offered by the 2009 victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).5 
Oshan Fernando mentions them as an example of Buddhist opposition to Christian 
evangelism in Sri Lanka, while Rohan Jayasekera compares them to Burma’s 969 as 
a warning of how “devalued” Buddhism can become.6 
                                                             
4 Nira Wickramasinghe, "Sri Lanka in 2013: Post-War Oppressive Stability," Asian Survey 54, 
no. 1 (2014); "Sri Lanka in 2014: Cracks in the Edifice," Asian Survey 55, no. 1 (2015). She 
also briefly mentions them, in historical context, in Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of 
Contested Identities (Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2006), 
401-2. Hendon and Hines also briefly mention the group in a similar summary of 
contemporary affairs: David W. Hendon and Jason Hines, "Notes on Church-State Affairs," 
Journal of Church and State 55, no. 3 (2013).  
5 Ameer Ali, "The End of the Road," South Asia Journal, no. 9 (2013). 
6 Oshan Fernando, "Religion's 'State Effects:' Evangelical Christianity, Political Legitimacy 
and State Formation," Religion 44, no. 4 (2014): 574; Rohan Jayasekera, "Narratives of Hate," 
Index on Censorship 42, no. 2 (2013). 
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Very few academic publications have focussed on the Bodu Bala Sena itself as a 
primary subject of discussion, with two notable exceptions being Michael Jerryson’s 
“Buddhists and Violence” and James John Stewart’s “Muslim-Buddhist Conflict in 
Contemporary Sri Lanka.” The latter paper analyses the rhetorical devices of two 
prominent anti-Muslims groups in Sri Lanka, the Bodu Bala Sena and the Sinhala 
Ravaya, and concludes that the activities of such groups are “simply an extension 
of… past anti-Tamil, anti-other political platforms.”7 I build on Stewart’s analysis in 
Chapter 3, analysing Bodu Bala Sena discourse more generally to support his 
argument that they are best understood as a new development in an existing 
tradition of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Jerryson includes the Bodu Bala Sena in 
his own article as part of a broader discussion of the relationship between 
Buddhism and violence both in Sri Lanka and abroad. He describes one of the 
principal means by which the Bodu Bala Sena constructs Sri Lankan Muslims as 
posing a threat to Sinhalese Buddhism: by situating the Sinhalese as a minority (and 
so endangered) within a global context, regardless of their majority status within 
Sri Lanka itself.8 I build on this, and on similar means by which the Bodu Bala Sena 
constructs Muslims as a threat, in Chapter 4. 
My particular objective is contributing to this existing scholarly knowledge of the 
Bodu Bala Sena. Behind this lies my more general interest in the relationship 
between politics, violence, and religion. As I will argue in Chapter 5, much of the 
writing on religious violence today is dominated by secularist assumptions of a 
fundamental disconnect between “the religious” and “the political.” My more 
general objective with this thesis is to demonstrate, through the case of the Bodu 
Bala Sena, that this assumption has little grounding in reality and is not analytically 
                                                             
7 James John Stewart, "Muslim-Buddhist Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka," South Asia 
Research 34, no. 3 (2014): 256. 
8 Michael K. Jerryson, "Buddhists and Violence: Historical Continuity/Academic Inaccuracy," 
Religion Compass 9, no. 5 (2015): 114. 
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useful. Buddhism is not a fixed, unchanging, apolitical and non-violent “whatever”9 
that is either the sole cause of violence or an unwilling partner to it, but a dynamic 
and multivalent tradition that is ultimately defined only by ideologies, actions, 
norms, and customs of Buddhists themselves, developed in response to ever-
changing social, spiritual, and political contexts. 
The case of the Bodu Bala Sena demonstrates the continuing relevance of “religion,” 
religious ideas, and religious actors to Sri Lanka’s political development in the post-
war era. Susan Hayward claims that Sri Lanka’s intercommunal conflicts should not 
be considered religious conflicts “in the sense of a dispute between competing 
religious beliefs,” but rather as conflicts “over access to political power, economic 
and social well-being, and minority rights.”10 I disagree with this. As the case of the 
Bodu Bala Sena represents, the religious “framing” of these issues makes Sri Lanka’s 
political situation a religious concern, and makes intercommunal conflict and 
violent undeniably religious violence. Religious violence is not a dispute between 
competing religious beliefs, but nor is it purely political violence given a post hoc 
religious legitimisation. In Sri Lanka, violence is contextualised and legitimised by 
religious actors within a religious framework, making it simultaneously political 
and religious, not one or the other. 
1.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study has two primary limitations. These are the relative scarcity of English-
language primary resources on the Bodu Bala Sena, and my inability (due to time, 
                                                             
9 I borrow this term from Obeysekere, who uses it to (somewhat dismissively) refer to 
scholarly conceptions of sovereignty in pre-colonial Sri Lanka: Gananath Obeyesekere, 
"Buddhism, Ethnicity, and Identity: A Problem in Buddhist History," in Buddhism, Conflict 
and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, ed. Mahinda Deegalle (New York, USA: Routledge, 2006), 
137. 
10 Susan Hayward, "The Spoiler and the Reconciler: Buddhism and the Peace Process in Sri 
Lanka," in Between Terror and Tolerance, ed. Timothy D. Sisk (Washington D.C., USA: 
Georgetown University Press, 2011), 183. 
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funding, and language skills) to do the substantial fieldwork that I see necessary for 
an in-depth study of how Buddhism in Sri Lanka has responded to the end of the 
civil war. Even with these limitations, I have managed to gather enough primary 
resources (from news media, video recordings, and internet sources) to construct a 
picture of the Bodu Bala Sena’s key ideologies and motivations that allows me to use 
them as a case study in a more general discussion of religious violence and Buddhist 
nationalism in Sri Lanka. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
I support these arguments primarily through analysis of the publically available 
discourse of the Bodu Bala Sena, supplemented by interviews conducted by 
academics and journalists. This choice of methodology is partly pragmatic, in that I 
do not have the resources available to, for example, gather ethnographic data or 
conduct interviews myself. Discourse analysis does however promise several 
unique insights that cannot be gained through other means, and is not necessarily a 
“lesser” alternative to other forms of research.11 The central concern of discourse 
analysis is to trace the attempted connections between reality and discursive 
space.12 This produces insight in both directions: the state of the discourse-
producer’s world as it is and as they would want it to be.13 In the case of the Bodu 
Bala Sena, given the success of their discourse in attracting supporters and 
mobilising them to action (as in Aluthgama), an analysis of their rhetoric will also 
allow us to understand the mindset of the audience; that is, we can consider Bodu 
Bala Sena discourse to be representative of a certain subset of Sinhalese Buddhist 
                                                             
11 Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston, USA: Allyn and 
Bacon, 2001), 189-90. 
12 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992). 
13 Frans Wijsen, "Discourse Analysis in Religious Studies: The Case of Interreligious Worship 
in Friesland," Anthropos 105, no. 2 (2010): 541. 
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nationalism, and so draw conclusions about the state of nationalism in Sri Lanka 
more generally based on their (the Bodu Bala Sena’s) discursive practices. 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
Chapter 2 will set out the theoretical framework for my argument. In this chapter, I 
will introduce the “identity narrative” concept of Margaret Somers and argue that 
the adoption of Muslims as a salient threat in lieu of the LTTE (defeated and so no 
longer a credible threat) demonstrates the necessity of such a threat to nationalist 
identity. I will argue that Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have by this point so 
heavily entrenched a conception of their own identity in opposition to a threatening 
other – an “impious invader” – that the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 necessitated for 
some the identification of a new threat, lest this defining feature of their identity be 
lost. 
In Chapter 3 I will attempt to situate the Bodu Bala Sena within existing literature 
on Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. I will argue that while there are significant 
differences between the Bodu Bala Sena and earlier nationalist movements, the 
Bodu Bala Sena is best understood as a successor to earlier nationalist movements 
and a part of the broader phenomenon of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. The 
points of departure from these earlier movements then beg the question: why has 
the Bodu Bala Sena reinterpreted existing nationalist ideology in these ways? 
Chapter 4 focusses on the most significant new development in Bodu Bala Sena 
ideology, the construction of Muslims as a new threat to Sinhalese Buddhism. I will 
explore the rhetorical construction of this threat through the “securitisation” 
framework of the Copenhagen school, and argue that in constructing Muslims as a 
threat the Bodu Bala Sena is attempting to re-interpret the existing nationalist 
conceptions of Sinhalese identity into a form relevant to the post-war era. 
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Finally in Chapter 5 I will argue that analysing the Bodu Bala Sena’s violent 
discourse as an exercise in identity politics (and the narrative of violence between 
“us” and “them” that frames Sinhalese Buddhist conceptions of identity and alterity) 
highlights a common problem in discussions of religious violence in Sri Lanka and 
beyond. I will identify a secularist dichotomy in existing literature on religious 
violence, and suggest that contrary to the assumptions of this dichotomy agents like 
the Bodu Bala Sena can be understood to operate simultaneously within the 
“religious” and “political” spheres. 
1.5 THREE THEMES: VIOLENCE, IDENTITY, AND ALTERITY 
In this section I will briefly introduce and discussion the three key themes of my 
thesis. My first conceptual theme is violence: I am interested in how religious actors, 
in this case the Bodu Bala Sena, understand violence within a religious framework. I 
do not use “framework” to imply an explicitly cosmological or otherworldly 
conceptualisation of violence, as Juergensmeyer does, though this can be, and often 
is, an important component of religious violence. 14 Rather, I consider the 
incorporation of violence into a religious framework to be the process by which 
violence becomes a normalised part of religious belief or practice, through which 
the violence is given some particular religious meaning.15 This may be inclusive of 
                                                             
14 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: the Global Rise of Religious Violence 
(California, USA: University of California Press, 2003). 
15 What exactly “religious meaning” constitutes is perhaps outside of the scope of this thesis. 
I assume, for the purposes of this project, that there are certain phenomena (such as the 
Catholic mass, Orthodox iconography, the Hindu practice of darśan etc.) that are “religious” 
and that in some traditions certain acts of violence come to be considered similarly 
“religious.” There is a respectable amount of literature that seeks to understand how and 
why some violence is given religious meaning, including Walter Burket, Rene Girard, and 
Jonathan Z. Smith, Violent Origins: Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation, ed. Robert G. 
Hamerton-Kelly (California, USA: Stanford University Press, 1987); Maurice Bloch, Prey Into 
Hunter: The Politics of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Moticated by a Religious 
Imperative," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 18 (1995); Thomas Robbins, "Religious 
Movements and Violence: A Friendly Critique of the Interpretive Approach," Nova Religio: 
The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 1, no. 1 (1997); Jessica Stern, Terror in the 
Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York, USA: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003); 
Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to be Martyrs: the Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism," 
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everything from explicit calls to holy war in the name of God to the hosting of 
soldiers in a Buddhist wat in Southern Thailand.16 This approach, as I will argue in 
Chapter 5, is based on a post-secularist understanding of the relationship between 
what constitutes “religious practice” and “political action.” In a secularist 
understanding these are mutually exclusive categories, an assumption that I 
disagree with.17 
In this case, I examine the manner in which the Bodu Bala Sena contextualises 
violence (against Muslims) in its religious framework in order to legitimate that 
violence. In order to unravel this framing of violence in religious terms, I ask the 
following questions: what might have caused the Bodu Bala Sena to incorporate 
violence in its religious framework? How do they go about this incorporation? What 
rhetorical devices do they use in order to communicate this to their supporters, and 
to legitimise violence against Sri Lankan Muslims? 
My second conceptual theme is identity, and the relationship between identity and 
religious violence in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is a fascinating case study in the 
interaction of religion and identity because of the close relationship that religion 
and ethnic or national identity have come to assume. Sri Lankan Muslims are, as a 
result of certain historical developments, a minority “nationality” in Sri Lanka that 
are primarily identified by their religion; in their case, religion is nationality.18 As I 
expand on in Chapter 2, and largely as a result of the nationalist project begun in the 
colonial era, the national identity of the Sinhalese has been similarly defined by the 
                                                             
in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New 
York, USA: Routledge, 2006). 
16 As in Michael K. Jerryson, Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand (New 
York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
17 I acknowledge the influence here of William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: 
Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (North Carolina, USA: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
18 See, for example, Bart Klem, "Islam, Politics and Violence in Eastern Sri Lanka," The 
Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 3 (2011). 
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majority religious identity of Buddhism. The relationship between this religious 
identity and violence has been a central theme of many significant works on 
violence in Sri Lanka, and this relationship continues to be relevant in the post-war 
era and to my study of the Bodu Bala Sena. Identity as a concept straddles the 
boundaries of both politics and religion, and is particularly useful for undermining 
secularist assumptions about the relationship between religion (belonging to the 
apolitical “religious sphere”) and politics (belonging to the areligious “secular 
sphere”), a task I attempt in Chapter 5. 
My final conceptual theme is alterity, a fundament component of identity. Gingrich 
and Baumann tell us, “Identity is part of difference insofar as its own formation is 
subject to the basic relation with a powerful and distinct “Other” whose gaze defines 
the terms.”19 The creation of alterity, or Otherness, is central to an analysis of the 
Bodu Bala Sena as their principal innovation in the nationalist tradition is their 
definition of their own identity in opposition to Muslims rather than Tamils. Why 
has the Bodu Bala Sena established Muslims as their “Other,” and what implications 
does this have for their construction of their own identity as Sinhalese Buddhists? 
1.6 THE BODU BALA SENA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Much of the Bodu Bala Sena’s genesis is not immediately clear. Many contradicting 
accounts can be found in English-language media, and the Bodu Bala Sena itself 
does not help matters thanks to its frequent establishment and abandonment of 
official websites.20 The following information is therefore not intended as a 
                                                             
19 Andre Gingrich, "Conceptualising Identities," in Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural 
Approach, ed. Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich (New York, USA: Berghan Books, 2006), 
11. 
20 Bodubalasena.net, a Sinhalese language website, was in use at the start of 2015 but was 
removed in the early part of the year when bodubalasena.co, an English-language 
alternative, was launched. As of August 1, 2015, bodubalasena.net re-directs to a new 
Sinhalese-language site at bodubalasena.info, with its original content now posted under 
bodubalasena.com (which can also be reached through bodubalasena.org). As of August 1, 
2015, bodubalasena.co, the English-language domain referenced frequently throughout the 
following pages, has expired and been suspended awaiting restoration and fees payment. 
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comprehensive history, but as a brief introduction to the group that will inform the 
discussion to come. 21 
The Bodu Bala Sena was formed in 2012 as a breakaway from the nationalist Jathika 
Hela Urumaya (JHU).22 The original founders were four monks, including Galagoda 
Gnanasara, Kerama Wimalajothi, and two unnamed others, as well as lay Buddhist 
Dilanthe Withanage. Wimalojothi, the Bodu Bala Sena’s founding President, has 
since renounced the organisation, leaving Gnanasara as General Secretary (and de 
facto leader) and Withanage as CEO. These two are the main spokespeople for the 
Bodu Bala Sena, and their press conferences, speeches, and interviews form the 
basis of my analysis. Gnanasara claims that they are supported by “almost 80%” of 
monks in Sri Lanka. While this seems an exaggeration, the Bodu Bala Sena does 
enjoy considerable monastic support, as the following image demonstrates: 
 
Figure 1: Monks in the audience of the Bodu Bala Sena's 2014 conference.23 
Withanage, the Bodu Bala Sena’s CEO, has never been ordained or, in his own 
words, formally trained in Buddhism. His background in is IT, which he studied in 
                                                             
21 The information in this section, unless noted otherwise, was kindly provided by Michael 
Jerryson, who had a series of unrecorded conversations with Withanage June 26– 28, 2014, 
as well as formal interviews with both Withanage and Gnanasara on June 25. 
22 Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age, 401. 
23 From facebook.com/OfficialBoduBalaSena (accessed November 1, 2015). 
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the Soviet Union during the 1980s. His LinkedIn profile states that he holds an MSc 
from the Georgian Technical University, and that he began working towards a PhD 
in artificial intelligence.24 He returned to Sri Lanka and began working in IT and 
computer literacy before turning to policy and public service in the 2000s. In 2011 
he served as advisor to the Minister of National Language and Social Integration and 
assisted in developing a programme for engaging Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims in 
joint development projects before transferring to the now-defunct Ministry for 
Consumer Welfare. He has known Gnanasara since at least 2011, when they were 
both members of the Sinhalese Buddhist delegation to a Norwegian conference on 
post-war reconciliation.25 In 2012 he, along with Gnanasara and Wimalajothi, co-
founded the Bodu Bala Sena. In 2013 the Ministry asked for his resignation, and he 
has since worked full-time as CEO of the Bodu Bala Sena.26 
Gnanasara, despite being the spiritual leader of the Bodu Bala Sena and its most 
outspoken leader, is harder to find concrete information on. Jerryson puts him in his 
late 30s, and from his name we can assume that he was either born near or 
ordained at Galagoda temple south of Kandy. Withanage claims that Maduluwawe 
Sobhitha, a senior nationalist monk,27 has a “soft spot” for Gnanasara, and also that 
Gnanasara was partly inspired by Gangodawila Soma, a university monk and social 
reformer. 
                                                             
24 https://lk.linkedin.com/in/dilanthe (accessed September 27, 2015). 
25 The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sri Lanka, "Statement Regarding the Alleged Connection 
Between Bodu Bala Sena and Norway,"  
http://www.norway.lk/News_and_events/News/Statement-regarding-the-alleged-
connection-between-Bodu-Bala-Sena-and-Norway/#.VgdSZRuqpBc (accessed on September 
27, 2015). 
26 Jerryson notes that “during his short speech at the ICES [International Centre for Ethnic 
Studies], Dilantha said that… no one was paid, it was all volunteer work.” This raises the 
question of how Withanage has been working full-time for the Bodu Bala Sena for the past 
two years. 
27 "Sobhitha Thero Suspects Moves to Stop Him," BBC Sinhala Online, October 7, 2010. 
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The Bodu Bala Sena’s early campaigns included a protest against halal food 
certification and Muslim dress codes, but they came to international prominence in 
mid-2014 after a public rally of theirs devolved into violence near Aluthgama, 
resulting in Tamil and Muslim deaths.28 This short extract of the speech gives a 
sense of Gnanasara’s inflammatory language: 
“Dharga town… I think that this name should also be changed… I saw 
Aluthgama Muslims are being protected with special task forces and 
police as in Nandikadal. What is this?! What is this?! 
I would like to say that it is a Sinhala police in this country, and the 
army in this country is a Sinhala army. Hereafter, if a marakkalaya 
[Muslim; derogatory] or any other paraya [foreigner] lays so much 
as a hand on a Sinhala person, let alone a monk, it would be the end 
of this person! 
We must tell this: there is a leader for marakkalayas. There is a 
leader for Tamils. But we Sinhalese have no leader. Sinhalese have 
no leader. Sinhalese have no leader [sic; repeated three times]. There 
is a person called Diyawara Nilame.29 He calls himself leader of 
Buddhists. We are in an unfortunate era when no Buddhist leader 
speaks for the rights of the Buddhist. Sinhala Ministers who holler 
on stages in the name of Buddhism say that we [the BBS] are racists 
and extremists. Our own sakkily [derogatory term] ministers. Yes we 
are [extremists and racists]! 
…the problem we have is that the police and the politicians have 
created a mythical fear in their heads. All of these fellows [gestures 
at police surrounding the rally] with their bayonets and rubber 
bullets are getting prepared to attack us. That is wrong! Police 
should remember this. 
There was an incident in Badulla, and in other places. We would like 
to ask if a single monk or a Sinhala person has attacked anyone. Not 
                                                             
28 "Sri Lanka Shaken by Religious Violence," Al Jazeera English, June 16, 2014. 
29 The Diyawadana Nilame is the chief lay attendant to the Śri Dalaga Maligawa (Temple of 
the Sacred Tooth), a temple in Kandy housing a significant Buddhist relic. 
14 
 
because we are unable! We would like to lovingly remind that we 
should get organised. It is time to stop loitering. We should unite and 
determine to fulfil our duty for the time. If not, future Sinhala 
generations would curse us definitely. We should unite to save us 
from that curse. Our forefathers saved the heritage of this country 
for us. They did so by sacrificing their eyes, heads, blood, sweat and 
lives. Now enemy forces have mobilised to loot that heritage.”30 
This last section illustrates the Bodu Bala Sena’s sense of continuity, a theme I will 
discuss further in Chapter 3. They see themselves as fulfilling a historical duty to 
save the heritage of Sri Lanka and of Sinhalese Buddhism from impious foreign 
invaders. In post-war Sri Lanka, these invaders (according to the Bodu Bala Sena) 
are Muslims, but this is only the most modern incarnation of a historical threat. 
Sinhalese Buddhism nationalists framed their fight against the LTTE as defence of 
the sacred heritage of Sinhalese Buddhism against impious foreign invaders, a fight 
that they claimed had its origins with the invasion of Elara described in the 
Mahavamsa. In the following chapters I will trace the development of this particular 
belief and argue that the Bodu Bala Sena understands itself to be fulfilling the same 
role. 
1.7 TERMINOLOGY 
For consistency’s sake, and following Fernando,31 the island in question is referred 
to as “Sri Lanka” throughout, as are the various political entities (Ceilão Português, 
Nederlands-Zeylan, British Ceylon, Independent Ceylon, the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam) that have laid claim to its full or partial 
governance. This convention is employed for simplicity and continuity even when 
such use is anachronistic. Similarly I have used “Sinhalese” and “Sri Lankan” as 
                                                             
30 "This is What Sri Lankan Monk Think About Muslim, Tamil Hindu, Dalit and White 
People," (FataasTV, 2014). 
31 Jude Lal Fernando, Religion, Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka: The Politics of the 
Interpretation of Nationhood (Berlin, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2013), 1. 
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adjectives and demonyms throughout, with the exceptions of quotes and proper 
nouns (Portuguese “Chinghala;” “Sinhala Maha Sabha”), while I use “Sinhala” to 
refer to Sinhalese language. 
I transliterate Sinhala words largely following the systems described by Dileep 
Chandralal,32 with two exceptions. First, I use neither diacritics nor double vowels: 
for example, I transliterate both අ and ආ as “a” instead of “aa” or “ā.” Second, I 
transliterate ඇ as “ä” instead of “æ.” 
I make exceptions from Chandralal’s system for Sinhala names when the individual 
is known to prefer an alternate spelling, or when (as in the case of Dharmapala) the 
alternate spelling is so widely known that not using it would be confusing. 
I transliterate Pali words following the system of the Pali Text Society’s Pali-English 
Dictionary, again dropping the diacritic markings.33 
I do include diacritic markings in the spelling of European words that would 
normally employ them (in other words, when it the official spelling of the word in 
the native alphabet, rather than a transliteration or Romanisation). An example 
used infrequently is “Ceilão Português.” 
Following Seneviratne,34 I omit the title of “Venerable” that conventionally precedes 
the names of monks in English (and the equivalent suffix “thero”). This is for 
concision and to avoid unnecessary repetition, and is not intended as a mark of 
disrespect. 
While Sanskrit terms are often used in literature on Sri Lanka, most likely due to the 
familiarity of some common terms (karma; dharma; ahimsa), I use Pali throughout 
                                                             
32 Dileep Chandralal, Sinhala (Amsterdam, Nederland: John Benjamins B.V., 2010), Chapter 
Two. 
33 T.W. Rhys Davis and William Stede, eds., Pali-English Dictionary (Pali Text Society, 2009).  
34 H.L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Illinois, USA: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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(kamma; dhamma; avihimsa). This is in an attempt to remain faithful to the practice 
of Sinhalese Buddhism, in which Pali is the liturgical language, but does result at 
times in some inconsistency between my own writing and direct quotes from other 
authors who have used Sanskrit. 
Finally, all Dutch surnames, and surnames of Dutch origin, are capitalised and 
ordered according to Dutch convention: K.M. de Silva, for example, is listed in my 
bibliography as “De Silva, K.M.” under the letter “S.” 
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2 NARRATIVE, IDENTITY, AND EMPOWERMENT 
In this chapter I will set up the broader theoretical framework of my argument. If 
the Bodu Bala Sena is, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, a successor of earlier 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist movements, why might they be attempting to recast 
Sinhalese Buddhism as being under threat from a new group? This indicates to me 
that the presence of a credibly threatening “Other” is in some way important to 
nationalists, and that the loss of the LTTE as such a credible threat necessitated, for 
the Bodu Bala Sena, the identification of another to take its place. In this chapter I 
will argue that this is due to the particular “identity narrative” that Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalism has adopted, which casts the Sinhalese as a uniquely pious 
Buddhist nation that has historically defended Sri Lanka against impious outsiders. 
The LTTE provided an “Other” against which Sinhalese Buddhists could defend the 
dhammadipa, and the Bodu Bala Sena is responding to the loss of this “Other” by 
constructing Muslims as a new alternative. Their hostility towards Muslims is best 
understood as an attempt to create a new narrative of Sinhalese identity that will be 
relevant in the post-war era. 
I will begin this chapter, in §2.1, by explaining the narrative framework I use to 
analyse identity. This is largely based on Margaret Somers’ concept of an “identity 
narrative.” The “identity narrative” framework is particularly well-suited to 
discussing identity politics in Sri Lanka because of the powerful influence of 
historical narratives (particularly from the Mahavamsa) on the development of 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. 
In §2.2 I will identify various identity narratives constructed and maintained by 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and argue that the differences between these 
narratives are primarily driven by changing political and social contexts. In each 
incarnation of the identity narrative, nationalists have attempted to re-interpret the 
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story that they tell about Sinhalese Buddhism to adapt to new social and political 
climates. Significantly, new interpretations of the narrative have always favoured 
appropriating and adapting existing tropes rather than inventing complete 
novelties. These attempts at maintaining continuity lend the new narratives some of 
the legitimacy of the old. This section will also provide some historical background 
for the more detailed discussion of 20th century Sinhalese nationalism (and the 
Bodu Bala Sena’s reinterpretation of its key themes) in Chapter 3. 
Finally, in §2.3 I will examine broader literature on the role that violence can play in 
reifying and legitimising identity narratives, and argue that the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
hostility towards Muslims is best understood as such an attempt at reification.35 
2.1 NARRATIVE AND IDENTITY 
In this section I will introduce and define the concept of an “identity narrative” as a 
tool for analysing the historical development of nationalist claims about Sinhalese 
identity. The narrative approach to identity assumes that group identities are not 
“fixed, singular, bounded, internally harmonious, distinct from others at [their] 
boundaries, and marked by historical longevity, if not rooted in nature,”36 but rather 
relational and contextual. An individual holds any number of group affiliations 
(such as gender, ethnicity, sexuality, or political views) that may at various times 
and in various contexts be more or less salient for that individual.37 An individual 
living in Sri Lanka, for example, might simultaneously be a citizen of that country, a 
Sinhala speaker, ethnically Sinhalese, a pious Catholic, a male, a heterosexual, and a 
cyclist, among many other things, any of which might at various times form the 
                                                             
35 I use the term “reify” (to make real or to bring into being) to refer to nationalist attempts 
to make their particular identity narratives appear true and salient. 
36 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations," Journal 
of Modern History 73, no. 4 (2001): 866. 
37 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny (London, UK: Penguin Books, 
2006), 18. 
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basis for a sense of group identity with others who share those characteristics. 
Individuals and groups may attempt to create a particular interpretation of group 
identity that emphasises some of these shared characteristics above others (such as 
Sinhalese ethnicity over Catholic religion, in our example).38 Narrative analysis, I 
will now argue, is a particularly useful way to examine the way in such identity 
interpretations are constructed and maintained.  
I use the term identity narrative to refer to a particular interpretation of group 
identity which is articulated (implicitly or explicitly) in narrative form. Margaret 
Somers first introduced this concept as the “emplotment” of a group, and its 
relationships with other groups, in a particular time and place.39 Narrative 
approaches to identity have since been considered in fields like political science and 
social psychology. Narratives, according to Funk and Said, are “the stories that 
members of social and political groups tell about themselves and their relations 
with selected “Others,” to create or reinforce a sense of collective identity and 
shared purpose.”40 This definition is useful because it sets identity against alterity. 
Narratives allows group members to identify one another, but also to identify 
members of the “Other.” 
In order for a particular identity narrative to be persuasive in defining identity to 
members of a group, it must be reified through engagement. Engaging with the 
narrative allows group members to identity one another and to differentiate 
                                                             
38 Wickremeratne discusses the manner in which Sinhalese Christian leaders “exulted in 
being Sinhalese” following the July 1983 riots: Ananda Wickremeratne, "Historiography in 
Conflict and Violence," in Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, ed. Mahinda 
Deegalle (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). 
39 Margaret Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network 
Approach," Theory and Society 23 (1994): 616. 
40 Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, "Islam and the West: Narratives of Conflict and 
Conflict Transformation," International Journal of Peace Studies 9, no. 1 (2004): 3. 
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themselves from outsiders who do not engage with the same narrative.41 Narrative 
engagement may involve a re-enactment of actions, situations or affective states 
described in the narrative, all of which strengthen the participant’s self-
identification with the narrative itself.42 
Muna Güvenç provides a case study in narrative engagement through her analysis 
of public architecture in Diyarbakır, Turkey. She examines the “Kurdification” of 
public spaces in the city, notably including many references to the Medes, believed 
to be the historical ancestors of the modern Kurdish people.43 She suggests that the 
naming of public spaces after this ancestral group (such as “Medya Park” or the 
entertainment centre “Medland”) serves to create a narrative linking the Kurdish 
people, distinct from Turks, to the land through their ancestors. This constructs the 
area as historically “Kurdish.”44 The narrative constructed by public architecture 
allows the Kurds to engage with and strengthen their sense of historical identity “in 
their everyday practices: in parks, protests, prayers, hunger strikes, marches, 
funeral gatherings, house meetings and so on… the everyday experience of urban 
space, which transforms citizens and enables them to practice as a community and 
reinvent their identity and culture.”45 
As well as demonstrating a practical means by which groups can engage with an 
identity narrative, Güvenç‘s study also reveals why such narratives might be 
deliberately constructed by interested groups. Kurds are a marginalised group in 
Turkey, and in response to this some Kurds have constructed a narrative of their 
                                                             
41 J. Bruner, "Life As Narrative," Social Research 54, no. 1 (1987); Phillip Hammack and 
Andrew Pilecki, "Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Political Psychology," Political Psychology 
33, no. 1 (2012): 77-8. 
42 Suzanne Keen, "Narrative Empathy," in Toward a Cognitive Theory of Narrative Acts, ed. 
Frederick Luis Aldama (Texas, USA: University of Texas Press, 2010), 70. 
43 Muna Güvenç, "Constructing Narratives of Kurdish Nationalism in the Urban Space of 
Diyarbakir, Turkey," Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review 23, no. 1 (2011): 35. 
44 Ibid., 37. 
45 Ibid. 
21 
 
own identity that emphasises their alleged descent from the Medes, a civilisation of 
high status and significance. This serves as a counter-narrative through which 
Kurds may construct their identity in more positive terms than the identity 
narrative constructed by the Turkish state for the Kurds which seeks to assimilate 
them into the Turkish nation.46 
In this section I have defined the concept of an identity narrative with reference 
both to general literature about narrative approaches to identity and the case study 
provided by Güvenç. The features of the narrative approach that are most salient 
moving forwards are its focus on interpretation (and re-interpretation), and the 
role that engagement with the narrative plays in reifying it (making it convincing to 
members of the group it is intended to define the identity of). These two features 
form the respective foci of my following two sections. In §2.2 I will examine the 
narratives constructed for Sinhalese identity from the colonial era through to the 
20th century, and argue that differences between them reflect their different social 
and political contexts. In §2.3 I will look at how these narratives – and particularly 
the narrative of the Bodu Bala Sena – have been reified, and argue that the Bodu 
Bala Sena’s hostility towards Muslims is best understood as an attempt to engage 
with and thereby reify their narrative. 
2.2 IDENTITY NARRATIVES IN SRI LANKA 
The purpose of this section is to outline the historical development of significant 
identity narrative in Sri Lanka.47 I say “significant” because this is not intended to be 
an exhaustive list of every possible interpretation of Sinhalese identity that has 
been offered since the colonial era. I identify five narratives that I consider to be 
                                                             
46 Derya Bayir, "Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary," Human Rights 
Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2013). 
47 An early draft of this section was presented at the New Historians Conference at Victoria 
University of Wellington in September 2015, and I am grateful for the insightful questions 
posed by conference participants and university staff. 
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representative of the organisations and movements that constructed them: that of 
the Portuguese and Dutch (which are similar enough to be discussed together); the 
British; Sinhalese nationalists opposing colonial rule; Sinhalese nationalists during 
the civil war against the Tamils; and finally the Bodu Bala Sena. 
SINHALESE IDENTITY NARRATIVES CONSTRUCTED BY SUCCESSIVE GROUPS 
The Portuguese and Dutch Empires “The inhabitants of Sri Lanka are 
heathens to be converted and 
controlled.” 
The British Empire “The Sinhalese are a once-great 
civilisation now in decline that will 
benefit from British colonial rule.” 
Sinhalese nationalists seeking 
independence from the British 
“The Sinhalese are an independent 
nation with a rich and significant 
history that has a right to self-
governance.” 
Nationalists leading up to and during 
the civil war 
“The Sinhalese are a pious nation who 
have historically defended the 
dhammadipa from impious Tamil 
invaders.” 
The Bodu Bala Sena “The Sinhalese are a pious nation who 
have historically defended the 
dhammadipa from impious invaders.” 
 
I will discuss the first four of these narratives in the following subsections, and 
make two main arguments about them. First, all of the identity narratives I will 
examine share several key features, the most notable of which is their common 
reliance on the Mahavamsa for historical legitimisation. Second, and more 
significantly, they differ from one another in crucial points, each of which 
represents an attempt by the groups in question to redefine Sinhalese identity to 
suit their own political agendas, and more broadly to suit the political and social 
context in which each group operates. This will set the background for my 
discussion of change and continuity in the Bodu Bala Sena’s narrative in chapters 3 
and 4. 
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While a historical survey of this sort may seem tangential to my study of a 
contemporary group, two quotes, from Fernando and Kemper respectively, 
convince me of the necessity of this historical context. Fernando, in his book on the 
potential for reconciliation in the early post-war era, wrote that often, “The answer 
to the question ‘who are we?’ is given by the answer to the question ‘who were 
we?’”48 He argues that it impossible to understand contemporary Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalism without addressing its origins in the colonial era. Similarly, 
Kemper states that “the scholarly inability to take nationalism on its own terms 
derive[s] from portraying nationalism as absolutely discontinuous with the past… 
nationalism, in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, is simply the most recent stage in the 
ongoing construction of the past.”49 Before turning, in Chapter 3, to the Bodu Bala 
Sena and its links to civil war era nationalism, I wish to trace this particular 
methodology of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism (“the ongoing construction of the 
past” as an identity narrative) and demonstrate that it has its origins considerably 
further back than the 1970s. 
2.2.1 Pre-Colonial Identity 
Before embarking on a discussion of the historical construction of identity 
narratives in Sri Lanka, I wish to briefly address the question of pre-colonial 
Sinhalese identity. Nationalism, and the concept of a national identity, have their 
origins in modern Europe and were only exported to the rest of the world, including 
South Asia, through the mechanism of colonialism.50 Prior to the introduction of 
such ideas through colonial invasion, occupation, and governance, and contrary to 
the popular primordialist beliefs of many Sinhalese nationalists, the modern 
                                                             
48 Fernando, Religion, Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, 258. 
49 Steven Kemper, The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala Life 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 15. 
50 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (London, UK: Verso, 1983). 
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Sinhalese (Buddhist) national identity simply did not exist. 51  While an awareness 
of the cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic distinctions between Sinhalese and 
other groups did exist in pre-colonial Sri Lanka, such divisions existed only among 
“a plethora of other identities such as kin group, caste, village, occupation, gender 
and so on.”52 
Primiordialists and nationalists aside, scholars increasingly agree that constructions 
of a Sinhalese national identity53 had their genesis in European ideas introduced 
through successive Portuguese, Dutch and British colonisations. The first European 
narratives of Sinhalese identity were designed to legitimise and facilitate colonial 
rule, but the development of an indigenous Sinhalese nationalism led to the 
construction of alternate narratives that redefined Sinhalese identity in terms. 
2.2.2 The Portuguese and Dutch Narratives 
The identity narratives constructed and imposed by the Portuguese and the Dutch 
share several key features and so can be treated together. Both homogenised 
                                                             
51 Kemper, The Presence of the Past, 108. 
52 Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and Cultural 
Continuity (New York, USA: Palgrave, 2001), 9-10. Some authors have argued that literate 
elites in pre-colonial Sri Lanka did attempt to “mobilise the whole ethnic group against 
external threats” from South India: C.R. de Silva, quoted in R.A.L.H. Gunawardena, "The 
People of the Lion: the Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and Historiography," in Sri 
Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (New York, USA: Routledge, 
1990), 67; H.L. Seneviratne, Buddhism, Identity, and Conflict (Colombo, Sri Lanka: 
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2002), 5, 13. Gunawardena disagrees with this, 
arguing that such ethnicity-wide actions were motivated by personal ties of loyalty, 
obligation and expectation of reward, not by specific calls to a “national” identity that 
superseded all others: Gunawardena, "The People of the Lion," 67. Dharmadasa in turn 
disagrees with Gunawardena, believing the existence of a distinct Sinhalese language as 
early as the 5th century is evidence of Sinhalese identity that has remained contiguous from 
this point onwards: K.N.O. Dharmadasa, "The People of the Lion: Ethnic Identity, Ideology, 
and Historical Revisionism in Contemporary Sri Lanka," Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities 
15 (1989). 
53 The emphasis here is on national identity, in the modern sense of “nations” and 
“nationalism.” This is not to deny that group identity in various configurations was 
significant in the pre-colonial era or in the Kandyan kingdom: see John D. Rogers, “Post-
Orientalism and the Interpretation of Premodern and Modern Political Identities: The Case 
of Sri Lanka,” Journal of Asian Studies 53:1 (1994); John Clifford Holt, The Religious World of 
Kirti Sri: Buddhism, Art, and Politics in Late Medieval Sri Lanka (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1996); Michael Roberts, Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period, 1590s 
to 1815 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004). 
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Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims into a common, non-Christian, and uncivilised 
people who would benefit from European rule, although both simultaneously and 
perhaps unintentionally created the beginnings of distinct and divisive Sinhalese 
and Tamil identities through the pragmatic implementation of administrative 
divisions on linguistic lines. Local narratives, particularly those that reinforced a 
non-Christian (and therefore potentially problematic) aspect of Sri Lankan identity, 
were actively targeted for re-interpretation by missionaries in an attempt to reify 
this identity narrative. 
The Portuguese encountered Sri Lanka in the early 16th century and gradually 
expanded their rule inland from their initial port of Colombo. Early writings 
describe the native people of Sri Lanka with only a secondary consideration for 
their ethnic and religious diversity. Duarte Barbosa, writing around 1516 from the 
distance of Kerala, describes the natives as only either “Moors” or “Heathens.”54 
Dom Afonso de Noronha, Viceroy in the mid-16th century, mentions the Chingalas 
(Sinhala) but is generally more concerned with political divisions on the island 
between the kingdoms of Kotte and Sitawaka, a dynastic rather than ethnic or 
cultural distinction.55 Almost a century later, Constantino de Sá de Miranda 
discusses the beliefs of gentiles, Moors and Chinghalas, who are considered 
universally Buddhist.56  
In all of these accounts the distinction is between (presumably, though not explicitly 
in the older accounts) Buddhist Chinghalas and Muslim Moors. The implication is 
that the term Chinghala was used to those perceived to be native to the island, while 
the Moors were Arab Muslims who had settled later. No mention is made by Holt’s 
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writers of its ethnic Tamil population or of Śaivism as a third religion alongside 
Buddhism and Islam, despite many encounters with and eventual conquest of the 
Northeastern Jaffna Kingdom. Fernando suggests that to outsiders like the 
Portuguese, the island appeared almost a singular homogenous entity (presumably 
other than the Heathen-Muslim distinction noted above).57 The Portuguese, with 
dual missions to convert and control, were primarily interested in practical 
categorisations: who was subject to which kingdom, and how easily they could be 
converted to Christianity.58 The only distinction between Sinhalese and Tamil in this 
conception was a pragmatic one, with linguistic dominance determining 
administrative divisions in the Portuguese portions of the island.59 
The imposition of this homogenising narrative on Sinhalese and Tamils was 
achieved in part through what Houtart calls a systemic replacement of the existing 
Buddhist “system of meanings” that underpinned Sri Lankan society with a Catholic 
system. This was achieved through conversions, the claiming of Buddhist temples as 
government or even Church land, and finally through direct reinterpretation of 
existing narratives.60 Constantino de Sá de Miranda, a Catholic missionary, argued 
that the local belief that the Buddha stood on Adam’s Peak and left his footprint 
there was clearly false, and that the footprint instead must have been left by St. 
Thomas the Apostle. Though he offers little evidence to support his belief that the 
Apostle visited Sri Lanka and left his footprint there, he is hasty to apply Western 
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geometry and science to demonstrate the poor logic behind the Sinhalese account.61 
De Sá de Miranda’s argument represents a deliberate attempt to undermine a 
particular Sinhalese narrative linking the religion to the land (through the Buddha’s 
visit to and sanctification of the island) and replace it with a Christian one.62 
The most significant change between the Portuguese and Dutch periods was the 
change of state religion to Protestantism and the subsequent persecution and 
repression of Catholics.63 The Dutch strategy was twofold: maintain political and 
social discipline through military hegemony and religious conversion; and ensure 
the economic decline of the independent and now landlocked Kandyan Kingdom.64 
The latter was largely accomplished by the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 
(Dutch East India Company; VOC), who acted as the “King’s Middlemen” and “His 
Majesty’s Servants” in Kandy while using their monopoly both to control Kandyan 
interaction with the outer world and to promote the association between 
Protestantism and material wealth.65 The Dutch maintained the segregation of 
Sinhala and Tamil speakers in separate administrative sectors, again primarily for 
pragmatic reasons.66 
The narrative of the Portuguese and Dutch was primarily one of homogeneity and 
religious inferiority. Sinhalese and Tamils were conflated by this narrative into one 
heathen identity group, primarily defined by their lack of Christianity (whether 
Catholic or Protestant). This identity narrative served the interests of the 
Portuguese and Dutch colonists by dismissing the native inhabitants of Sri Lanka as 
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a group to convert and to be made useful to the colonial project, thereby 
legitimising colonial rule. 
2.2.3 The British Narrative 
In this subsection I will outline some key features of the British narrative of 
Sinhalese identity, particularly noting differences from the earlier European 
narratives described above. The British narrative generally is more nuanced than 
those of the Portuguese and Dutch, but their most significant innovation was the use 
of the Mahavamsa as historical evidence that they interpreted to support their 
particular narrative. I consider this to be the most significant innovation because 
subsequent identity narratives – including that of the Bodu Bala Sena – have 
similarly drawn on interpretations of the Mahavamsa as supporting evidence. I will 
argue that this shared reliance on the Mahavamsa reflects a deliberate attempt by 
early Sinhalese nationalist to co-opt the methodology of the British and use it to 
legitimise their own alternate interpretation of Sinhalese identity. 
The British, more so than the Portuguese or Dutch before them, were interested in 
learning about, and thereby effectively ruling, their new subjects.67 In keeping with 
the historical and anthropological methods of the time, the British sought out 
Sinhalese ancient texts to shed light on their history and provide evidence for the 
identity narrative that they (the British) constructed for the Sinhalese.68 This 
practice of supporting identity narratives through reference to ancient texts, 
particularly the Mahavamsa, was later adopted by Sinhalese nationalists and 
became a defining feature of modern Sinhalese identity. 
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The British narrative of ancient Sinhalese civilisation was that of the rise and fall of 
a great nation, analogous to Greece and Rome. To British historians, Sinhalese 
civilisation was a thing of the past: “its achievements [to be] celebrated, but 
nonetheless a dead end.”69 The only way forward for Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese 
nation was through European enlightenment and the renunciation of historical 
traditions that, while they may have served well in the past, only held Sri Lanka 
back from the present. The Mahavamsa was understood by the British to be a literal 
and historical account of this rise and fall, and the various histories of Sri Lanka 
published by British writers during this period used it as a primary source. These 
histories interpreted the content of the Mahavamsa in modern terms of nationhood, 
with the conflicts depicted explained in national terms and the British narrative at 
the fore.70 
Several British scholars published histories of Sri Lanka with both the colonial 
intent of understanding the new subject and the academic intent to document 
another strand of the human story (and place it into the broader understanding of 
the time). Two of the principal nineteenth-century histories of Sri Lanka, Knighton’s 
History of Ceylon from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (1845) and Tennent’s 
Ceylon (1859) both used the Mahavamsa as source material.71 In both texts Sri 
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Lanka’s history was contextualised in present terms – Sinhala Buddhists had a 
distinct identity that conformed to modern notions of nationality, and disputes with 
other parties were phrased as national conflicts.72  
The British attempted to shape and control what it meant to be “Buddhist” as they 
did “Sinhala.” David Scott describes the efforts of British administrators and 
academics to document an “authentic” Buddhism derived from scripture and 
separate it from “inauthentic cultural practices” like “demon-worship.”73 This 
process was also carried out by individuals not officially representing the British 
Empire, most notably Henry Steel Olcott. Olcott’s Protestant influence on 
Dharmapalite reforms have been discussed by a number of academics,74 and I 
interpret this here as another mechanism through which the colonial power 
imposed its narrative of Sinhalese Buddhist identity onto Sinhalese Buddhists.75 
The British constructed a narrative of Sinhalese identity that suited their colonial 
ideology. They defined the Sinhalese as a once-great civilisation mired in pre-
modern traditions that required enlightened Western intervention (in the form of 
the British Empire) in order to progress. This narrative was supported by reference 
to Buddhist texts, particularly the Mahavamsa, which quickly became established as 
the primary source of Sinhalese history (and therefore of Sinhalese identity, as it 
was interpreted by the British). This narrative was not, however, accepted 
wholeheartedly by the Sinhalese. As I will document in the following subsection, the 
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Sinhalese took the British narrative, and the methodology that the British used to 
support this narrative, and constructed their own counter-narrative that redefined 
Sinhalese identity on Sinhalese terms. 
2.2.4 The Sinhalese Counter-Narrative 
In this subsection I will outline key features of what I call the Sinhalese counter-
narrative. By this I mean alternative definitions of Sinhalese identity that 
nationalists in the colonial era put forward to support their project of 
independence. These nationalists, I argue, deliberately adopted the British 
methodology of using the Mahavamsa as historical evidence in order to make the 
counter-narrative as convincing as possible on British terms.76 
The central ideology of the British Empire was that a civilised nation had the right 
(and indeed the obligation) to rule over less civilised people for the benefit of those 
“lesser” people, making it hardly surprising that many of their colonial subjects 
would absorb this concept and declare themselves what Ninian Smart calls 
“counter-nations” in their own right.77 Tambiah argues that the current conception 
of what it is to be “Sinhalese,” with linguistic, ethnic and religious components, is 
entirely a construction of this period. While these elements did exist earlier, it was 
only through exposure to European ideas about national and racial identity that 
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they coalesced into their current form.78 This fits with Anderson’s model of modular 
nationalism: “once created, [nationalism becomes] modular, capable of being 
transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social 
terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political 
and ideological constellations.”79 Fernando notes that the assertion of nationalism, a 
concept taken from the British themselves, would have been a source of pride for a 
people otherwise downtrodden by their masters.80 The British conception of 
nations and nationalities, once introduced to Sri Lanka, became the primary means 
of self-identification among Sinhalese, Tamils, and Moors alike, and soon thereafter 
became the primary means of asserting the right to independence. 
The religious dimension of the developing Sinhalese sense of national identity is 
best explained by G. Aloysius’s model of “emancipatory religion,” originally used to 
describe Tamil Buddhists in South India. He argues that transformations of religion 
under colonialism from traditional to emancipatory forms occurs when there is 
both consciousness of oppression and a desire for a change in social praxis, which 
together alter every “lens of social life,” including the religious.81 A change in social 
orientation necessitates some change in religious orientation to accommodate the 
now-perceived injustices of the material world and to set the religion against the 
dominant ideology of the oppressor.82 The central belief of this new interpretation 
of the religion becomes some variation on “emancipation as salvation,” which then 
becomes projected as “a socio-cultural principle… from antiquity guiding and 
governing the life of the community… the pulse behind the collective heritage of the 
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group.”83 Most crucially the new interpretation of identity is contextualised as 
having always been present in the history of the group and as essential for the 
continuation of that legacy; the religious, emancipatory, and identity narratives 
become conflated into one historicised understanding of what it means to be 
Sinhalese. 
This historicised understanding was, in Sri Lanka, supported by the evidence of the 
Mahavamsa, the same text that the British had used to support their own 
interpretation of Sinhalese identity. Prior to British interest in the Mahavamsa, the 
text was not well-known by the average Sinhalese or even by the sangha (as it was 
not a liturgical text, but primarily a chronicle of Buddhism in Sri Lanka).84 This was 
not so after the British histories of the Sinhalese people drew on the Mahavamsa as 
an authoritative source. James D’Alwis (1823-78) was a Sinhalese historian who, 
following earlier British writers, asserted that Sinhala civilisation possessed a 
“remarkable” continuity with its North Indian origins. 85 These Northern origins, 
distinct from the South Indian roots of the Tamils, were emphasised in D’Alwis’s 
later works on the linguistics of Sinhalese, which he believed preserved “Indo-Aryan 
purity” thanks to the “the implacable hatred of [Sinhalese] forefathers towards their 
Dravidian neighbours which induced [the Sinhala language] to repel their 
advances.”86 While D’Alwis’s primary motive in this study was presumably to 
advance the prestige of Sinhala as an Indo-Aryan language, and the prestige of the 
Sinhalese people more generally, his work also served to distance the Sinhalese 
from the Tamils and set the two up as historically antagonistic nations. 
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Sinhalese nationalists countered the European construction of their identity by 
developing their own narrative of what it meant to be Sinhalese, drawing on the 
historicised Mahavamsa and incorporating a religious dimension. The use of the 
Mahavamsa is particularly significant, as it represents a deliberate appropriation by 
the nationalists of the means by which the British supported their colonial 
narrative. The anti-colonial narrative’s origins in the colonial, and the form that it 
took as a result, is what led Qadri Ismail to claim that “the fundamental struggle of 
the Sinhalese narrative is to repair the damage done by centuries of colonial rule.”87 
This narrative provided the basis for Sinhalese claims of nationhood and the right to 
self-governance in the early twentieth century, and it was this narrative that was 
called upon by nationalists opposing Tamil separatism later in that same century. 
In this section I have traced the historical development of Sinhalese identity 
narratives, from colonial constructions through to nationalist-counter narratives. In 
the following chapter, I will discuss some of the key themes of 20th century 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, which drew on these earlier narratives and re-
interpreted them for their own purposes during the Civil War. Before this, I will first 
discuss the role that violence has played, and continues to play, in establishing and 
maintaining these narratives of identity. 
2.3 IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE 
In this section I will argue that violent alterity has come to play a key role in 
nationalist identity narratives, and that the Bodu Bala Sena’s violence against 
Muslims is best understood as an attempt to construct and maintain their own 
interpretation of this narrative. The Bodu Bala Sena has, on more than one occasion, 
offered their own explanation of their hostility towards Muslims. Gnanasara has 
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claimed in interviews that the Bodu Bala Sena became interested in the Muslim 
threat after only after “moderate” Muslims brought this threat to the attention of 
the Bodu Bala Sena.88 Withanage has similarly claimed that “one Muslim group 
came and said… we [the Bodu Bala Sena] were talking only about protecting 
Buddhism, but you [also the Bodu Bala Sena] have to protect Islam also.”89 Bodu 
Bala Sena hostility towards Muslims, in this explanation, is essentially altruistic (it is 
on behalf of the moderate Muslim community) and limited to just those “extremist” 
Muslims who pose a threat to Sri Lanka and to the Sinhalese. This explanation, 
offered in interviews to foreign press and academics, seems somewhat 
unconvincing in light of Gnanasara’s speech at Aluthgama and the deadly riots 
against Muslims and Tamils alike that following. In this section I will offer my own 
explanation for the Bodu Bala Sena’s hostility against Muslims: that violence, and 
the legitimisation of violence against an alleged enemy, serves a particular social 
function for the Bodu Bala Sena and for its supporters. Through legitimising and 
carrying out acts of violence against Muslims, the Bodu Bala Sena attempts to reify 
their particular narrative of Sinhalese identity, which is based on the civil war 
narrative but re-interpreted to account for the loss of the LTTE as the salient other. 
Carrying out, or threatening to carry out, violence is one of many behaviours that 
members of a group may engage in. There is a deep reciprocal connection between 
group identity and group behaviour: a group’s understanding of its own nature, and 
of its relationship with other groups, influences and is influences by the manner in 
which it behaves towards members of those other groups. If a group member 
accepts a particular understanding of what it means to be a member of that group 
(an interpretation of identity, which I present as a “narrative of identity”), this 
understanding to some degree dictates what behaviour is appropriate for that 
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group member. In particular, if the group member accepts an understanding of the 
relationship between their own group and another group this understanding will 
help to determine how that group member interacts with members of the other 
group. Identity is not just descriptive, but normative. 
Simultaneously, as the behaviour of group members conforms to an identity 
narrative, the narrative appears more persuasive to other members of the group 
and so becomes more widely and deeply accepted. If an identity narrative describes 
a group as engaged in a historical conflict with another group, then acts of violence 
by group members against that other group will serve to reify the narrative, making 
it appear more real to members of that group. 
The reciprocal relationship between identity and behaviour is my explanation for 
the Bodu Bala Sena’s hostility towards Muslims in post-war Sri Lanka. The defeat of 
the LTTE signalled the end of Tamil separatism as a credible threat (at least for the 
immediate future). This created an identity crisis for Sinhalese Buddhist 
nationalists: without the LTTE as an “Other” to defend the dhammadipa against, as 
their narrative of Sinhalese identity told them was their historic national duty, how 
were they to act out and reify this narrative?  
The Bodu Bala Sena’s solution to this potential crisis was to shift the “Other” of the 
narrative from Tamils to Muslims, allowing them to continue defending the 
dhammadipa as the previously existing narrative required. The Bodu Bala Sena’s 
mission might be best understood as the promotion and reification of this new 
narrative of Sinhalese identity: similar in many ways to the existing anti-Tamil 
narrative of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, but re-interpreted to remain relevant 
in the post-war era. Their hostility towards Muslims and their construction of 
Muslims as a threat to Sinhalese Buddhists are attempts to reify their own narrative 
that sets Sinhalese Buddhists against Muslims.   
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The relationship between identity and behaviour, particularly violent behaviour, 
has been discussed in literature. Bush and Keyman, writing on the Copenhagen 
School’s concept of “societal security,” consider the construction of threats as 
integral to or even generated by the construction and maintenance of group 
identity: 
“…complete security – that is, the complete absence of threat or 
danger – even if it were possible, would destroy a necessary 
precondition for politicised group identity. If the absence of threat 
challenges a group’s sense of identity… the construction of threat 
may also consolidate identity.”90 
They explain that the construction of threats helps to “mobilise” group identity by 
making certain axes of identity (such as ethnicity, gender, class, language, or 
religion) more salient.91 The Bodu Bala Sena responded to the “complete absence of 
threat or danger” following the collapse of the LTTE by constructing a new threat, 
through which they sought to consolidate Sinhalese Buddhist identity in the post-
war era. 
Tobias Theiler argues, “Group members seek to align their actions and beliefs with 
what they perceive to be dominant group norms,” and that group members can 
“enhance [their] valuation of the ingroup and thus of the self not only by perceiving 
outgroups in a discriminatory way but also by treating them in this way.”92 Theiler’s 
two claims have significant implications. First, it suggests that identity is normative. 
If the identity narrative of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists portrays Sinhalese 
Buddhists as “defenders of the dhammadipa” then Sinhalese Buddhists who accept 
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the narrative will seek to emulate this role. Without an enemy to defend against, 
they have no means of aligning their actions with the group norm, and this 
undermines their sense of identity. Theiler’s second claim, that valuation of the 
group identity is enhanced by participation in discriminatory action against 
outsiders, including intergroup conflict, further underlines this point. The narrative 
of the Bodu Bala Sena provides a means by which Sinhalese Buddhists might still 
engage in discriminatory action against the salient other by re-interpreting Muslims 
as that other. 
In this section I have suggested that the Bodu Bala Sena’s hostility towards Muslims 
might be understood as an attempt to reify their new narrative of Sinhalese identity. 
With the end of the civil war nationalists lost the LTTE as a credible threat and as an 
“Other” against which to define Sinhalese identity. This necessitated 
reinterpretations of Sinhalese identity that would remain relevant in the post-war 
era. For some, this may have involved the construction of a new identity narrative 
that downplayed alterity and the role of violence in reifying the narrative, but the 
powerful relationship between identity and alterity made this difficult. The Bodu 
Bala Sena’s solution was to instead redefine the Sinhalese “Other” as Muslims, a 
threat made credible by global fears of Islamist extremism, and they have attempted 
to reify this narrative and make it persuasive as a definition of Sinhalese identity 
through the violence that they inspire and carry out. 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER TWO 
Why, to paraphrase former Minister Senaratna, did the Bodu Bala Sena abandon 
their “Tamil sickness” in favour of a “Muslim sickness?” They did so because Tamil 
separatism no longer posed a credible threat to Sinhalese Buddhism, and so could 
no longer function as the designated “Other” of the nationalist interpretation of 
Sinhalese identity. For over a century now, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have 
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defined themselves, and their nation, as a people under siege, who have fought for 
generations to preserve their sacred land from impious foreign. For the Bodu Bala 
Sena, Sri Lankan Muslims now serve as that invader, and by fighting against this 
“new threat” the Bodu Bala Sena is attempting to reify their new narrative and so 
redefine Sinhalese identity.
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3 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: BUDDHIST NATIONALISM 
IN SRI LANKA 
My aim in this chapter is to locate the Bodu Bala Sena as a new development in a 
broader history of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism by discussing change from, and 
continuity with, earlier movements. I will critically examine existing literature on 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism and argue that in many significant ways the Bodu 
Bala Sena continues this tradition. This is not to say that the Bodu Bala Sena is 
identical to earlier movements, as its ideology does include significant novel 
developments. My objective here instead is to demonstrate that the Bodu Bala Sena 
has a place in academic discussion about Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism broadly 
conceived. Locating the Bodu Bala Sena in existing nationalist tradition serves two 
purposes: first, it allows us to bring existing discussions of this tradition to bear on 
the Bodu Bala Sena (which I will do in this chapter); and second, it raises the 
questions of why and how the Bodu Bala Sena diverges from these earlier 
movements (the focus of Chapter 4). 
Many authors have attempted to “explain” Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, by 
which I mean they have attempted to answer some of the following questions: What 
role does religion play in enabling or even motivating violence against minorities? 
Why do Sinhalese Buddhist authorities make it their business to legitimise such 
violence on Buddhist grounds? Is ethnic violence an inevitable result of the state of 
contemporary Sinhalese Buddhism, or can Sinhala-minority relations improve 
regardless of, or perhaps even thanks to, the current religious position? By locating 
the Bodu Bala Sena in this tradition, we can begin to assess existing explanations for 
Buddhist nationalism in light of the new development of the Bodu Bala Sena, which 
I will begin to do in this chapter and in those following. 
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In §3.1 I will consider the role that the Mahavamsa has played in nationalist 
discourse. The Mahavamsa is referenced in almost every major scholarly work on 
the relationship between violence and Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and I will argue that 
while direct references to the Mahavamsa are relatively scarce, indirect references 
to the content and to popular interpretations of the Mahavamsa are very present in 
Bodu Bala Sena discourse. This suggests that the Mahavamsa has come to occupy 
such a central position in nationalist ideology that even groups which do not 
directly reference it are influenced by readings of the text. 
In §3.2 I will discuss the phenomenon of what De Silva calls “Buddhist 
Fundamentalism,” an imagination of an ideal moral past and an imperative to 
restore this morality in contemporary Sri Lanka. I will discuss the genesis of this 
imagined past and its influence throughout 20th century nationalist ideology, before 
arguing that it continues to influence the Bodu Bala Sena’s ideology today. 
3.1 THE MAHAVAMSA IN NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY 
The Mahavamsa has historically played a significant role in Sinhalese Buddhist 
nationalist ideology. While the Bodu Bala Sena appears to make few direct 
references to the Mahavamsa itself, in this section I will argue that this text 
continues to influence their ideology as it has earlier movements. Interpretations of 
the Mahavamsa have influenced Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism to such an extent 
that any such group, including the Bodu Bala Sena, will bear traces of these 
interpretations even when they do not directly employ the Mahavamsa’s content in 
support of their position. I will give some background on the Mahavamsa and its 
historiography before turning to the Bodu Bala Sena’s rhetoric. 
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The Mahavamsa is a text originally complied in the 6th century from earlier oral and 
written traditions, including the Dipavamsa (“island chronicle”).93 This represents 
Chapters I-XXXVII of the Geiger translation, culminating in the reign of Mahasena, 
but a number of “updates” to the Mahavamsa, often referred to as the Culavamsa 
(“lesser chronicle”) have since been written. The most recent of these updates was 
produced in 1978 under then-President J.R. Jayewardene.94 The Mahavamsa 
primarily served as a history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, or as Fernando puts it, “the 
official history of the state written with a sectarian perspective,”95 an important 
development on the earlier Dipavamsa, which was “a straightforward account of the 
dynasties of kings.”96 The Mahavamsa turned this earlier history into a narrative 
that constructed an essential political order for Sri Lanka consisting of “a king, a 
people, and a religion bound together in symbiosis.”97 
The influence of this political order, and of the Mahavamsa more generally, on 
Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka is undeniable. Three sections in particular have 
been used to support nationalist claims of priority over minorities: the visit of the 
Buddha to Sri Lanka (Mhv. I); the arrival of Prince Vijaya and the founding of the 
Sinhalese race (Mhv.VI-VII); and finally the Dutugämunu epic (Mhv. XXI-XXXII). 
These accounts together form the basis of the dhammadipa doctrine: the belief that 
Sri Lanka is a sacred island set apart for the preservation of Theravada Buddhism, 
                                                             
93 Gananath Obeyesekere, "The Myth of the Human Sacrifice: History, Story, and Debate in a 
Buddhist Chronicle," Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice 
25, no. 1 (1989): 78. This makes the Mahavamsa post-canonical, but it is still highly 
authoritative in Sinhalese Buddhism: Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva, 
"Buddhist Fundamentalism and Identity in Sri Lanka," in Buddhist Fudamentalism and 
Minority Identities in Sri Lanka, ed. Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva (New 
York, USA: State University of New York Press, 1998), 4-5. 
94 Steven Kemper, "J.R. Jayewardene, Righteousness and Realpolitik," in Sri Lanka: History 
and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (New York, USA: Routledge, 1990). 
95 Fernando, Religion, Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, 122. Fernando was in turn referencing 
Peter Schalk, ed. Buddhism Among Tamils in Pre-Colonial Tamilakam and Ilam: Part One 
(Prologue), the Pre-Pallava and the Pallava Period (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2002). 
96 Obeyesekere, "The Myth of the Human Sacrifice: History, Story, and Debate in a Buddhist 
Chronicle," 79. 
97 H.L. Seneviratne, "Identity and the Conflation of Past and Present," 5. 
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and that the Sinhalese are tasked with this defence.98 Any threat to the unity of Sri 
Lanka, or to the dominance of Sinhalese Buddhists and Sinhalese Buddhism, is, 
according to this understanding, a threat to this sacred task that must be resisted by 
pious Buddhists.99 
The Mahavamsa also provides an example of how such threats might be resisted in 
the Dutugämunu account. Throughout these chapters the Mahavamsa stresses the 
piety of Dutugämunu: he fixes a relic of the Buddha to his spear (Mhv. XXV:1) and 
marches with the company of 500 bhikkhavo, who were “blessing and protection” 
for his army (Mhv. XXV:3-4). However, after slaying all of his foes and uniting Sri 
Lanka for the first time under a Sinhalese Buddhist king, Dutugämunu still “knew no 
joy, remembering that thereby [his victory] was wrought the destruction of 
millions” (Mhv. XXV:103). Eight arahanto then console him: 
“From this deed arises no hindrance in thy way to heaven. Only one 
and half human beings have been slain here by thee, O lord of men. 
The one had come unto the refuges, the other had taken on himself 
the five precepts. Unbelievers and men of evil life were the rest, not 
more to be esteemed than beasts. But as for thee, thou wilt bring 
glory to the doctrine of the Buddha in manifold ways; therefore cast 
away care from thy heart, O ruler of men!” (Mhv. XXV: 109-111).100 
                                                             
98 Neil DeVotta, Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict 
Resolution in Sri Lanka, Policy Studies 40 (Washington, DC, USA: East-West Center, 2007), 
29-30; Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma. Dhammadipa is usually translated by scholars 
as “island of the dhamma” and is used in reference to the nationalist understanding of Sri 
Lanka as consecrated for the protection and preservation of Buddhism. I use the term 
similarly, although I will note that Peter Schalk disagrees with this translation of 
dhammadipa, suggesting that this is only a “Sinhalatva” (nationalist) interpretation and that 
this interpretation is at odds with canonical usage of dhammadipa: Peter Schalk, "Semantic 
Transformations of the Dhammadipa," in Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri 
Lanka, ed. Mahinda Deegalle (London, UK: Routledge, 2006). 
99 Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma, 20. 
100 Emphasis my own. 
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Deegalle, who is critical of the Mahavamsa treatment of violence, suggests that this 
may have been a “rehabilitation strategy” or “an instance of skill-in-means” by the 
arahants: 
“In the long run, it would not help the Buddhist monastic community 
keeping the victorious king in remorse or in a depressed condition… 
The monastic community as a group could not change his 
[Dutugämunu’s] past karma, but as a community who believed in the 
free-will and individual effort, it was possible for them to direct and 
channel the king in a positive direction: their rehabilitation strategy 
was to identify that positive dimension, a sphere of potential growth 
and creativity. However, the unforeseen consequence of that 
strategy was a ‘gross calculation’ of the victims of war as ‘only one 
and a half human beings’ and ‘unbelievers and men of evil.’”101 
Regardless of the monks’ intentions, the model of Dutugämunu fighting for the 
“glory of the doctrine” became central to Buddhist nationalist ideology in the 20th 
century, with many nationalist groups constructing the civil war against Tamil 
separatists as a modern re-enactment of the Dutugämunu-Elara conflict. The post-
colonial state came to be seen as an accomplishment of the project begun by 
Dutugämunu, and defence of that unified state became the highest priority for pious 
Buddhists.102 
Bartholomeusz argues that this account is used by nationalists to consider avihimsa 
(non-violence) as a prima facie obligation, one that is “ineradicable but over-
ridable” if a greater moral duty (such as the defence of the dhamma itself) presents 
itself.103 She bases this largely on a moral logic that she sees in the consolation of 
Dutugämunu by the arahants, in which devastation is justified “in order that the 
                                                             
101 Mahinda Deegalle, "Is Violence Justified in Theravada Buddhism?," Current Dialogue 39 
(2002): 9. 
102 Fernando, Religion, Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, 204. See also Kemper, The Presence of 
the Past, 69-78. 
103 Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma, 72. 
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dhamma might prosper.” Her summary of this moral logic in a just war (dhamma 
yuddhaya) framework is that 
“Buddhists have imagined a past that was protected by warrior 
kings, legitimated by Buddhist symbolism, including the sangha, and 
whose violence was justified given its awesome role in defending the 
pacific faith. In sum… the need to protect a pacific Buddhism can 
legitimise violence.”104 
The idea that violence is legitimate when carried out in defence of the dhammadipa 
remains influential in Bodu Bala Sena ideology, even though the text itself is only 
rarely cited.105 Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, an “ally” of the Bodu Bala Sena,106 has said, 
“Since the time of King Dutugämunu, they [the sangha] have taken the leadership in 
all struggles to protect the country.”107 The Bodu Bala Sena, which primarily 
consists of monks, similarly takes leadership in their own struggle to protect the 
country from the Muslim threat (which I will discuss in the following chapter). 
The Bodu Bala Sena is also increasingly attempting to take a leadership role in 
democratic politics. Before the 2015 presidential elections, Gnanasara expressed his 
hope that it might result in the installation of a “Sinhala Buddhist king.”108 
Presumably, unless the Bodu Bala Sena has more radically revolutionary tendencies 
than they have indicated elsewhere, he does not desire to literally replace the 
presidential system with a monarchy and is using the term “Sinhala Buddhist king” 
                                                             
104 Ibid., 16. 
105 Rohini Mohan claims that Gnanasara has made a reference to a “historical king” who had 
defended Sri Lanka from Tamil invasion, presumably Dutugämunu: Rohini Mohan, "Sri 
Lanka's Violent Buddhists," The New York Times, January 3, 2015. This is the only direct 
reference to the Mahavamsa by the Bodu Bala Sena that I have been able to find. 
106 Ibid.; "Hardline Lanka Buddhists to Launch Party, Say Inspired by BJP, RSS," Sri Lanka 
Mirror, January 20, 2015. 
107 Mahinda P Liyanage Galle, "Sangha Played Historic Role During War: Defence Secretary," 
Sri Lanka Daily News, 11th March 2013. This is a reference to Mhv. XXV:3, “Give us, that we 
may treat them with honour, bhikkhu who shall go on with us [to war], since the sight of 
bhikkhu is blessing and protection for us.” See also Rahula’s claim that “when monks 
accompany the army the war appears to be of religious nature:” Walpola Rahula, The 
Heritage of the Bhikkhu (New York, USA: Grove Press, 1974), 152, note 1. 
108 "Bodu Bala Sena Silenced?," Sri Lanka Mirror, December 16, 2014. 
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in a more general sense. A number of Sri Lankan presidents, including Jayewardene 
and then-incumbent Rajapaksa, have attempted to present themselves as cakkavatti 
(he who sets rolling the Wheel [of dhamma]; a just and faithful king)109 and I 
interpret Gnanasara’s comment similarly. In “the history,” the Bodu Bala Sena 
claims that monks “guided [kings] to the throne” and that their purpose today is “to 
produce lay persons who can guide and provide leadership.”110 Monks and kings, in 
this conception, together have a dual role in leading the Sinhalese nation. This has 
strong parallels to the “economic monk” model discussed by Seneviratne, who was 
characterised by “status-yearning, his desire to be king, and the symbolic 
superiority of the monk over the king in the Buddhist tradition.”111 It appears that 
this element of earlier nationalist ideology remains relevant to the Bodu Bala Sena. 
The dhammadipa doctrine in general terms also remains relevant to Bodu Bala Sena 
ideology. Wimalajothi has claimed that Sri Lanka is “not a multi-cultural country but 
rather a nation for the Sinhala Buddhists.”112 His claim that Sri Lanka is “for” 
Sinhalese Buddhists clearly points to the dhammadipa interpretation of the 
Mahavamsa. Gnanasara has also referred to the “sacred Sinhala franchise” that 
supported former president Rajapaksa.113 This reference to the Sinhalese franchise 
as “sacred” implies that either the Sinhalese are themselves a sacred group or 
possibly that those Sinhalese who are not members of the political franchise (in this 
case, those who do not support Rajapaksa) are not sacred. Again, this is drawn from 
the dhammadipa understanding of the Sinhalese having a clear (sacred) purpose, as 
well as rightful ownership over Sri Lanka. 
                                                             
109 Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma, 37; Bruce Kapferer, Legends of People, Myths of 
State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia, New and Revised 
ed. (New York, USA: Berghahn Books, 2011), 304. 
110 "Rajapaksa is the Genuine Common Candidate: Bodu Bala Sena," Adaderana, October 28, 
2014; "Bodu Bala Sena to Enter Politics," Adaderana, October 21, 2014. 
111 Seneviratne, The Work of Kings, 93. 
112 "Buddhist Monk to Fight Jihad Threat," Al Jazeera English, September 28, 2014. 
113 Qadijah Irshad, "Buddhist Party for Ban on Halal Food," Khaleej Times, February 18, 2013. 
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Gnanasara often uses the terms “nation” and “religion” seemingly interchangeably: 
his aim is to “unite all forces that believe in Buddhism… to protect Sinhala and 
Buddhist rights” and the Bodu Bala Sena is both “working to protecting our nation” 
and providing “necessary protection to our religion.”114 Withanage translated the 
interview himself, giving these word choices particular significance. This again 
suggests that in Bodu Bala Sena ideology, as in earlier interpretations of the 
Mahavamsa, Sri Lanka is a consecrated island for the dhamma and for the Sinhalese 
as defenders of that dhamma. 
These points together indicate that the Mahavamsa remains a significant influence 
on Bodu Bala Sena ideology. This influence is not, however, manifested in entirely 
the same manner as it was in previous nationalist movements. While 
Bartholomeusz argued that nationalists during the civil war relied on the text to 
provide a moral logic that would legitimise violence against the LTTE on Buddhist 
grounds, the Bodu Bala Sena does not appear to directly use the Mahavamsa for this 
purpose. The Bodu Bala Sena’s ideology does draw on the dhammadipa doctrine 
derived from nationalist readings of the Mahavamsa, suggesting that the text 
continues to indirectly influence their movement even when not explicitly 
referenced. This may also indirectly co-opt some of the moral legitimacy of the civil 
war, even when the explicit justifications for the Bodu Bala Sena’s violence do not 
directly reference this logic. I will discuss the Bodu Bala Sena’s own justification for 
violence against Muslims further in Chapter 4. In summary, while the Bodu Bala 
Sena only rarely directly refers to the Mahavamsa, their ideology is clearly derived 
from a nationalist reading of its contents and demonstrates the extent to which 
interpretations of this text have dominated nationalist ideology in Sri Lanka. 
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3.2 REFORMING AND RESTORING THE SASANA 
Throughout the 20th century nationalists argued that the sangha had been 
disempowered by colonialism and that a “restoration” of Buddhism to its pre-
colonial state was necessary for the ongoing benefit of Sri Lanka. I will argue that 
the Bodu Bala Sena continues this rhetoric, arguing that monastic education in 
particular is a concern that must be addressed for the well-being of Sri Lanka as a 
whole. 
This fits the Bodu Bala Sena into De Silva’s definition of a “Buddhist 
Fundamentalism.” He describes this as having three key features: 
1. The distant past, depicted in the Mahavamsa, is believed to have been an 
idyllic and utopian period, in which people lived simple and moral lives; 
2. The sangha played a key role in the polity, both as advisors to the ruler and 
as moral guides for the laity; and 
3. If the relationships within and between the sangha, laity, and polity can be 
restored (in that order), then this moral utopia will return. 115 
Nationalist belief in a utopian past that might yet be restored originated with the 
Anagarika Dharmapala, who was allegedly the first person to consistently use the 
term “Sinhala-Buddhist.”116 Dharmapala believed that colonialism had had a 
negative impact on the Sinhalese117 that he sought to reverse through cultural and 
religious reform.118 The revival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka was the first crucial, step 
towards the restoration of the Sinhalese to their “ancient glory.”119 He wrote, 
                                                             
115 Chandra R. De Silva, "The Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into Views 
Among Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka," in Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in 
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119 Anagarika Dharmapala, "The Western Invastion and the Decline of Buddhism," in Return 
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“Practices which were an abomination to the ancient noble Sinhalese have today 
become tolerated under the influence of the Semitic sociology… in the days of the 
Sinhalese kings and under the Buddhist rule no liquor was sold, no animals were 
slaughtered, land was not sold… now the Sinhalese, once the lord of the soil, is but a 
stranger in his land,”120 and asked instead that “the Mahavansa [sic] be a guide, 
and… the learned elderly Maha Theros of the different parts of the island be asked 
to advise the government as to the best means to be adopted for promoting the 
material and moral welfare of the Sinhalese Buddhists.”121 Dharmapala imagined a 
utopian past, lost to colonialism, and planned to re-create it in his own 
contemporary Sri Lanka, a pattern that would be followed by nationalists in the 20th 
century, and by the Bodu Bala Sena in the 21st. 
Dharmapala’s imperative to reform and restore Buddhism was later taken up by 
Walpola Rahula, whose 1946 book On the Heritage of the Bhikkhu “influenced the 
monkhood more than any other [text] in the recent history of Sri Lankan 
Theravadan Buddhism.”122 Building on Dharmapala, Rahula described in both the 
Heritage and in his earlier work The History of Buddhism in Ceylon a mutually 
beneficial relationship between the sangha and Sinhalese kings stretching back into 
the 3rd century and broken only by colonial rule.123 The interruption of this 
relationship led to the decline of both the religion and of the Sinhalese people, a 
decline that could only be prevented or reversed by the reinstatement of the sangha 
as guides and guardians of the new “kings” of the modern (independent) Sinhalese 
state. The political role that Rahula demanded for monastics in Sri Lanka was not, in 
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his understanding, a novel development, but rather the reinstatement (and perhaps 
a modern updating) of an existing relationship between monk and politics.124 
Throughout the 20th century, political leaders increasing adopted Rahula’s calls for a 
necessary reform of the Buddhasasana.125 Bechert claims that this is due to “the 
continued effectiveness of the traditional Buddhist doctrine of the responsibility of 
the state for the reform of the sangha,”126 although I suspect that it would be naïve 
to ignore the political expediency of publically supporting the majority religion. 
Although no government came quite so far as to declare Buddhism the official state 
religion, it has been an expectation of any government that they publically affirm 
their support for the religion in keeping with its position as “foremost” in Sri 
Lanka.127 Buddhism, Holt argues, was throughout the 20th century “invoked as a 
trope for the means to establish a social and religious condition modelled on an 
idealised image derived from the Mahavamsa.”128 This trope continues to influence 
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the Bodu Bala Sena, who like Rahula and Dharmapala before them see the 
restoration of Buddhism to be a vital step in repairing the damage of colonialism. 
The Bodu Bala Sena’s mission statement “would line up the four Buddhist 
congregations – Bhikkus, Bhikkkunis, Upasaka and Upasika – to lead the nation in 
protecting, safeguarding and sustaining Buddhist social values in the face of 
dynamic global trends of change.”129 The mention of “Buddhist social values” 
immediately recalls the moral past of Dharmapala, a connection underlined by 
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the Bodu Bala Sena’s strongest public supporter in the 
Rajapaksa regime. Rajapaksa has said that the Bodu Bala Sena’s mission was to 
“restore” Buddhist values and the “age old” social traditions of the country. This 
suggests the continued influence of the first fundamentalist belief listed by De Silva: 
that the distant past was an idyllic and utopian period, in which people lived simple 
and moral lives. The Bodu Bala Sena, like Dharmapala and Rahula before them, 
claims that its primary goal is to restore the morality of that time. 
The second of De Silva’s features of Buddhist fundamentalism is that in this ideal 
time, monks are believed to have played a key role in the polity as both moral 
guides and as political advisors. The Bodu Bala Sena similarly see themselves as 
rightfully playing a key role in the governance of the contemporary Sri Lanka polity. 
In “the history,” the Bodu Bala Sena claim that monks “guided [kings] to the throne” 
and that their purpose today was “to produce lay persons who can guide and 
provide leadership.”130 This suggests that monks and kings (sovereigns) together 
have a dual role in leading the Sinhalese nation, perhaps explaining the Bodu Bala 
Sena’s increasing interest in Sri Lanka elections. Leading up to the 2015 Sri Lanka 
presidential elections, the Bodu Bala Sena initially refrained from supporting any 
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particular candidates. This was not, in their own words, because they saw no role 
for themselves in politics, but because they believed that none of the candidates 
would fulfil the role of a “Sinhala Buddhist king” that they desired.131 Once 
Maithripala Sirisena, the common opposition candidate, announced that he would 
limit the powers of the Executive Presidency if elected, the Bodu Bala Sena 
immediately began to publicly voice support for the incumbent President 
Rajapaksa.132 Following Rajapaksa’s defeat by Sirisena, the Bodu Bala Sena then 
launched their own political party to (unsuccessfully) contest the general elections. 
This increasing involvement in the political process, seemingly motivated by 
frustration over the failure of political candidates to embody the righteous 
Sinhalese Buddhist kings that the Bodu Bala Sena desires, strongly suggests that the 
second of De Silva’s features of Buddhist fundamentalism continues to influence the 
Bodu Bala Sena. 
De Silva’s first and second features of Buddhist fundamentalism are rooted in a 
particular interpretation of the past: in the pre-colonial era there was an ideal and 
moral social order maintained by an ideal political order (a relationship between 
monks and polity). The breakdown of this political order under successive colonial 
regimes, according to De Silva’s fundamentalists and to the Bodu Bala Sena, led to a 
loss of the moral social order. This leads to De Silva’s third point: by restoring the 
relationships within and between the sangha, the polity, and the people, the moral 
values of the ideal past can also be restored. The Bodu Bala Sena, similarly to some 
earlier nationalists,133 sees education, both of the sangha and the laity, as an 
essential part of this reform and restoration. Withanage explains: 
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“We were running this education system in this country focussing on 
value first. Now the British came into this system with Western – 
you know, scientific revolution and everything…. They changed our 
structures and introduced that knowledge is the main focus. Now 
why we are having problems in our society is because I do not 
understand you, you don’t understand me, but we have this much of 
knowledge and you have that much of knowledge, we have 
knowledge but our hearts are not; so this is the primary problem… 
what I am trying to say [is that] we had our own health [care] 
system, education system, we had our own systems. So now, the 
British legal system, Dutch law, then the British schools… their 
music system. So the Buddhist monks have to go through this 
[European] education system… now, with Marxist philosophies and 
British structures, government and all these legal systems, Buddhist 
monks are nowhere. And the… violence… destroyed the peaceful 
means of Buddhist clergy in this system. And as a result, today we 
ended up with a set of Buddhist monks who are seen as fighters, not 
as good Buddhist monks who preach the dhamma.”134 
There are several claims here to unpack. First, Withanage claims that prior to 
colonial intrusion Sinhalese education was value-oriented.135 Education, in his 
understanding, reinforced the moral values of the ideal past. Second, the 
introduction of European education (alongside legal, healthcare, and musical 
systems) disrupted this traditional values-based approach and in doing so, 
displaced the sangha. This displacement, and the subsequent loss of the “peaceful 
means” of the sangha, led to the violence that has since plagued Sri Lanka. 
Withanage’s solution to this problem is to reform the education system, 
                                                             
discussed in Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities, Chapter Two: Producing Sri Lanka from 
Ceylon. This book’s introduction begins, “Let us speak of Buddhism – the Buddhism of the 
Great Theras [Theravada] which, surviving unchanged through a hundred vicissitudes, is a 
shining beacon for all mankind” and continues to describe a history of Sri Lanka that rises 
and falls with respect to this shining beacon: J.R. Jayewardene, Golden Threads (Sri Lanka: 
Department of Government Printing, 1986), 3. 
134 Withanage, interview by Michael Jerryson, June 25, 2014. Emphasis Jerryson’s. 
135 Earlier in the same interview, he explained that while Western education was focussed 
on knowledge, then skill, then attitude, traditional Sinhalese education prioritised attitude, 
then knowledge, and then skill. 
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reintroducing the traditional values of the past and training Buddhist monks with 
“better organised” monastic education.136 Withanage acknowledges that Sri Lanka 
“is not the same world, it’s a globalised world,” and so suggests that instead of 
“go[ing] back to history,” the Bodu Bala Sena seeks to restore and improve the 
educational system, and thereby society as a whole. 
The Bodu Bala Sena also seeks to restore Buddhism through the restoration and 
preservation of Buddhist places of worship, both contemporary and historical. 
Temples are, in the Bodu Bala Sena’s vision, to be centres of social development, 
those experiencing hardship are to have their conditions improved, and 
archaeologically significant sites are to be identified, promoted and safeguarded by 
legislation.137 This is a particularly contentious political issue, as the “reclamation” 
of sacred space for Buddhism has been a recurring theme of Sinhalese nationalist 
movements and has often occurred at the expense of Tamil and Muslim 
communities. The reclamation of Anuradhapura from the “desecrating effects of 
colonial rule” shortly following independence is one such example.138 In 1942 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, then Minister for Local Administration, created the 
Anuradhapura Preservation Ordinance that led to the eviction of the old town’s 
residents and the burning of its colonial buildings to better showcase the ruins of 
the historical capital of Dutugämunu as described in the Mahavamsa.139  
Reclamations of sacred space continued throughout the civil war period, often with 
similar ties to the Mahavamsa history. As recently as 2010, a stupa previously 
believed to have been the tomb of the Tamil King Elara was declared to instead 
                                                             
136 Ibid. 
137 Bodu Bala Sena, "About Us." 
138 Elizabeth Nissan, "History in the Making: Anuradhapura and the Sinhala Buddhist 
Nation," Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice 25 (1989): 
65-6. 
139 The negative impact of this on Muslim and Tamil landowners is noted in 
Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age, 155. 
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belong to his killer, Dutugämunu.140 The Bodu Bala Sena has continued in this 
fashion, targeting a 10th century mosque in the Kuragala cave complex which they 
maintain has “taken over” the historically Buddhist place of worship and destroyed 
evidence of a greater Buddhist heritage.141 In this manner the Bodu Bala Sena 
continues the existing nationalist practice of “reclaiming” sacred spaces, although it 
is perhaps notable that in this example they target a Muslim mosque rather than a 
Tamil stupa. I will discuss this specific case further in §4.3. 
The Bodu Bala Sena also claims that the restoration and empowerment of the 
monastic orders themselves is an essential step towards the Buddhist society that 
they hope to build. The Bodu Bala Sena seeks to establish an “independent and 
brave society of bhikkhus who have no involvement in party politics, no 
dependency on political patrons and parties, but with [sic] the ability of guiding 
them [the political patrons and parties] all in the right direction.”142 They also seek 
to modernise Bhikkhu education, re-establish the Bhikkhuni in Sri Lanka, and 
support Buddhist social development and entrepreneurship. These objectives, 
particularly the modernisation of Bhikkhu education, all have strong parallels to 
Rahula’s project and so might be interpreted as a similarly self-interest attempt at 
furthering the interests of the Bodu Bala Sena’s monastic leaders. 143 
The Bodu Bala Sena’s adoption of the fundamentalist imperative to restore the 
utopian past may have some implications for De Silva’s original argument. He 
observes, following Marty and Appleby, that fundamentalism is both “selectively 
traditional and selectively modern.”144 The Bodu Bala Sena seems to confirm the 
                                                             
140 Ibid., 398. 
141 "Sri Lanka's Buddhist Extremists Vow to Remove Muslim Mosque in Kuragala," Colombo 
Page: Sri Lanka Internet Newspaper, March 18, 2013. 
142 Bodu Bala Sena, "About Us." 
143 Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 23-26. 
144 De Silva, "The Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism," 59; Martin E. Marty and R. Scott 
Appleby, eds., Accounting for Fundamentalism(Chicago, USA: Chicago University Press, 
1994), 825. 
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truth of this, with Withanage’s call for reform tempered by his admission that the 
world is increasingly globalised and that monastic education must reflect this.145 
In this section I have demonstrated that there has been an imperative to reform 
Buddhism and restore the moral values of an imagined utopian past throughout the 
history of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. The influence of this ideal past continues 
on into Bodu Bala Sena ideology, and much of their rhetoric (and even their official 
mission statement) revolves around the need to restore Sri Lanka to this imagined 
past, which they plan to do through the reformation of the sangha and of education 
in Sri Lanka. 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER THREE 
In this chapter I have discussed two major themes that scholars have identified in 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist: the moral logic of the dhammadipa as read in the 
Mahavamsa and the belief in an ideal moral past that must be restored. Both of 
these themes remain relevant to the ideology and rhetoric of the Bodu Bala Sena, 
albeit with some minor differences that reflect the changing socio-political context 
of 21st century Sri Lanka. In the following chapter I will turn to the major point of 
departure from these earlier nationalist movements, which is the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
construction of Muslims, rather than Tamils, as the salient threat to Sinhalese 
Buddhism that must be violently defended against. Why, given the strong links that 
this chapter has demonstrated the Bodu Bala Sena shares with prior nationalist 
movements, has such a major shift in alterity taken place in Bodu Bala Sena 
ideology?  
 
                                                             
145 Withanage, interview by Michael Jerryson, June 25, 2014. Cf. De Silva, "The Plurality of 
Buddhist Fundamentalism," 69. 
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4 CONSTRUCTING THE NEW THREAT 
The previous chapter identified points of change and continuity between the Bodu 
Bala Sena and the existing tradition of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, and argued 
that the Bodu Bala Sena is best considered to be a new development in this 
tradition. In this chapter I will focus on the principal difference between the Bodu 
Bala Sena and earlier nationalist movements: their misoislamist rhetoric.146 I will 
argue that while the Bodu Bala Sena may identify a new threat to Sinhalese 
Buddhism, and attempt to legitimise their claims about this threat in novel ways, 
the construction of the threat itself reveals that it serves some important function 
for the Bodu Bala Sena’s conception of Sinhalese Buddhist selfhood. Muslims are to 
the Bodu Bala Sena as Tamils were to earlier nationalist movements, and the 
lengths that the Bodu Bala Sena goes to in order to maintain this alterity suggests 
that it is fundamentally important to their sense of identity.  
I will analyse the Bodu Bala Sena’s rhetoric through the securitisation framework of 
the Copenhagen school of security studies, which places its emphasis on how and 
why authorities construct phenomena as security threats. §4.1 will briefly outline 
this framework. In the following sections, I will introduce the principal claims that 
the Bodu Bala Sena makes about the nature of the Muslim threat, and argue that in 
order to make these claims persuasive they have selectively appropriated and 
reinterpreted rhetoric from the existing tradition of Buddhist nationalism in Sri 
Lanka and from global misoislamist discourse. The addition of these new 
articulations of threat to the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist “vocabulary” should not 
be seen as a radical departure from securitisation projects of the past but rather as 
                                                             
146 I borrow the term “misoislamia” from Amir Hussain, a neologism he uses to identify not 
just a phobia of Muslims but an outright hostility towards them: Amir Hussain, "Confronting 
Misoislamia: Teaching Religion and Violence in Courses on Islam," in Teaching Religion and 
Violence, ed. Brian K. Pennington (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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a new development that reflects the rapidly globalising world that Sinhalese 
Buddhism finds itself in. 
I will address in turn four major claims that the Bodu Bala Sena makes about the 
Muslim threat to Sinhalese Buddhism: that Muslims pose demographic threat to 
Sinhalese Buddhists through conversion to Islam, high birth rates, and polygamy 
(§4.2); that they are engaged in what Gnanasara calls “cultural assassination,” or the 
undermining of Sinhalese cultural dominance (§4.3); that Muslims have an unfair 
economic advantage over Buddhists (§4.4); and finally that Islamic extremism poses 
a political threat through terrorism, criminal activity, and the institution of shari’ah 
(§4.5). In each of these sections I will identify and discuss individual claims made by 
the Bodu Bala Sena that construct Muslims as posing each form of threat, before 
suggesting why these particular claims might have been made and what makes 
them persuasive to the Bodu Bala Sena’s supporters.  
4.1 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: SECURITISATION ANALYSIS 
In this section I will briefly outline my methodological framework, which I take 
from the Copenhagen school of security studies.147 The Bodu Bala Sena, as I will 
demonstrate in the following sections, is attempting to establish a new threat for 
Sinhalese Buddhism in the post-war era. The process of constructing a threat is the 
focus of Copenhagen securitisation analysis, described by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, 
and Jaap de Wilde as an effort to understand “who securitises [constructs a threat], 
on what issues, for whom, why, with what results, and, not least, under what 
                                                             
147 The Copenhagen school is, along with the English, French, and Welsh schools, one of the 
new critical approaches to security studies that emerged towards the end of the Cold War. 
Its three main contributions to security are the concepts of “securitisation,” discussed here, 
“regional security complexes,” and “security sectors.” Sectors and regions are, according to 
Wæver, primarily sites in which securitisation may be analysed: Ole Wæver, "Aberystwyth, 
Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and their Origins Between Core and 
Periphery," paper presented in International Studies Association (Montreal, 2004). 
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conditions.”148 This is a thoroughly constructivist approach to understanding 
security and the constructions of threat, and it is the ideal analytical framework for 
discussing the Bodu Bala Sena’s attempts to construct Islam as a credible threat to 
Sinhalese Buddhism, as I will do in the following section. 
Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde identify three units of securitisation analysis: referent 
objects, securitising actors, and functional actors.149 Functional actors only 
indirectly affect the dynamics of securitisation, and the key relationship (and 
distinction) for BWW is between referent objects and securitising actors. A referent 
object is something with a legitimate claim to survival (traditionally the state) 
which the securitising actors declare to be existentially threatened. Securitising 
actors rarely use themselves as referent objects. More commonly actors are 
“political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups”150 
who attempt to persuade others that a given referent object is under threat, that 
this threat is beyond the ability of normal politics to respond to, and that extra-
political measures are therefore necessary to make the referent object secure. 
Jonathan Bright considers these extra-political measures (“rule-breaking”) to be one 
of the defining characteristics of securitisation, and discusses British “control 
orders” as a prominent example that arose out of the War on Terror 
securitisation.151 
I consider the Bodu Bala Sena to be attempting an act of securitisation, and in the 
following sections I will discuss how they go about constructing Muslims as a threat 
to Sinhalese Buddhism (their referent object). I am using this framework for three 
                                                             
148 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 32. This book is the primary source of all 
information in this section, unless otherwise cited. 
149 Ibid., 36. 
150 Ibid., 40. 
151 Jonathan Bright, "Securitisation, Terror, and Control: Towards a Theory of the Breaking 
Point," Review of International Studies 38, no. 4 (2012). 
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reasons. First, securitisation is defined as a speech act, and so securitisation analysis 
is well-suited for analysing Bodu Bala Sena rhetoric. Second, securitisation analysis 
is not concerned with the validity of security issues and alleged threats, only in the 
means of their construction.152 No matter how far-fetched they are, I do not think 
that it is a productive exercise to engage with the accuracy of the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
claims about Muslims. What is more interesting to me is the manner in which they 
make these claims and the motivations lying behind them, which is the focus of 
securitisation analysis. Finally, the success or failure of securitisation is determined 
by its acceptance by its audience: “the existential threat has to be argued and… gain 
enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize 
emergency measures of other steps had the discourse not taken the form of 
existential threats, point of no return, and necessity.”153  Securitising actors, 
including the Bodu Bala Sena, therefore aim to make their claims as persuasive as 
possible, else the extra-political actions that they desire may not be viewed as a 
legitimate response to the alleged threat. The Bodu Bala Sena’s rhetoric varies 
considerably depending on their audience, which demonstrates how deliberately 
they are attempting to be persuasive.  
To international audiences, including foreign academics or media interviews, they 
deny allegations of racism and maintain that they are only opposed to “extremist” 
Islam, and that “[the] Bodu Bala Sena is not against Muslims or Tamils or any other 
ethnic group. We [the Bodu Bala Sena] are only against those who spread hatred, 
religious extremism among citizens."154 Withanage has also claimed that the Bodu 
Bala Sena wants to protect “moderate, traditional Muslims from this scourge [of 
                                                             
152 “Commentators on security at least as far back as Arnold Wolfers have noted the security 
can be approached both objectively and subjectively… our argument is that securitisation, 
like politicisation, has to be understood as an essentially intersubjective process.” Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, 30. 
153 Ibid., 25. 
154 "BBS Warns Again on Sharia Law," Legal Monitor Worldwide, September 10, 2014. 
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extremism].”155 Withanage and Gnanasara have both stated on separate occasions 
that their focus on the threat of Islam only arose after moderate Muslim groups in 
Sri Lanka came to the Bodu Bala Sena and requested that they protect Muslims from 
extremists and terrorists.156 
The use of the words “extremist” and “terrorist” both suggest that the Bodu Bala 
Sena is trying to appeal to existing international narratives, drawing on these terms 
to make their own behaviour appear acceptable and their claims of Muslim threat 
appear plausible to international audiences. As early as 1977 Edmund Leach argued 
that the label “terrorist” is used by authorities to illegitimise and dehumanise those 
“Others” to which the label is applied.157 The distinction between “moderate” and 
“extremist” Muslim, with the latter conflated with the dehumanising “terrorist,” is 
the central narrative of the US-led War on Terror.158 Gnanasara draws on this 
narrative to add legitimacy to his claims of Muslim threat, maintaining that the 
Bodu Bala Sena is fully supportive of a diverse and peaceful Sri Lanka,159 and that 
they are only opposed to “terrorism” and “extremists” but not the Muslim 
community as a whole.160 Ashin Wirathu, the leader of Myanmar’s 969 movement 
and ally of the Bodu Bala Sena, spoke at their annual conference of the threat that 
Buddhists around the world face from jihadists: “there is a jihad against Buddhist 
monks.”161 Finally, in an open letter to then-President Rajapaksa the Bodu Bala Sena 
                                                             
155 "New Government, Old BBS," Tamil Guardian, February 13, 2015. 
156 Gnanasara, "Muslims Pose a Threat in Sri Lanka." 
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made appeal to “the principals of democracy.”162 By associating themselves with 
“democracy,” “diversity,” and “peaceful society,” and Sri Lankan Muslims with 
“terrorism,” “extremism,” and “jihad,” the Bodu Bala Sena is attempting to 
appropriate the pre-existing global securitising narrative of the War on Terror and 
make their claims appear more persuasive.163 
In the Bodu Bala Sena’s public rallies, with an audience of their supporter, this sort 
of language is completely abandoned. While to international audiences they 
maintain that they are only concerned with “Islamic extremism,” in addresses to 
domestic audiences the distinction between extremist and moderate is replaced 
with phrases like, “Hereafter, if a Muslim or any other paraya [foreigner; 
derogatory] lays so much as a hand on a Sinhala person, let alone a monk , it would 
be the end of him.”164 Here all Muslims, extremist or moderate, are considered 
paraya and are subject to threats of reprisal should they dare to stand against 
Sinhalese Buddhists. The contrast between the language chosen for international 
audiences and this quote, as with many of those from the following sections, 
demonstrates how deliberately the Bodu Bala Sena crafts its rhetoric to appear 
persuasive. 
In the following sections, I will use the securitisation framework outlined above to 
analyse the means by which the Bodu Bala Sena attempts to construct a new group, 
Sri Lankan Muslims, as an existential threat to Sinhalese Buddhism. By doing so, the 
Bodu Bala Sena is attempting to create a sense of societal insecurity for Sinhalese 
                                                             
162 "Set Up Commission To Probe Foreign Interventions, BBS Tells President," Sri Lanka 
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163 Despite their stated mistrust of the international community, the Bodu Bala Sena has 
expressed concerns about both Tamils and Muslims using their global diasporas to “slander” 
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Buddhists: a “situation in which significant groups within a society feel threatened, 
feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural 
imperialism, and try to defend themselves.”165 By creating this sense of insecurity, 
the Bodu Bala Sena stands to legitimise both their campaign of violence against 
Muslims and their particular interpretation of Sinhalese Buddhist identity. 
4.2 MUSLIMS AS A DEMOGRAPHIC THREAT 
In this subsection I will discuss the demographic threat that the Bodu Bala Sena 
claims that Muslims pose to Sinhalese Buddhism. The Bodu Bala Sena claims that 
Muslims, although currently a minority in Sri Lanka, threaten the dominance of 
Sinhalese Buddhists through the allegedly high birth rates of Muslims, through 
practicing polygamy, and through proselytization and conversion to Islam. While 
nationalists expressed concerns about Christian proselytization in the colonial 
period and beyond, civil war-era nationalists did not express concerns about the 
demographic threat that Tamils posed, and the Bodu Bala Sena’s claims about the 
demographic threat of Muslims appears to be entirely novel to the Sri Lankan case. I 
suggest that there are two possible origins for this rhetoric: the Bodu Bala Sena may 
be trying to play on existing cultural fears of Christian dominance (which could not 
be applied to the Tamil Other during the civil war) and redeploy them against Islam, 
or they may be drawing on similar misoislamic rhetoric from the Hindutva 
movement in India and Myanmar’s 969. 
The Bodu Bala Sena claims that Muslims have a higher birth rate than Sinhalese, and 
that while Muslims are currently a minority in Sri Lanka this may change in 
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future.166 When Michael Jerryson asked Withanage about this in an interview, 
Withanage replied: 
“There is… an NGO supporting reducing Sinhala Buddhist 
households, and abortions, but Muslims will not do that. So we had 
the family plan [sic] to improve, [but] those are only for Sinhala. The 
Muslims, the churches, the mosques, won’t do that. So we started 
this anti-family improvement [against the] slogan that ‘the small 
family is a golden family,’ we said don’t do that [don’t limit family 
size]… we have to have more children. But the problem is that 
government and economic structures and everything, it is very 
difficult for Sinhala families to have more children. Because of 
education, because of employment, but we are promoting that… we 
demand some population control for Islam.”167 
There are several significant points in this response. First, Withanage claims that 
while Sinhalese Buddhists make use of family planning services, Muslims as a group 
have rejected them.168 The reference to “the mosques” seems to imply that this is a 
religious prohibition on contraception: Islam itself is to blame, in this view, for the 
high birth rate of Muslims in Sri Lanka. Second, the relatively low Sinhalese 
Buddhist birth rate is due to a number of factors (in Withanage’s account): 
government, economic structures, education, and employment. This provides an 
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interesting contrast. According to Withanage, there are many non-religious factors 
influencing the low birth rate of Buddhists, while the major factor influencing the 
high birth rate of Muslims is simply their religion. One implication of this contrast is 
that while the factors limiting Buddhist birth rate might be altered or improved 
upon, the “problem” of high Muslim birth rate cannot be dealt with without 
addressing Islam itself and its prohibitions on contraception. This implication is 
reflected in the Bodu Bala Sena’s proposed remedies. As well as simply improving 
the economic situation of Buddhists (which I will address in a later subsection), 
allowing them to support larger families, Withanage also “demands” population 
control for Muslims. For Withanage, the religious prohibition on contraception in 
Islam is so fundamental that no solution short of enforced birth rates can be 
effective in limiting Muslim population growth. Interestingly, the Bodu Bala Sena 
has also made claims that Muslim store owners have secretly fed contraceptives to 
unwitting Buddhist women, a claim that was not repeated to Jerryson.169 
There is little precedent of Sinhalese nationalists expressing similar concerns about 
the high birth rates of other minorities. During the civil war period, the explicit 
objective of the LTTE was control over territory in which Tamils were already the 
majority population, not population growth and expansion into other areas. This 
would have limited the effectiveness of claims about Tamil population growth, had 
civil war-era nationalists wanted to make them, as they would not have been 
consistent with the nature of the LTTE threat. The Bodu Bala Sena, unlike these 
earlier nationalists, is not so limited by explicitly stated objectives of their 
designated threatening Other, and so are free to make claims about the threat of 
Muslim population growth. 
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These claims are strongly paralleled by Hindutva claims about Muslim population 
growth in India. Hindutva nationalists have claimed that Muslims enjoy high birth 
rates while the Hindu race is “dying out.” 170 The Bodu Bala Sena has acknowledged 
the influence that Hindutva has had on their ideology, 171 and it seems likely that 
they would be aware of these claims and their effectiveness in rallying misoislamic 
sentiment in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (not to be confused with the Bodu 
Bala Sena’s Bodu Jana Peramuna political party) has used these claims to construct 
a “myth of permanent invasion” of India by Muslims that bears similarities to Bodu 
Bala Sena rhetoric.172 It seems possible that the Bodu Bala Sena is deliberately 
attempting to replicate the success of the Hindutva “myth” through appropriation of 
their claims about Muslim birth rates. 
Another claim of the Bodu Bala Sena, again shared with Hindutva nationalists, is 
that Muslims pose a demographic threat through their practice of polygamy. Sri 
Lankan law permits up to four wives for Muslim men and Withanage has argued 
that this will reduce the dating pool for Sinhalese males, further contributing to the 
decline of the Sinhalese ethnic group.173 This is illustrated on the Bodu Bala Sena 
website in the following infographic: 
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country--one-law-.html (accessed on 1st April, 2015). 
67 
 
 
Figure 2: From "One Country, One Law," published by Dilanthe Withanage on a now-defunct Bodu Bala 
Sena website.174 
In this image, Withanage attempts to demonstrate logically that if Muslim men do 
indeed take up to 4 wives each, then some of those wives must necessarily be 
Sinhalese women. This will deprive Sinhalese men of potential wives themselves 
and so further contribute to the “dying out” of the Sinhalese race.  Again, concerns 
about Muslim polygamy, and the threats that it poses to the majority, are paralleled 
in Hindutva rhetoric.175 
The Bodu Bala Sena has also expressed concerns about the status of Sinhalese 
women who marry into Islam. A popular belief in both Sri Lanka and Myanmar is 
that Buddhist women who marry Muslim men are forced to convert to Islam, or that 
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they will become “captive” to shari’ah and Muslim cultural norms.176 Withanage has 
said in an interview that “[if] a Sinhalese women marries a Muslim man, her right is 
not protected because she has to marry under the Muslim law. So she comes under 
the Quazi courts. And then she cannot get back to the normal legal system because 
she is… under the Muslim law.”177 Myanmar’s 969 movement, a public ally of the 
Bodu Bala Sena,178 shares similar concerns about “inter-faith marriage, polygamy, 
religious conversion, and unequal population growth,” and again it seems likely that 
the Bodu Bala Sena was inspired by the 969’s success with this rhetoric in their own 
country.179 
More generally, the Bodu Bala Sena has repeatedly claimed that Muslims pose a 
threat through proselytization.  Withanage has claimed that Sri Lanka “face[s] 
threats from Muslims and other minorities who are actively engaged in 
conversions.”180 Gnanasara has called the continuation of “unethical conversions” a 
failure of the Ministry for Buddha Sasana and Religious Affairs, which he claims is 
unable to “safeguard Buddhism” against this threat.”181 
The language of “unethical conversions” is drawn from the rhetoric of the JHU, the 
political party from which Gnanasara split in 2012. The JHU deployed this term 
against Christian proselytization, and managed to pass a bill prohibiting such 
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unethical conversions.182 Neil DeVotta and Mahinda Deegalle both attribute the 
success of the JHU in mobilising anti-Christian and anti-conversion sentiment to 
their effective harnessing of public mourning at the death of Gangodawila Soma, a 
prominently anti-Christian monk.183 Withanage has acknowledged that Soma was 
an “influence” on Gnanasara and on the Bodu Bala Sena’s ideology.184 
Popular use of the term “unethical conversion” has, since its introduction by Soma 
and the JHU, been expanded to include conversions to Islam, as the website 
“Unethical Conversion Watch” makes clear: 
“This site provides information on unethical conversion of Buddhists 
to Christianity and Islam in Sri Lanka. 
Forced conversions have been taking place since 1505 when Sri 
Lanka (then Ceylon) was colonised by the Portuguese, who were 
followed by the Dutch and the British. Unethical conversions since 
independence have escalated since the late 1970s often taking 
advantage of the internal armed conflicts that racked the country for 
30 years. 
While conversion from one religion to another through conviction is 
the human right of an individual, modern day evangelists primarily 
use a variety of psychological and economic tactics to swell the 
numbers of their churches… It is this type of conversions that are 
carried out with the specific objective of Christianizing Sri Lanka to 
change its cultural identity that we object to.”185 
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This webpage is illustrative of the appropriation mechanic that the Bodu Bala Sena 
also engages in. While the webpage begins by specifically mentioning Islam as a 
culprit of unethical conversions, the evidence that it goes on to present is entirely 
focussed on Christian conversions and the history of Christianity in Sri Lanka. I 
suggest that this is because while Sinhalese nationalism has a long tradition of 
rhetoric concerning Christian conversion,186 the inclusion of Islam as a culprit is a 
relatively recent development only being employed by select groups like the Bodu 
Bala Sena and the Unethical Conversion Watch. The relative novelty of these claims 
of Muslim proselytization means that these groups are forced to appropriate 
existing claims about Christian proselytization and reinterpret them to include 
Islam. Hindutva nationalists also make claims about forced or unethical conversions 
of Hindus to Islam in India,187 as does the 969 in Myanmar.188 
In this subsection I have discussed three interrelated claims that the Bodu Bala Sena 
makes about the demographic threat of Muslims to Sinhalese Buddhism: that 
Muslims have a higher birth rate than Buddhists; that Muslim polygamy threatens 
the availability of wives to Buddhists; and that Muslims engage in unethical 
conversions of Buddhists to Islam. In these three ways the Bodu Bala Sena attempts 
to construct Muslims as posing a threat to the demographic dominance of Sinhalese 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka. This is, I have suggested, a relatively novel feature of 
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nationalist rhetoric, certainly with respect to Muslims. To make this claim 
persuasive, the Bodu Bala Sena has drawn on similar claims made about Muslims by 
their allies and influences in India and Myanmar, as well as existing Sinhalese fears 
about Christian conversions, and appropriated them to construct Sri Lanka’s 
Muslims as a similar threat. 
4.3 MUSLIMS AS A CULTURAL THREAT 
In this subsection I will present claims made by the Bodu Bala Sena about the 
“cultural threat” that Muslims are alleged to pose, which Gnanasara once 
memorably referred to as “culture assassination and the destruction of [Sinhalese] 
civilisation.”189 The Bodu Bala Sena claims that Muslims are engaged in an active 
campaign to undermine the historic character of Sinhalese culture and to “Islamify” 
Sri Lanka. I will examine two specific examples given by the Bodu Bala Sena of 
alleged attempts at Islamification, namely halal certification (the issue on which the 
Bodu Bala Sena first came to national prominence) and the desecration of sacred 
(Buddhist) space. I will suggest that the construction of Muslims as a cultural threat 
to Sinhalese Buddhism plays into public fears of what BWW call “horizontal 
competition” from neighbouring or space-sharing cultures that threatens to change 
or dilute the “essence” of the referent cultural identity.190 
BWW only consider the possibility of a minority culture fearing assimilation from a 
majority culture. This does not appear, at first glance, to fit the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
attempts to play on fears of a minority culture, Islam, threatening the majority 
Sinhalese culture. Despite this, I still see the horizontal competition dynamic at play 
in the Bodu Bala Sena’s attempts to construct Muslims as a cultural threat. One of 
BWW’s three predicted responses to such threats is the use of government and 
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legislation to preserve one culture at the expense of the other. Sinhalese nationalists 
have a long tradition of using legislation and policy to protect their own culture at 
the expense of minorities, most notoriously with the 1956 Language Act and the 
constitutional assertion of Buddhism’s “foremost place” among Sri Lankan 
religions.191 This might be explained by Tambiah’s diagnosis of the Sinhalese as a 
“majority with a minority complex.”192 While the Sinhalese are the majority in Sri 
Lanka, they have historically considered themselves a minority in the global 
context, leaving them susceptible to fears of horizontal competition and the 
construction of minorities as credible threats to their cultural dominance. 
One significant issue that the Bodu Bala Sena has used to draw on these fears of 
horizontal competition is halal certification.193 The Bodu Bala Sena’s first prominent 
national campaign in 2013 was against halal certification, which they saw as a 
strategic move by Muslims to “destroy Sinhalese and Buddhist food habits and 
culture by replacing them with halal culture.”194 Halal certification in Sri Lanka was 
at the time carried out by the All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU), which describes 
itself as “the apex religious body of Islamic theologians, that provides religious and 
community leadership to the Sri Lankan Muslim community.”195 The original 
objection of the Bodu Bala Sena to halal certification in Sri Lanka was that the 
practice inflated the price of consumer goods, and that this helped to fund Islamic 
religious activities. When the ACJU later offered to transfer control of halal 
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certification to government agencies, the Bodu Bala Sena called for a complete 
boycott of certified products until the entire practice was abolished.196 
The Bodu Bala Sena’s rejection of the ACLU’s proposed transferral of control to the 
government tells us that the Bodu Bala Sena were not, despite their initial 
objections, primarily concerned with how or by whom the practice was managed. 
Instead, they were attempting to construct the very practice of certifying foods as 
halal, appropriate for Muslim consumption, as a threat in itself. Withanage has 
claimed that the practice of halal certification is a “force” by which Muslims try “to 
penetrate into the society [sic].”197 In his interview with Michael Jerryson, he 
elaborated on this: 
“The halal affects the culture of the society. Every shop: halal food, 
halal restaurant… they are only ten percent of the people. But if you 
look at it [Sri Lanka?], if someone comes here, it looks like a Muslim 
country. So therefore we thought that it is… a part of Islamification. 
This is the first step in Islamification.”198 
For Withanage, a major problem with certifying products as halal is that this makes 
the country appear less Sinhalese and more Muslim. This, for nationalists like the 
Bodu Bala Sena, is a visual symbol of the dominance of the minority culture over the 
majority: the threat of horizontal competition. 
Gnarasara has also claimed that halal certification is part of a “strategic plan” to 
Islamify Sri Lanka: 
“They [Muslims] wanted all Sinhalese business people to have these 
certificates for their products. They managed to get all the hotels, 
restaurants and others to buy these halal certificates and made a lot 
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of money through them. They are trying to destroy Sinhalese and 
Buddhist food habits and culture by replacing them with halal 
culture. That is what we tried to stop and that is the reason why they 
[Muslims] are against us.”199 
Here Gnanasara is claiming that the threat posed by halal certification is not merely 
the result of natural competition between neighbouring cultures, but part of a 
deliberate strategy to change the dominant culture in Sri Lanka. This, according to 
the Bodu Bala Sena, will ultimately transform the island from a dhammadipa into an 
“Arabian kingdom.”200 This rhetoric about the alleged dangers of halal certification 
Islamifying Sri Lanka plays into a nationalist understanding of Sri Lanka as a sacred 
space set aside for the Sinhalese and for Buddhism, which I will discuss shortly. 
I will first discuss another claim that the Bodu Bala Sena makes about Muslims as a 
cultural threat, that they are engaged in the desecration or occupation of sacred 
(Buddhist) space in Sri Lanka. The Bodu Bala Sena has repeatedly claimed that 
Muslims establish mosques and residential areas near or on Buddhist religious sites 
and that Muslims destroy images of the Buddha, both of which (similarly to the 
halal issue) minimise the physical and visible presence of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.201 
Withanage has expressed concerns about the relative numbers of Buddhist places of 
worship against churches and mosques, which he attributes in part to the 
destruction of many Buddhist temples by the Portuguese and Dutch.202 The 
encroachment of Muslims on what, according to the Bodu Bala Sena, should rightly 
be Buddhist space, is not held to be a historical phenomenon but an ongoing 
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process. Wickramasinghe gives an example of a mosque built as recently as 1922 in 
a large cave at Kuragala, believed to have been the home of a Sufi saint in the 12th 
century.203 Since the 1970s, a number of nationalists have claimed that the cave was 
actually an ancient Buddhist archaeological site dating back to the 2nd century that 
the Sufis had merely appropriated for their own use.204 The Bodu Bala Sena has 
taken up this campaign, threatening to demolish the mosque at Kuragala “brick by 
brick” to stop “infidel Muslims from running riot.”205 This is a part of their more 
general resolution to intervene “to protect vulnerable Buddhist heritages [and] 
archaeological sites worldwide,” a key point in their “Memorandum of 
Understanding” with Myanmar’s 969 movement.206 During a presentation to the 
International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), Withanage showed the following 
slides to illustrate the alleged growth of mosques at the expense of Buddhist 
temples: 
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Figure 3: Slide 10 from Withanage's presentation to the ICES. Reproduced courtesy of Michael K. Jerryson 
and Mahinda Deegalle. 
 
Figure 4: Slide 41 from Withanage's presentation to the ICES. Reproduced courtesy of Michael K. Jerryson 
and Mahinda Deegalle. 
This second slide claims to show the former site of a demolished Buddhist thupa in 
the Eastern provinces. The Eastern provinces traditionally have a significant Muslim 
population, implying Muslim fault for the bulldozing. 
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The Bodu Bala Sena has also expressed support for a similar message from the 
British nationalist group Britain First. Britain First protested against the building of 
a “mega-mosque” in Dudley, England, and the Bodu Bala Sena shared the 
promotional material for this protest on their own Facebook page: 
 
Figure 5: A promotional image from Britain First, shared (without context) on the Bodu Bala Sena 
Facebook page.207 
While the Bodu Bala Sena did not post any text with the image to provide context, 
we can infer that this was intended as a gesture of support or even empathy for 
Britain First. 
As well as encroaching on physical space, the Bodu Bala Sena also claims that 
Muslims (as well as Christian evangelists) routinely destroy Buddhist statues or 
otherwise profane them.208 One website, that affiliates itself with the Bodu Bala 
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Sena, claims that the “destruction of ancient history and idols is part of what Islam’s 
iconoclasm is all about… through all conquests Islamic rulers [have] destroyed 
churches, kovils, and Buddhist temples.”209 This website goes on to suggest that this 
alleged destruction of temples, along with halal certification and the building of 
mosques, is a part of a broader strategy of “soft usurping of Sri Lanka’s Buddhist 
civilisation.” 
I find this to be an excellent summary of the way in which the Bodu Bala Sena claims 
that Muslims threaten Sinhalese Buddhist culture. Islamification, whether of cuisine 
or of Buddhist sacred space, is a credible threat because Sinhalese Buddhists 
understand their culture to be both unique and very fragile, and so very much at 
risk of usurpation or horizontal competition by Sri Lanka’s minorities. Withanage 
has said that “although we are… a majority in this country, we are [a] minority in 
the global context. A very small minority. Because if something happens to Sinhala 
Buddhists, we wouldn’t have anyone to complain [to]. But if something happens to 
Muslims, they will tell all Muslim countries and we realised that that is the 
danger.”210 Foreign funding for other religious groups and for the Tamils, which I 
will discuss in more detail in a later section, is a particular concern.211 Gnanasara 
claims that countries like Saudi Arabia are funding extremist groups in Sri Lanka, 
leading him to the statement that Sinhalese live “in a global society that is 
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structured by global funding, global politics and also global terrorism, all of which 
[is now working] against global minorities.”212 The following slide, again from 
Withanage’s presentation to the ICES, illustrates this: 
 
Figure 6: Slide 3 from Withanage's presentation to the ICES. Reproduced courtesy of Michael K. Jerryson 
and Mahinda Deegalle. 
Nationalist fears of horizontal competition long predate the Bodu Bala Sena, and I 
suggest that by constructing Islamification as a salient threat the Bodu Bala Sena is 
attempting to tap into these existing concerns about Sinhalese assimilation into 
“global majorities.” Tambiah has called Sinhalese Buddhists a “majority with a 
minority complex,”213 and Fernando observes that Sinhalese nationalists during the 
civil war stressed the South Indian origins of Tamils and sought to frame Tamil 
separatism as a form of Indian expansionism.214 This rhetoric, similarly to the Bodu 
Bala Sena’s rhetoric about the global majority of Muslim, set up the threat (then of 
Tamil separatism) as not an assertion of selfhood by a group within Sri Lanka, but 
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rather an attempt to absorb part of Sri Lanka into a much larger global entity. Both 
Tamil separatism and Islamification (both understood by nationalists as 
assimilation into a larger global majority) thereby threaten the Mahavamsa 
understanding of Sri Lanka as dhammadipa, an island set apart for Sinhalese 
Buddhism in which other ethnicities and religions may only be tolerated guests.215 
Islamification, through halal certification and encroachment on sacred space, 
undermines the cultural dominance that, according to dhammadipa understanding, 
Sinhalese Buddhism ought to enjoy, through visually and spatially transforming Sri 
Lanka from Buddhist to Muslim.216 
In this section I have discussed how the Bodu Bala Sena uses halal certification and 
the protection of sacred space as evidence to support its claims that Muslims pose a 
cultural threat to Sinhalese Buddhism. This cultural threat, which Buzan, Wæver, 
and De Wilde would call a fear of horizontal competition, is made possible despite 
the majority status of Sinhalese Buddhists because of the “global minority” that they 
have historically perceived themselves to be. The Bodu Bala Sena is attempting to 
play on these fears of cultural usurpation by Sri Lanka’s minorities by presenting 
halal certification and encroachment on sacred space as a part of a deliberate 
strategy by Muslims to Islamify Sri Lanka and replace elements of Sinhalese culture 
with their own. 
4.4 MUSLIMS AS AN ECONOMIC THREAT 
In the preceding section, I mentioned that both Gnanasara and Withanage, when 
talking about the “global majority” status of Muslims, claim that this gives Muslims 
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access to “global funding.”217 In this section I will explore what they mean by “global 
funding,” and how they use this term to construct Muslims as an economic threat to 
Sinhalese Buddhists. The Bodu Bala Sena’s rhetoric, although including some 
modern language, is not entirely novel in its construction of Muslims as an 
economic threat, and I suggest they are attempting to draw the historic successes of 
earlier securitisations in their own rhetoric. 
The Bodu Bala Sena claims that Muslims, as part of a “global diaspora” with links to 
the Middle East, enjoy an unfair advantage over Sinhalese Buddhist business 
owners. According to Gnanasara, this “global funding,” along with “global politics 
and also global terrorism” are working against “global minorities,” including 
Sinhalese Buddhists: 
“…most of them are from the Middle East and Saudi Arabia. These 
are the countries that fund Muslim extremist groups here… I don’t 
think that this is something that we should allow to happen. These 
are attempts to destroy the culture of our country… they [Muslims] 
are a minority in number but if you look at their economic power 
and their international network, they are not a minority.”218 
In this quote, the economic advantage that Muslims are alleged to enjoy is not 
constructed as problematic in itself, but rather as problematic through its 
relationship to the funding of extremists (which I will discuss in the following 
section) and attempts to destroy the culture of the country (discussed in the 
preceding section). Withanage has also claimed that “foreign money plays behind” 
both conversions and Muslim birth rates, the issues discussed in §4.2.219 However, 
the alleged economic advantage of Muslims is not merely an epiphenomen to other 
issues, as the Bodu Bala Sena takes the promotion of Buddhist entrepreneurship as 
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one of its key objectives. Of these 12 objectives, 3 might be considered economic in 
nature: 
8.  To set up organizations that support the development of Buddhists and 
network those organizations 
a. To identify and strengthen the organizations work [sic] genuinely 
for the Buddhist social development 
b. To identify the need to set up Buddhist organizations and setting up 
of new organizations 
c. To network the Buddhist organizations operating locally as well as 
internationally for better coordination and cooperation. 
9. To set up funds for Buddhist development 
a. To work for the identifying the need of monetary resources for the 
Buddhist social development 
b. Setting up of funds for Buddhist social development and taking 
actions to raise funds 
c. To prepare a mechanism that ensures transparency and 
accountability of the funds and managing securities 
d. To establish a Buddhist Development bank 
10. To build and safeguard Buddhist entrepreneurs and enterprises 
a. To work for the identifying Buddhist businessmen/entrepreneurs 
b. To organize and network of Buddhist businessmen 
c. To find and implement solutions for the problems and situations 
faced by the members of the Buddhist business community 
d. To take necessary actions to promote new especially young 
Buddhist businessmen and entrepreneurs220 
For an organisation comprised mainly of monks, dedicated to the establishment of a 
“Buddhist society,” and known for violence against minorities, to include such a list 
of economic concerns among its key objectives suggests that the alleged economic 
disadvantage of Buddhists, relative to Muslims, is highly significant to the Bodu Bala 
Sena’s understanding of contemporary Sri Lanka. If the global funding of Muslims 
was only a concern because of its potential links to extremism or cultural 
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usurpation, why would the Bodu Bala Sena consider, for example, the establishment 
of a Buddhist development bank to be a crucial part of their proposed reform? 
Stewart points in particular to objective 10, the safeguarding of Buddhist 
entrepreneurs, and suggests that this takes on a “more sinister tone” in light of the 
history of economically motivated attacks against Muslims in Sri Lanka.221 
The most significant conflict between Sinhalese Buddhist and Muslims prior to 
recent events occurred in 1915. The parallels between this violence and that at 
Aluthgama in 2014 are somewhat chilling: in response to Muslim noise complains 
during a Vesak celebration in Kandy, a group of Sinhalese men stormed a mosque, 
sparking off riots that left 25 Muslims dead, 189 wounded, and four known to have 
been raped.222 The violence was not spontaneous, but erupted from a village 
meeting (similar to Gnanasara’s rally at Aluthgama) in which a provocative speech 
was made, concluding with “the Tambies [Muslims; derogatory] are insulting our 
nation and our religion, we must harass the Tambies, and they must be driven out of 
Ceylon!”223 Several authors, including Stewart, considered the ethno-religious 
overtones of the 1915 riots to be “merely a piece of propaganda that hid the real 
economic agenda... a desire to eliminate business rivals, who just happened to be 
Muslims.”224 The causality of economic factors in the 1915 violence is not 
uncontested, as Michael Roberts has argued that the “religio-cultural threat from 
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the Moors” played an equally important role in motivating the violence.225 However, 
economic tensions between Sinhalese Buddhists and Muslims remains significant to 
some degree in all accounts. 
These historical tensions provide the context for what Stewart calls the “sinister 
tone” of the Bodu Bala Sena’s construction of Muslims as an economic threat.226 
Gnanasara specifically mentioned Muslim NGOs with Middle Eastern funding in his 
speech at Aluthgama,227 although, as in the 1915 speech, this did not form the centre 
of his rhetoric. I suggest that by claiming that, among the other ways in which 
Muslims supposedly threaten Sinhalese Buddhism, they have some unfair economic 
advantage, Gnanasara and the Bodu Bala Sena were attempting to some degree to 
replicate the circumstances of the 1915 riots. By this, I do not mean that Gnanasara 
was specifically attempting to re-enact this historical event, but rather that he was 
attempting to draw on sentiments that he knew had been historically successful in 
securitising Muslims and inciting violence against them. 
In this section I have outlined the economic threat the Bodu Bala Sena claims that 
Muslims pose to Sinhalese Buddhists, and suggested that this is not a novel claim 
but one that has a history stretching back to the 1915 anti-Muslim riots. By making 
claims about the supposedly unfair economic advantage of Muslims over Sinhalese 
in Sri Lanka today, funded by a global diaspora with roots in the Middle East, the 
Bodu Bala Sena is attempting to persuade their audience that the threat of 1915 
continues today, albeit in a slightly different form. 
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4.5 MUSLIMS AS A POLITICAL THREAT 
In this section I will address the political threat that the Bodu Bala Sena claims that 
Muslims pose to Sri Lanka. A political threat, as defined by Buzan, Wæver, and De 
Wilde, is a threat to state sovereignty, which is both the broadest in substance and 
the most pressing of all threats previously discussed. This section covers claims that 
the Bodu Bala Sena makes about Muslim criminal activity, ranging from arson and 
smuggling to terrorism, to the potential takeover of the Sri Lankan state by 
“creeping shari’ah” and Islamic extremism. The Bodu Bala Sena constructs these 
threats with, nominally, the state, but I will argue that in reality their referent object 
is their own particular conception of the state, which is fundamentally Sinhalese 
and Buddhist. 
The Bodu Bala Sena has claimed that Muslims are engaged in a variety of criminal 
activities in Sri Lanka. They have campaigned for a ban on the wearing of niqabs, as 
they say that these can conceal identities or even hidden weapons and drugs. 228 
These weapons and drugs, they went on to say, are smuggled by Muslims to fund 
terrorist activity (which I will discuss below), along with human trafficking. Drug 
smuggling and human trafficking are among the two most commonly securitised 
transnational crimes in Asia, according to a report by James Laki, and he suggests 
that this may be a result of domestic ethnic, religious, or minority groups within 
weak states to undermine the state apparatus.229 Withanage has also alleged that 
some Muslim shop owners commit arson for insurance fraud: “Sometimes Sinhala 
Buddhists also set fire, but Muslims escalate the situation. Why: they can get foreign 
funding, they can get insurance.”230 These criminal activities that the Bodu Bala 
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Sena claims that Muslims are engaged in are constructed as a challenge to the 
state’s sovereignty. 
The Bodu Bala Sena also claims that Muslims present a more direct threat to the 
state through terrorist activity. They have claimed that Muslim communities in Sri 
Lanka might provide an “environment for al-Qaeda and jihad to thrive,”231 and that 
“while the majority of Muslims are innocent… once they come under the influence of 
Muslim extremists, they can easily fall into smuggling, illegal weapon handling and 
even terrorist activities.”232 These terrorist activities, which Gnanasara claims that 
even previously innocent Muslims might engage in if under the influence of 
extremism, pose a direct challenge to the security of the state. In today’s 
international politics labelling an enemy as “terrorist” marks them out as an 
existential threat above all others, requiring extraordinary measures to defend 
against.233  
By casting Sri Lanka’s Muslims as terrorists or potential terrorists, Gnanasara is 
very clearly trying to draw on these post-9/11 security narratives and so legitimise 
his campaign against them. The Bodu Bala Sena has consistently tried to connect its 
own rhetoric with the global War on Terror, evidenced by some of the images 
posted on their official Facebook page. 
                                                             
231 "New Government, Old BBS," Tamil Guardian, 13th February 2015. 
232 Gnanasara, "Muslims Pose a Threat in Sri Lanka." 
233 K.M. Fierke, "The 'War on Terrorism:' A Critical Perspective," Irish Studies in International 
Affairs 16, no. 1 (2005). 
87 
 
 
Figure 7: An image from the Bodu Bala Sena's Facebook page, featuring Gnanasara (left) and Withanage 
as Islamic State execution victims.234 
The image above is one example of this. This image features an Islamic State 
militant and execution victim, doubled, with the head of victim replaced in either 
image by the heads of Gnanasara and Withanage and the word “next” printed above. 
This image presumably is intended to indicate that, because of their outspoken 
resistance to Islamic extremism and terrorism in Sri Lanka, the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
leaders risk retaliation from the Islamic State. The image is titled “The Face Of 
Buddhist Terror: Sri Lanka,” presumably an ironic reference to the edition of Time 
magazine, banned in Sri Lanka, that gives this title to the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
Myanmarese ally Ashin Wirathu. Through images like this, and through the 
application of the label “terrorist” to Muslims in Sri Lanka, the Bodu Bala Sena 
draws on the legitimacy of the global War on Terror narrative and appropriates it 
for their own ends. 
Simultaneously, the Bodu Bala Sena also appears to be drawing parallels to the 
earlier Tamil threat. The label “terrorist” was frequently applied to Tamil 
separatists by civil war nationalists in what Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah see as a 
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deliberate attempt to delegitimise the LTTE.235 Gnanasara has directly linked the 
Muslim threat to the earlier Tamil threat on at least two occasions. In a press 
statement warning about shari’ah law, Gnanasara claimed that “Muslim extremism 
could be far worse than LTTE terrorism if authorities do not take necessary 
measures to prevent it from spreading.”236 This represents a deliberate attempt to 
construct Muslims as an even greater threat than Tamils ever were. Rohini Mohan 
also claims that Gnanasara, at a 2012 rally, suggested that the Muslim threat was a 
direct successor to the Tamil: 
At a rally in 2012, the B.B.S. leader Mr. Gnanasara likened the Sri 
Lankan military's victory to the ancient conquest of a Tamil chief by 
a beloved Sinhalese king. The spectators knew the story and cheered 
at the comparison. ‘Tamils have been taught a lesson twice,’ he said; 
so would other minorities if they tried to ‘challenge Sri Lankan 
culture.’”237 
Here Gnanasara references what we can assume is the Dutugämunu epic of the 
Mahavamsa (the Tamil chief being Elara, whom Dutugämunu killed) but explicitly 
extends the character of the invading threat to include Muslims (“other minorities”). 
Civil war nationalists took this section of the Mahavamsa and used it as a historical 
justification for contemporary conflict against a Tamil enemy (the LTTE), and the 
Bodu Bala Sena appears to be trying to do the same for their Muslim enemy. 
Labelling Muslims as “terrorists” or as successors to the LTTE constructs them as a 
direct, potentially violent political threat to the Sri Lankan state. The Bodu Bala 
Sena also claims that Sri Lanka’s Muslims pose a less direct political threat through 
the introduction of “creeping shari’ah.” Muslims, according to the Bodu Bala Sena, 
are attempting to introduce shari’ah to Sri Lanka through a conspiracy involving 
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cultural and economic dominance (as discussed in §4.3 and §4.4), because “they 
have no good land [outside of Sri Lanka], so people fund to establish their Islamic 
kingdom, their centre.”238 The Bodu Bala Sena has attempted to call attention to this 
alleged conspiracy on a number of occasions, including at the meeting advertised in 
this image: 
 
Figure 8: "Let's Defeat the Conspiracy to Establish Sharia Law Secretly in Sri Lanka," a meeting called by 
the Bodu Bala Sena.239 
The Bodu Bala Sena claims that Muslim personal law (including exceptions on the 
prohibition of polygamy and a lowered marriageable age) represents a first step 
towards the imposition of shari’ah upon the general population of Sri Lanka.240 
Shari’ah is, in turn, a step towards the total dominance of Islamism over Sri Lankan 
politics, which, according to former Bodu Bala Sena president Wimalajothi, 
“threatens to topple the government” unless checked.241 This arguably provides the 
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foundation for all other Bodu Bala Sena claims of Muslim threat, as any avenue of 
Muslim dominance – demographic, cultural, or economic – might conceivably lead 
to greater political control and the overthrow or undermining of Sri Lanka as a 
state. 
This concern is itself not entirely divorced from the question of Sinhalese self-
identity. The Bodu Bala Sena may construct Muslims as a threat to the state of Sri 
Lanka, but their interpretation of the state is very particular. Sri Lanka, again 
according to Wimalajothi, is "not a multi-cultural country but rather a nation for the 
Sinhala Buddhists."242 When the Bodu Bala Sena expresses concerns about the 
threat that Muslims may pose to the Sri Lankan state, we must bear in mind that for 
them this is primarily a threat to the Sinhalese Buddhist state. 
In this section I have addressed the political threat that the Bodu Bala Sena claims 
that Muslims pose to Sri Lanka, and more specifically to the Sinhalese Buddhist 
state as the Bodu Bala Sena understands it. This threat includes the alleged criminal 
activities of Muslims, the threat of terrorism akin to both international threats like 
al Qaeda or to the LTTE, and finally the political dominance of Islamism through 
“creeping shari’ah.” 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER FOUR 
This chapter has examined the means by which the Bodu Bala Sena constructs 
Muslims as a threat in Sri Lanka, considering the demographic, cultural, economic, 
and political aspects of that threat. In each case, the Bodu Bala Sena appears to very 
deliberately craft its rhetoric to best persuade audiences, both in Sri Lanka and 
internationally, of the legitimacy of their claims. I have demonstrated that this often 
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includes the appropriation of existing narratives of threat: from prior nationalist 
movements, from the Bodu Bala Sena’s allies and inspirations in India and 
Myanmar, and from the global War on Terror. The purpose of this appropriation is 
to contextualise the “Muslim threat” of the Bodu Bala Sena in these pre-existing 
narratives and so borrow their legitimacy. 
By making their claims about Muslim threat appear credible, the Bodu Bala Sena is 
attempting to construct Muslims as a threat as salient to Sri Lanka now as Tamil 
separatism was to Sri Lanka during the civil war period. Indeed, they make an active 
effort to draw parallels between these two, with Muslims being “taught a lesson” as 
the Tamils were, and Muslim extremism having the potential to be “far worse than 
LTTE terrorism.”243 This suggests to me that while the substance of the threat, and 
some of the rhetorical mechanisms by which it is constructed, may differ 
substantially from that of earlier nationalist movement, Muslims serve a similar 
function for the Bodu Bala Sena and their brand of Sinhalese Buddhism nationalism 
as Tamils once did for others. 
As I argued in Chapter 2, alterity is often a significant component of identity. With 
the defeat of the LTTE in 2009, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists lost their “Other” as 
a credible threat, necessitating some shift in their conception of Sinhalese Buddhist 
identity. For some, this might have involved a downplaying of alterity’s role in the 
identity narrative. I suspect that given Sinhalese nationalists’ long history of 
orienting themselves against an “Other,” this would be a radical development, and 
one that would not be readily persuasive. The Bodu Bala Sena is offering another 
alternative: an adaption of the identity narrative that still retain the orientation 
against a threatening, impious, foreign Other. They have attempted, as this chapter 
has discussed, to construct Muslims as a credible replacement for the LTTE in their 
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post-war narrative. In other words, the underlying drivers of the Bodu Bala Sena’s 
campaign against Muslims are conceptions of identity and alterity, and the 
desperate attempts of nationalists to find new enemies against which they can 
defend the dhammadipa. 
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5 BEYOND “CAUSE” OR “EPIPHENOMENON:” A POST-
SECULARIST APPROACH 
I have argued that violence against minorities by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists, 
most recently including the Bodu Bala Sena, is best thought of as an exercise in 
identity interpretation and re-interpretation. This does not conform to more 
general theories about religious violence that have been offered in recent years, nor 
to much of the writing specific to Sri Lanka. In this chapter I will argue that these 
general theories reflect what I consider to be a false dichotomy in studies of religion 
and violence, and that they are problematized by the case of the Bodu Bala Sena.  
This false dichotomy has led to an ultimately futile debate about whether religion is 
best consider a “cause” or an “epiphenomenon” to violence, and it is a product of 
Western assumptions about the exhaustive and exclusive natures of the “religious” 
and “secular,” with overlap between these categories (“religion turning violent” or 
“religion being corrupted by politics”) considered a dangerous and unwanted 
phenomenon. 
In §5.1 I will introduce Tambiah and Kapferer’s respective arguments about the 
relationship between religion and violence as representative of a broader debate 
about whether or not religion is best considered a “cause” or an “epiphenomenon” 
of violence. I do not intend this section to be primarily a critique of either author, 
but rather to set up the debate about the nature of religious violence that I believe 
the Bodu Bala Sena problematizes. In §5.2 I will argue that this debate ultimately 
arises from Western assumptions about the proper relationship between “the 
religious” and “the secular,” with politics, nationalism, and violence properly 
occupying the latter and not the former. I will criticise this assumption, using the 
case of the Bodu Bala Sena to problematize what I see as a false and unhelpful 
dichotomy. Finally, in §5.3, I will suggest that by considering religious violence in 
terms of identity politics we can break down the secularist dichotomy and move 
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beyond discussion of whether religion is a cause of or an epiphenomenon to 
violence. 
5.1 RELIGION AS CAUSE OF OR EPIPHENOMENON TO VIOLENCE 
In this section I will discuss the respective arguments of Tambiah and Kapferer and 
argue that while they represent opposing sides of a debate on religious violence 
during the civil war, both are the product of the same secularist assumptions about 
the relationship between religion and “the secular.” Tambiah’s Buddhism Betrayed 
traces the historical process by which Buddhism became “betrayed” through 
appropriation by political agendas and ultimately became a tool for legitimising 
violence in Sri Lanka. Kapferer, in Legends of People, Myths of State, argues that the 
violence is instead caused by a powerful cosmological hierarchy, found in Buddhist 
myth and ritual, that cast Tamil separatism as “demonic fragmentation” that 
required violence resistance. Both of these arguments, despite their differences, 
assume that “the religious” properly occupies a distinct sphere from politics, 
nationalism, and violence (which are properly “secular”), and that the intrusion of 
religion into “the secular sphere” is dangerous and unnatural. 
Tambiah examines Buddhism “through the eyes and practices of Buddhist actors 
situated in history.”244 He traces the origins of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism by 
giving a chronological narrative of key figures throughout its history, and 
demonstrates throughout that Sri Lankan Buddhism has tended to reflect and 
incorporate contemporary social and political concerns: “the substantively 
soteriological, ethical, and normative components of doctrinal Buddhism qua 
religion were weakened, displaced, even distorted, while the religio-political 
associations of Buddhism as set out in the monkish chronicles… assumed 
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primacy.”245 He argues that the Sinhalese Buddhism nationalism encountered 
during the civil war period is a product of the ongoing legacy of interaction between 
Sinhalese political concerns and religion stretching back into the colonial era, and 
that ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is primarily social and political conflict, with 
religious dimensions incorporated post hoc in a “betrayal” of the essentially 
apolitical and non-violent principles of Buddhism, co-opted here by a nationalist 
agenda.246 Tambiah assumes that the religious dimensions of ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka are secondary to more tangible political concerns, and that the appropriation 
of naturally apolitical religion for these political ends constitutes a “betrayal” of that 
religion.247 
Kapferer, in his earlier work, saw the Mahavamsa as more directly motivating the 
violence of the civil war. His central assumption was the myths, including the myth 
of the Mahavamsa, 
“have force and an emotional power… because their logic or 
reasoning connects with the way that human beings are already 
oriented in their realities… mythic event may be as much legitimated 
by the world as it legitimates lived reality.”248 
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 This understanding of the relationship between myth and lived experience bears 
strong similarities to Mark Juergensmeyer’s later argument that images of “divine 
warfare” feature in all religious traditions and that they “provide the content and 
the themes that are played out in the grand scenarios behind contemporary acts of 
performance violence.”249 Kapferer argues that the Mahavamsa reveals to Sinhalese 
Buddhists a divine order (which Juergensmeyer would call a “cosmic hierarchy”) 
that makes sense of the world around them. This order is derived in part from the 
accounts in the Mahavamsa of the subsequent arrivals of the Buddha and Vijaya in 
Sri Lanka, and is also, according to Kapferer, revealed and reinforced in ritual 
practices, particularly the demonic exorcisms that were the basis of Kapferer’s 
earlier studies.250 Kapferer argued that this divine order, revealed in both myth and 
ritual, was a major force behind the Black Friday riots and mass killing of Tamils by 
Sinhalese: 
“The rioting… may be likened to a gigantic exorcism. Tamils, the 
agents of evil, set to break the overarching unity of Sinhalese state, 
are rooted out… and by doing so [the Sinhalese] resubordinate and 
reincorporate the Tamil demon into the hierarchy.”251 
This violent exorcism is, in Kapferer’s understanding, directly inspired by the 
Mahavamsa. Among the Buddha’s first acts in Sri Lanka was the exorcism of the 
yakkha from the island, accomplished by striking terror to their (the yakkha’s) 
hearts through storm and fire, and later banishing them to the giridipa (Mhv. I:24; 
29; 30).252 Kapferer argues that in fighting against Tamil separatists, who sought to 
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disrupt the established hierarchy, pious Sinhalese Buddhists were re-enacting this 
first exorcism of the yakkha by the Buddha. 
I have framed Tambiah and Kapferer as opposing extremes of a debate about the 
relationship between religion and violence. On the one side (represented by 
Kapferer) religion is understood to be a cause of violence, a potentially dangerous 
force which must be kept in check and out of the public sphere lest its violent 
tendencies be unleashed. On the other side (represented by Tambiah), religion is 
understood to be an epiphenomenon of violence, something applied post hoc to 
rationalise or legitimise pre-existing conflicts. Both of these arguments, despite 
their apparent differences,253 are based on the same basic assumptions about the 
relationship between the religious and the secular, which I will outline here and 
then critique in the following section. 
The classic history of the secular begins with the Wars of Religion in Europe, and 
describes “the process by which sectors of society are removed from the 
domination of religious institutions and symbols.”254 In this understanding, religion 
once dominated the public sphere in Europe, but has been successfully privatised, 
leaving behind only the areligious “secular.” Casanova summarises refers to this as 
the “emancipation of the secular spheres – primarily the state, the economy, and 
science – from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation and 
specialisation of religion within its own newly found religious sphere.”255 Religion’s 
involvement in politics, economics, or science, understood by secularists to 
properly belong to the secular, is therefore viewed as regressive, parochial, 
undesirable and perhaps even dangerous. Until recently, this understanding of the 
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secular and the religious as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive halves of a 
dichotomy, rightly existing in public and private spheres respectively, had 
“paradigmatic status within the social sciences.”256 This understanding is what I 
argue lies behind both “cause” and “epiphenomenon” explanations of religious 
violence. 
Both sides of the “cause” or “epiphenomenon” debate tend to characterise, in 
differing ways, the “religion” of religious violence as being out of place. For those 
who see religion as a “cause” of violence, religion (inherently prone to violence) is 
intruding on the rightfully secular domain of politics and political action. Religion, a 
dangerous force, must be confined to the private sphere and kept away from politics 
by the peacekeeping secular state.257 For those who see religion as an 
“epiphenomenon” of violence, religion has been co-opted from its naturally peaceful 
(or at least apolitical) state into serving the ends of violence. Here religion is 
understood to rightfully exist in a private, apolitical, and non-violent sphere, and its 
presence in the public, political, and violent sphere of the secular is an aberration 
that must be explained away. In either case, the mixture of religion with politics, 
nationalism, or violence is understood to be a deviation (intrusive and unwanted) 
from the natural habitat of the religious, which is (by secularist definition) entirely 
separate from the secular sphere of politics, nationalism, and violence. 
In this section I have introduced what I consider to be the dominant theoretical 
debate about the nature of religious violence, and argued that it reflects secularist 
assumptions about the existence of a religious-secular dichotomy. In the following 
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section I will criticise these assumptions, both in general terms and with respect to 
post-war Sri Lanka and the Bodu Bala Sena, before providing an alternative in §5.3. 
5.2 PROBLEMATIZING SECULARIST THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 
If religion does properly inhabit a distinct sphere from politics, nationalism, and 
violence, as secularists believe, then the “blame” for religious violence might indeed 
have to fall at the feet of one or the other: either religious violence in Sri Lanka is 
inspired by religious mythology, as Kapferer argues, or it is fundamentally a 
political phenomenon that uses religion as a post-hoc legitimisation, as Tambiah 
argues. In this section, I will demonstrate that contrary to secularist assumptions, 
the religious-secular dichotomy is unfounded, and that approaches to 
understanding religious violence based on this dichotomy are therefore ultimately 
futile. I will problematize the dichotomy with reference to general literature on 
secularism, the critiques of Ananda Abeysekara, and finally the case of the Bodu 
Bala Sena. 
One of the most prominent early criticisms of the religious-secular dichotomy came 
from Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who claimed that “religion as a discrete category of 
human activity, separable from culture, politics, and other areas of life, is an 
invention of the modern West.”258 It might be anachronistic to characterise Smith as 
a proto-post-secularist, but his deconstruction of “religion” provided a foundation 
for later critiques of the alleged relationship between the religious and the 
secular.259 For the purposes of this thesis, I will not go quite so far as Smith in 
deconstructing “religion” itself. I introduce his criticism to problematize 
assumptions about the inherent separation and difference of the religious and the 
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secular, not to question whether or not Buddhism should be considered a religion at 
all. 
Scholars have since built on Smith’s critique of “the religious” and problematized 
the nature and genealogy of “the secular.” Talal Asad and Charles Taylor, among 
others, have both argued that the secular is a historical product of a religious 
context (post-Reformation Europe) and of the religious ideologies of that context.260 
Craig Calhoun has argued that instead of understanding the secular in negative 
terms (the absence of religion), we should instead consider it as a constructed 
presence.261 Building on this, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, José Casanova, and Erin K. 
Wilson all discuss secularism as an ideology, the function of which is to build and 
maintain the constructed “areligious” secular sphere.262 Finally, Robert Bellah 
suggested that while “religions” may have been banished to the private sphere in 
secular countries, religious functions remain public in what he called civil 
religion.263 Together these critiques problematise the secularist dichotomy by 
suggesting that the distinction between religious and secular may not be quite so 
clear. 
If, as I have argued in §5.1, theories about religious violence are based on secularist 
assumptions, then post-secularist challenges might necessitate a rethinking of our 
approach to religious violence. Cavanaugh argues that the concept of religious 
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violence itself is problematic due to its inherent secularist assumptions.264 He 
demonstrates that there is no functional difference between religious and secular 
violence, and suggests that the concept of religious violence (considered 
particularly dangerous) is a product of secularisation and of the developing nation-
state’s drive to monopolise legitimate violence. 
The critique of secularism, particularly as it relates to religious violence, that I have 
outlined above forms a theoretical background to Abeysekara’s critiques of 
approaches to political religion and religious violence in Sri Lanka. Abeysekara 
analyses scholarly, monastic, and political attempts to construct particular 
relationships between Buddhism and politics as “authentic” or not, which typically 
(Abeysekara argues) revolved around an understanding of this relationship as 
being historically constructed (in contrast to the supposedly apolitical pre-colonial 
Buddhism).265 “Violent Buddhism” was similarly the subject of authenticity debates, 
again based on assumptions that an authentic and essential “Buddhism” could be 
identified and defined normatively.266 Crucially, these debates about the nature of 
an authentic Buddhism all revolve around Buddhism’s relationship to, or separation 
from, “public” politics or violence. Debates of authenticity are therefore another 
means by which religion is discursively “located” in its proper sphere. 
This abstract problematizion of the secular-religious dichotomy is made concrete by 
the case study of the Bodu Bala Sena. The Bodu Bala Sena, I argue, does not conform 
to the secularist dichotomy, and to consider them exclusively from a religious or 
political perspective simplifies the more subtle dynamics of their operation. The 
Bodu Bala Sena and their follows are best understood as simultaneously religious 
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and political actors. This problematizes the secularist dichotomy and suggests the 
need for a new framework through which we might view the relationship between 
religion and politics in Sri Lanka. 
The Bodu Bala Sena is, on the one hand, a Buddhist (religious) organisation. When 
asked what the Bodu Bala Sena stood for, Gnanasara replied, “It stands for the 
forces of Buddhist power. It is to unite all forces that believe in Buddhism.”267 The 
Bodu Bala Sena is led by monks, including Gnanasara, who are religious authorities 
in Sri Lanka. By this I mean that the role of the monk in Buddhist community is to 
act as an authoritative source of knowledge for the lay community: “to teach the 
dhamma that is ‘lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, and lovely in the end,’ 
‘for the benefit and happiness of the many, out of sympathy for the world, for the 
good, benefit, and happiness of gods and men.’”268 The Bodu Bala Sena’s followers, 
as Sinhalese Buddhists, are members of that lay community. In his speech at 
Aluthgama, Gnanasara addressed his audience as “Sinhala” and “Buddhist” 
interchangeably.269 The relationship between the Bodu Bala Sena monks and their 
lay followers is therefore the fundamental relationship of the Buddhist sangha, and 
the knowledge transmitted from monks to lay followers (even when this knowledge 
concerns political or economic issues) should be considered within this framework. 
The Bodu Bala Sena’s authority comes from its monastic leadership, and this 
authority cannot be overlooked when discussing its violence against Muslims. 
Simultaneously, the Bodu Bala Sena is also a political organisation. As Chapters 3 
and 4 have demonstrated, the Bodu Bala Sena operates as a political actor:270 it has 
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clearly articulated political goals, it engages in mass action to achieve those goals, it 
concerns itself with matters of policy, and most recently it has launched its own 
political party, the Bodu Jana Peramuna, in order to more effectively operate in the 
political sphere.271  
Most prominently, the Bodu Bala Sena’s use of violence and the threat of violence 
against Muslims is a political act. Richard Devetak tells us that “violence becomes 
political when bodily harm is caused in pursuit of, or even as, a political end.”272 The 
Bodu Bala Sena claims that it is acting as the “unofficial police” in Sri Lanka, 
stepping in to protect Sinhalese Buddhism when existing laws are unable to do 
so.273 This statement frames “the protection of Buddhism” as a desirable political 
end: a task which should properly fall to the justice system, but which the Bodu Bala 
Sena has taken upon itself to pursue through violent means. The Bodu Bala Sena is 
therefore engaging in political violence, according to Devetak’s definition, and so is 
operating in the political sphere. 
The Bodu Bala Sena cannot be understood as either a religious or a political actor; 
they are both simultaneously. This problematizes the common approaches to 
explaining religious violence, in which religion serves as either a “cause of” or an 
“epiphenomenon to” violence. To consider the Bodu Bala Sena’s religious identity as 
the root cause of their violent actions overlooks their significant political concerns, 
and the role that changing social and political contexts have had on shaping that 
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religious identity. However we cannot dismiss their religious identity as merely an 
epiphenomenon to the real, political causes of their hostility towards Muslims. The 
Bodu Bala Sena is not a group of political actors dressing their ideology up in 
religious legitimisation: they are monks, legitimate religious authorities of 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka, leading a movement of self-identified Buddhists in actions 
that are simultaneously religious and political. 
5.3 RELIGION AS IDENTITY; IDENTITY AS POLITICAL 
In the preceding section I argued that the Bodu Bala Sena, as a simultaneously 
religious and political organisation, problematizes the religious/secular dichotomy, 
and that the dominant approaches to understanding religious violence are therefore 
inadequate to explain the Bodu Bala Sena’s violence towards Muslims in post-war 
Sri Lanka. This is not, I suspect, a problem specific to Sri Lanka and to the Bodu Bala 
Sena, but a problem for our approach to explaining religious violence generally. In 
this section I therefore aim to construct an alternate approach to explaining 
religious violence, based on the case of the Bodu Bala Sena but which might also 
provide a more general explanation for the relationship between religion, politics, 
and violence. 
I have argued that constructions (“narratives”) of identity and alterity are the key 
drivers behind the Bodu Bala Sena’s violence towards Muslims, and that this 
violence is best understood as a means by which the Bodu Bala Sena is attempting 
to make their new construction of Sinhalese identity persuasive. In this section I 
will suggest that this focus on identity can also help us to overcome the secularist 
dichotomy I have criticised above by bridging the apparent distance between “the 
religious” and “the political.” Religion plays an important role in constructions of 
identity, as I have argued above, but identity is itself a political concept, and identity 
politics are an established area of disciplinary inquiry. Using identity as a focus for 
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analysis allows examination of both its religious and its political dimensions 
simultaneously, which I will demonstrate is a useful and productive approach to 
explaining religious violence. 
Religion is a major factor of identity. By this I mean that among the many different 
ways in which we might define ourselves (gender, occupation, language, caste, and 
so on), our religion or lack thereof tends to feature prominently. Durkheim 
famously believed that religion is the primary means by which groups might 
identify themselves: “the god of the clan, the totemic principle, can therefore be 
nothing more than the clan itself.”274 For Durkheim, religion was the sacralisation of 
group identity. 
More recent scholars have also discussed the relationship between religious 
identity and group identity. Lilly Weissbrod has argued that “the role of religion is 
to provide values that delineate national identity.”275 Pamela Ebstyne King, writing 
about youth identity formation in North America, argues that religion provides 
powerful ideological, social, and spiritual foundations for identity.276 Claire Mitchell 
explores “the variety of ways in which religious practices, ideas, doctrines, values, 
and structures help [to] construct ideas about self and others” in Northern Island.277 
Amartya Sen has written in more than one paper about the relationship between 
religion and nationalism.278 Finally, writing specifically about Sri Lanka, Rogers 
discusses the role of religion in historical constructions of identity.279 
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These scholars all consider religion to be an important component of identity. 
Despite this, and the secularist paradigm that separates religion from politics, 
identity is an established political object. Mary Bernstein, presenting an overview of 
research on identity politics, discusses the relationship between personal 
experience and political stance; why identities might be understood or portrayed as 
essential or constructed; the “strategic dilemma” of basing political action on 
contested identities; and the cultural and political goals at which identity politics 
are aimed.280 We might expect that religion, as a significant factor of identity, would 
feature in this framework, but it is mentioned only twice, both times in discussions 
of other authors.281 
This should not be the case. Religion, as a factor of identity, is profoundly political. 
The Bodu Bala Sena, for example, fit into Bernstein’s outline perfectly: they clearly 
relate religious identity with political objectives, identifying themselves as a force of 
Buddhist power that seeks political reform; they present a definition of essential 
and authentic Sinhala identity (inseparable from religious identity); they take 
strategic action to support this interpretation of identity, as I have discussed in 
Chapter 4; and they have clear cultural and political goals. The Bodu Bala Sena is 
therefore unquestionably a movement of identity politics, in which “identity” has a 
distinctly religious character. 
What does this mean for our understanding of religious violence? Cavanaugh has 
argued that we should understand religious violence no differently from “secular” 
violence.282 In many ways I agree with this. The intersection of religion and politics 
is not necessarily more prone to violence, nor is this violence somehow more 
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dangerous than violence that has no relationship to religion whatsoever.283 This 
means, as Abeysekara suggests, that discussions about whether the root cause of 
violence is political or religious are misdirected. Distinguishing the religious from 
the political is a futile exercise that can only succeed through arbitrary limitations of 
either category. 
A more productive approach to understanding and explaining religious violence is 
to view it in the light of these identity politics. We might ask questions like: how has 
group identity been historically interpreted and re-interpreted so as to include 
violent components? How have religious beliefs and practices been interpreted to 
authorise this interpretation? By what authority is violence legitimated? These 
questions, I believe, will provide valuable insights into the enduring nature of 
religious violence, far more so than any questions which assume a clear distinction 
between “the religious” and “the secular.” 
This is not, I will stress, to dismiss religion entirely or to subsume it into a more 
general “political” heading. The term religion is a flawed attempt to corral a vast 
range of beliefs, practices, rituals, and more into one defined category, but 
acknowledging this does not necessarily diminish the impact of these phenomena 
on politics. Similarly, identifying “gender” as a political category does not diminish 
our understanding of, or appreciation for, the significance of gender identity.284 The 
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Bodu Bala Sena’s interpretation of Buddhism, and of their Buddhist identity, may be 
a product of historical political forces, but this does not mean that it can be 
explained away or overlooked in a study of their ideology and methodology. 
In this section I have begun to outline an alternate approach to explaining religious 
violence. I have suggested that in place of the religious/secular dichotomy I argued 
against in the preceding section, a more productive approach to understanding 
religious violence might be to view it as a product of identity politics, and to 
consider how religion shapes, and is shaped by, the politics of identity. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER FIVE 
The Bodu Bala Sena, and the branch of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism that they 
represent, are one the one hand a religious community operating under monastic 
authority and primarily identified (both by themselves and by others) as a religious 
group – they are, above all, an organisation of monks leading a community of 
Buddhists. Their identity as a group is a religious identity, and the steps that they 
take to protect and empower that community (including their violence against 
minorities) are religious actions. However, as I argued in §5.3, a religious identity is 
simultaneously a political identity. To be Sinhalese, according to the Bodu Bala Sena 
and their supporters, is to be Buddhist – there is no distinction between the 
ethnic/national identity and the religious identity. The Bodu Bala Sena operates in 
the political, “secular” sphere as freely as it does the religious: they respond to 
political circumstances in a pragmatic manner; they frame themselves as members 
(citizens) of a nation-state and interact with the political structure of that nation-
state; and they attempt to construct themselves as a political authority alongside 
their religious authority as a monastic organisation.285 
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Operating simultaneously as religious and political actors, the Bodu Bala Sena 
problematizes the secularist binary assumed by much of the general writing on 
religious violence. They fit as comfortably into Juergensmeyer’s explanation of 
“violence inspired by religious thinking” as they do into that of “violent [political] 
situations demanding religious justification.”286 Neither of these explanations alone 
suffices to explain the relationship between religion and violence manifest in the 
Bodu Bala Sena, as I hope that I have demonstrated in preceding chapters. Religion 
is not exclusively cause or epiphenomenon of violence: rather, the violence of the 
Bodu Bala Sena is rooted in their conception and interpretation of their own 
identity as Sinhalese Buddhists, and is both a religious and a political act. In this 
manner they problematize the religious/secular dichotomy that has influenced so 
much of the writing on religious violence generally and operate as simultaneously 
religious and political actors. 
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6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter serves three purposes. First, I will briefly summarise the individual 
arguments made in the preceding chapters, with particular reference to my over-
arching argument about the nature of the Bodu Bala Sena and Sinhalese Buddhism 
nationalism in the post-war era more generally. Second, I will outline some avenues 
for further study which I believe are highlighted by my examination of the Bodu 
Bala Sena. Finally, I will attempt to draw some broader conclusions about the three 
key themes of my study (violence, identity and alterity), the relationship that they 
might have to religion more generally, and the policy measures that might then 
arise in Sri Lanka and further abroad. 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
My central argument has been that the Bodu Bala Sena’s targeting of Muslims as a 
new threat to Sinhalese Buddhism is best thought of as an attempt to adapt 
nationalist narratives of Sinhalese Buddhist identity for the post-war era. 
Nationalist narratives of Sinhalese identity have, since at least the British colonial 
period, been of a “nation under siege,” defending a sacred land from impious foreign 
invaders: first the Chola army of Elara described in the Mahavamsa, then European 
colonialism and Christian proselytization, and then Tamil separatism and the LTTE. 
The 2009 defeat of the LTTE fulfilled this last narrative, but as much as it was cause 
for celebration it also left nationalists with a crisis of identity. Without an enemy to 
defend against, how were they to fulfil the role of “defenders of the dhammadipa” 
that they had convinced themselves was a fundamental part of their identity? The 
Bodu Bala Sena is attempting to address this crisis by adapting the narrative and 
providing a new threat, Sri Lankan Muslims, against which nationalists can continue 
to frame their conceptions of Sinhalese Buddhist identity. 
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In Chapter 2 I outlined the theoretical background to my argument. I established 
that alterity often plays a significant role in conceptions of identity, and that 
violence can be empowering for groups who might otherwise feel disempowered. I 
also traced the development of nationalist conceptions of identity (using a narrative 
framework) from the colonial era onwards, to demonstrate that the historical 
disempowerment and disenfranchisement of this period ultimately led to the 
construction of a chauvinistic and violence narrative of Sinhalese Buddhist identity 
by some nationalists. 
In Chapter 3 I surveyed existing literature on this particular period of nationalism, 
particularly on the use of the Mahavamsa as a legitimising historical record and the 
imperative to restore the idealised moral past. I discussed how each of these themes 
in turn were relevant to a discussion of the Bodu Bala Sena, and concluded that 
although there are several significant points on which Bodu Bala Sena ideology 
diverges from that of earlier movements, they ought still to be considered in the 
context of this existing nationalist tradition. 
In Chapter 4 I turned to the major novelty in the Bodu Bala Sena’s ideology from 
earlier movements, namely their hostility towards Sri Lankan Muslims. Using the 
securitisation framework of the Copenhagen school of security studies, I analysed 
how they go about constructing Muslims as a credible demographic, cultural, 
economic, and political threat to Sinhalese Buddhists. I then argued that this 
construction of a new threat in lieu of the LTTE suggests that such a threat is in 
some way important to the Bodu Bala Sena and their conception of Sinhalese 
Buddhist identity. 
In Chapter 5 I used the case of the Bodu Bala Sena to undermine what I see as a 
secularist assumption underlying writing on religious violence in Sri Lanka and 
more generally. I addressed two major works on religious violence and argued that 
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they represent two alternatives: either religion is a “cause of” or an 
“epiphenomenon to” violence, a division that I find unsatisfactory. I suggested that 
this is due to secularist assumptions of a fundamental disconnect between the 
religious and the political (properly in the areligious domain of the secular), and 
that these assumptions are unfounded and unhelpful in analysing religious violence. 
Examining religious violence in terms of identity politics, I suggested, is a more 
productive approach that may help to overcome this artificial distinction between 
religious and political. 
6.2 AVENUES FOR FURTHER STUDY 
I have attempted in this thesis to outline some of the most relevant features of the 
Bodu Bala Sena and position them within the tradition of Sinhalese Buddhist 
nationalism more generally. Given the increasing activity of the Bodu Bala Sena in 
Sri Lanka’s political sphere, including the launch of their own political party 
modelled after India’s Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,287 and the resulting increase 
in international awareness of the group and their activities, I feel that this study has 
been a timely discussion of a significant development in Sri Lankan religion and 
politics. However the rise of the Bodu Bala Sena as a new incarnation of Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalism is only one of a range of developments in the post-war era, 
and there are many perspectives that could be taken on this phenomenon that for 
reasons of scope and relevancy I have not considered. This raises several potential 
avenues for further study, which I will outline briefly below before turning in my 
next section to what I consider the most significant area of exploration that stems 
from this subject: the implications of this case for a more general understanding of 
the relationship between religion, politics and violence. 
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6.2.1 Peacebuilding Movements in the Post-War Era 
The Bodu Bala Sena is a fascinating case study of the continuation of violent 
Buddhist nationalism after the war – that is, after the “Other” of civil war 
nationalism, Tamil separatism, ceased to be a credible threat. However my focus on 
the Bodu Bala Sena should not be taken as a dismissal of other Buddhist responses 
to the end of the war, particularly those that focus on peacebuilding, 
intercommunalism and reconciliation.288 A comprehensive study of the relationship 
between Buddhism, politics and violence in the post-war era would not be complete 
without consideration of both legitimisation and opposition to violence by Sinhalese 
Buddhists and within the framework of Sinhalese Buddhism, and future studies will 
hopefully address this divergence of attitudes. How do such diametrically opposed 
political positions fit into the same framework of Sinhalese Buddhism? And how do 
advocates of either position engage with the other’s interpretation? 
6.2.2 Reception of the Bodu Bala Sena by Sinhalese Buddhists 
This study has focussed on the discursive output of the Bodu Bala Sena, operating 
on the assumption that this discourse has been “successful” in convincing Sinhalese 
nationalists of its truth because of the mass action it has helped to inspire (the 
Aluthgama riot). This assumption has served my purposes well, but the extent to 
which Bodu Bala Sena discourse has been convincing to Sinhalese Buddhists 
broadly needs testing. The Bodu Bala Sena and its supporters, notorious as they are 
becoming in international media, may be representative of a numerically significant 
development in Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, but it may be nothing more than a 
vocal and active fringe group. It is obvious from even a simple search on social 
media networks that there exists a large, and similarly vocal, population of 
Sinhalese Buddhists who actively oppose the Bodu Bala Sena and deny that they 
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represent authentic Sinhalese Buddhism.289 A large-scale study of receptions of the 
Bodu Bala Sena’s particular brand of nationalism by Sinhalese Buddhists might have 
implications for my understanding of the nature of Buddhist nationalism in the 
post-war era, and such a study is surely necessary generally in the post-war era. 
6.2.3 The Political Response to Religion in Sri Lanka 
I have focussed on religious discourse (that is, discourse created by religious 
authorities) that deals with traditionally political subjects – legitimate violence and 
the construction of identity and alterity. What has been absent from my study is a 
significant consideration of the political response to the actions of the Bodu Bala 
Sena. I have mentioned several times the tacit support that the Bodu Bala Sena was 
believed to have enjoyed under the Rajapaksa government, including direct support 
from Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, defence secretary under his brother President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa. With Rajapaksa now ousted by his rival Maithripala Sirisena and the 
Bodu Bala Sena’s BJP party unsuccessfully contesting the recent general elections, 
political tensions might continue rise between nationalists and government. 
Parallels might be drawn to the Buddhist-Socialist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in 
the 1970s and 80s, whose repression by the state (partially for their inciting of 
violence against minorities) led to armed uprisings. With this in mind, a detailed 
look at how the Rajapaksa and Sirisena governments have attempted to deal with 
nationalist movements like the Bodu Bala Sena in the post-war era might be both 
timely and crucial to providing the Sirisena government with options going forward. 
6.2.4 Buddhist Nationalism as a Non-Secular Phenomenon 
I argued in Chapter 5 that the Bodu Bala Sena is a simultaneously religious and 
political actor, which undermines secularist assumptions about the relationship 
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between religion and politics. Post-secularist literature has been prolific in recent 
decades, but much of it focusses on the relationship between religion and politics in 
the West, with some notable exceptions.290 The “historic role of monks” as both 
religious authorities and as political advisors in Sri Lanka suggests another 
potentially valuable criticism of secularism, though not post-secularist (referring to 
Western scholarship that has moved beyond secularist assumptions) but non-
secularist (as such assumptions were never present in Sri Lanka or in Buddhist 
history more generally). 
6.2.5 Religious Authorities in Securitisation Analysis 
Securitisation analysis has traditionally, though not explicitly, been concerned with 
the state or similar political authority as securitising actor.291 In this thesis I have 
argued that the Bodu Bala Sena, primarily (if not, as I argue above, exclusively) a 
religious authority, can be considered as a securitising actor, and that this 
consideration can lead to valuable analysis. Given this, what implications does this 
have for securitisation analysis more generally? This suggests a broader range of 
applications of this analysis than the primarily political studies offered by Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde in their original book, and these religious applications might 
well form the basis of further study. Securitisation might even have applications in 
pure theology: might we argue that God was performing a security act in Jer. 5-17 
when He tells the people of Israel of the “distant nation” of “mighty warriors” who 
threaten to devour and destroy?292 
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
I have explained the presence of “violence” in Sinhalese Buddhism as the product of 
a particular formulation of identity and alterity. More specifically, I argued that the 
                                                             
290 Such as Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. 
291 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, 40-42. 
292 NRSV. 
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historical development of Sinhalese national identity led to a particular “narrative” 
of what exactly that identity was: a nation entrusted with the sacred task of 
defending Sri Lanka from incursion by impious foreigners, a task which it has 
carried out throughout its history and which it must continue to carry out today, 
even in the post-war era. By identifying Sri Lankan Muslims as yet another enemy 
threatening the integrity of the dhammadipa and of Sinhalese Buddhist generally, 
the Bodu Bala Sena has allowed nationalists to continue to discharge that duty and 
reify the narrative of their religious and national identity. 
I do not presume that such a description would fit all incidents of religious violence 
universally, but I do suspect that this analytical approach might be valuable in other 
contexts. Many theories of religious violence, as I have argued in Chapter 5, tend to 
consider it as an aberration, an unwelcome co-option of religion for political ends or 
intrusion of religion into the “secular” political domain. This has led to policies, both 
domestic and foreign, that demonise and seek to suppress such aberrations (such as 
Islamism) or that forcibly maintain the division between church and state. I suggest 
that a more useful (given the goal of mitigating and avoiding religious violence) 
approach to such “political religions” or even to “violent religions” might be to look 
to how their actions interact with their particular narrative of identity, and to ask 
how policy might re-shape or re-direct this narrative of violence. 
This may be difficult to put in practice, but I suspect that such an approach would 
be, at worst, no less successful than current policies towards religious violence. 
Coercive suppression of violent or political religion seems to only strengthen its 
resolve, particularly when it has adopted a “siege mentality” as a result of colonial 
proselyting. Egypt might be an excellent example of this, with its Muslim 
Brotherhood winning the first elections held since independence by a landslide – 
here the violent suppression of conservative Islam by Nasser and his successors 
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served to reify the Muslim Brotherhood’s self-identified role as defenders of 
tradition in the face of secular modernity, in a narrative that I suspect might hold 
interesting parallels to that of the Bodu Bala Sena.293 On the other end of the 
spectrum, as my thesis has demonstrated, fulfilling the agenda of such a group may 
do little to mitigate their hostility, as they may simply identify a new threat to 
defend against. 
If violence serves to empower identity, then the objective of policy-makers should 
be to provide alternatives. In economic terms, the Bodu Bala Sena offers one means 
by which Sinhalese Buddhists might empower their sense of group identity: reifying 
the nationalist narrative and defending the dhammadipa against the Muslim threat. 
It is the task of policy-makers to offer preferable competition in identity-
maintenance, undermining the nationalist cause by giving their supporters another 
means of building identity. Alternative narratives of Sinhalese Buddhist identity 
that do not rely on violence and defence against the other need to be constructed, 
and socioeconomic factors that contribute to a sense of disempowerment must be 
addressed.294 If these alternatives are not available, or if violent nationalists like the 
Bodu Bala Sena can continue to exploit a sense of disempowerment among 
Sinhalese Buddhists, then nationalists may continue to move from target to target 
indefinitely and continue playing the role of defenders of the dhamma. 
I began this thesis by quoting the Mahavamsa, which ends each chapter by stating 
that it was compiled “for the serene joy and emotion of the pious.” I suggested that 
                                                             
293 Scott W. Hibbard, Religious Politics and Secular States (Maryland, USA: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2010), "The Rise and Decline of Egyptian Secularism." 
294 This recalls the advice of the Kutadanta sutta, in which a king whose realm is similarly 
troubled by violence is advised not to punish violent individuals, but to be generous and 
increase the overall prosperity of the realm. When this advice is following, then those men, 
following each his own business, will no longer harass the realm; the King’s revenue will go 
up; the country will be quiet and at peace; and the populace, please one with another and 
happy, dancing their children in their arms, will dwell with open doors” (D. 5:11). The 
Kutadanta sutta, in Dialogues of the Buddha, trans. T.W. Rhys Davis, 3 vols., vol. 1 (UK: Pali 
Text Society, 1995). 
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due to this text’s association with violent nationalism during the 20th century, we 
might consider that violence to also have been carried out for that serene joy and 
emotion. In the 21st century, and under the new government of Maithripala Sirisena, 
we must hope that new narratives of Buddhist identity arise, in which piety no 
longer means chauvinism and it is instead religious tolerance that evokes such 
serene joy and emotion.
119 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abeysekara, Ananda. Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity, and Difference.  South 
Carolina, USA: University of South Carolina Press, 2002. 
———. "The Saffron Army, Violence, Terror(ism): Buddhism, Identity and 
Difference in Sri Lanka." Numen 48, no. 1 (2001). 
Ali, Ameer. "The End of the Road." South Asia Journal, no. 9 (2013). 
All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama. "About Us."  acju.lk/about. 
Aloysius, G. Religion as Emancipatory Identity: A Buddhist Movement among the 
Tamils under Colonialism.  New Delhi, India: New Age International 
Publishers, 2000. 
Amarasuriya, Harini, and Jonathan Spencer. "With That, Discipline Will Also Come 
to Them: the Politics of the Urban Poor in Postwar Colombo." Current 
Anthropology 56, no. 11 (supplementary) (2015). 
Ames, Michael M. "Religion, Politics, and Economic Development in Ceylon: an 
Interpretation of the Weber Thesis." Paper presented at the Symposium on 
New Approaches to the Study of Religion, Seattle, USA, 1963. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism.  London, UK: Verso, 1983. 
Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity.  California, USA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003. 
"Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post-War Sri Lanka." Colombo, Sri Lanka: 
Center for Policy Alternatives, 2013. 
The Attanagaluvansa, or the History of the Temple of Attanagalla. Translated by 
James D'Alwis. Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1866. 
Banerjee, Sumanta. "Hindutva: Ideology and Social Psychology." Economic and 
Political Weekly 26, no. 3 (1991): 97-101. 
Bartholomeusz, Tessa J. In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri 
Lanka. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism.  New York, USA: Routledge, 
2002. 
———, and Chandra R. de Silva. "Buddhist Fundamentalism and Identity in Sri 
Lanka." In Buddhist Fudamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka, 
edited by Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva. New York, USA: 
State University of New York Press, 1998. 
Bayir, Derya. "Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary." Human Rights 
Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2013). 
"BBS Apologises From Prostitutes." Sri Lanka Mirror, January 4, 2015. 
"BBS to Contest in the General Election." Asian Tribune, June 30, 2015. 
"BBS To Support President Rajapaksa." Adaderana, November 27, 2014. 
"BBS Warns Again on Sharia Law." Legal Monitor Worldwide, September 10, 2014. 
De Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Translated by Howard Madison Parshley.  
London, UK: David Campbell, 1993. 1949. 
Bechert, Heinz. "Contradictions in Sinhalese Buddhism." In Religion and 
Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka, edited by Bardwell L. Smith. 
Pennsylvania, USA: ANIMA Books, 1978. 
———. "S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the Legitimisation of Power Through Buddhist 
Ideals." In Religion and the Legitimisation of Power in Sri Lanka, edited by 
Bardwell L. Smith. Pennsylvania, USA: ANIMA Books, 1978. 
Bellah, Robert N. "Civil Religion in America." Daedalus 96, no. 1 (1967): 1-21. 
Berg, Bruce L. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences.  Boston, USA: 
Allyn and Bacon, 2001. 
120 
 
Berger, Peter. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion.  New 
York, USA: Anchor, 1967. 
Bernstein, Mary. "Identity Politics." Annual Review of Sociology 31, no. 1 (2005): 47-
74. 
"BJP Sri Lanka Joins Active Politics." Sri Lanka Mirror, June 25, 2015. 
Bloch, Maurice. Prey Into Hunter: The Politics of Religious Experience.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
"Bodu Bala Sena."  http://kwelos.tripod.com/bodu_bala_sena.htm. 
Bodu Bala Sena. "About Us."  www.bodubalasena.co/about-us.html. 
"Bodu Bala Sena Silenced?" Sri Lanka Mirror, December 16, 2014. 
"Bodu Bala Sena to Enter Politics." Adaderana, October 21, 2014. 
Bond, George D. The Buddhist Revival in Sri Lanka: Religious Tradition, 
Reinterpretation and Response. Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1992. 
Bright, Jonathan. "Securitisation, Terror, and Control: Towards a Theory of the 
Breaking Point." Review of International Studies 38, no. 4 (2012): 861-79. 
Bruner, J. "Life As Narrative." Social Research 54, no. 1 (1987). 
"Buddhist Monk to Fight Jihad Threat." Al Jazeera English, September 28, 2014. 
Burket, Walter, Rene Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith. Violent Origins: Ritual Killing 
and Cultural Formation. edited by Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly California, USA: 
Stanford University Press, 1987. 
Bush, Kenneth D., and E. Fuat Keyman. "Identity-Based Conflict: Rethinking Security 
in a Post-Cold War World." Global Governance 3, no. 3 (1997): 311-28. 
Buzan, Barry. "Will the "Global War on Terrorism" be the New Cold War?" 
International Affairs 82, no. 6 (2006): 1101-18. 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis.  Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
Cady, Linell E., and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd. "Comparative Secularisms and the 
Politics of Modernity." In Religion and Politics: European and Global 
Perspectives, edited by Johann P. Arnason and Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski. 
Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. 
Calhoun, Craig. "Rethinking Secularism." The Hedgehog Review 12, no. 3 (2010): 34-
48. 
———. Social Theory and the Politics of Identity.  New York, USA: Blackwell, 1994. 
Carver, Terrell, and Veronique Mottier. Politics of Sexuality: Identity, Gender, 
Citizenship.  New York, USA: Routledge, 1998. 
Casanova, José. Public Religions in the Modern World.  Chicago, USA: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994. 
———. "The Secular, Secularisations, Secularisms." In Rethinking Secularism, edited 
by Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan van Antwerpen. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Cavanaugh, William T. "'A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House:' the Wars of 
Religion and the Rise of the State." Modern Theology 11, no. 4 (1995): 397-
420. 
———. Migrations of the Holy: God, State, and the Political Meaning of the Church.  
Michigan, USA: Eerdmans, 2011. 
———. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern 
Conflict.  North Carolina, USA: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Chandralal, Dileep. Sinhala.  Amsterdam, Nederland: John Benjamins B.V., 2010. 
Datta, Pradip Kumar. "Dying Hindus: Production of Hindu Communal Common 
Sense in Early 20th Century Bengal." Economic and Political Weekly 25, no. 
28 (1993). 
Deegalle, Mahinda. "Is Violence Justified in Theravada Buddhism?" Current Dialogue 
39 (2002). 
121 
 
———. "JHU Politics for Peace and a Righteous State." In Buddhism, Conflict and 
Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, edited by Mahinda Deegalle. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
———. "Politics of the Jathika Hela Urumaya Monks: Buddhism and Ethnicity in 
Contemporary Sri Lanka." Contemporary Buddhism 5, no. 2 (2004): 83-103. 
Devetak, Richard. "Globalisation's Shadow." In The Globalisation of Political Violence, 
edited by Richard Devetak. Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2008. 
DeVotta, Neil. Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and 
Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka. Policy Studies 40. Washington, DC, USA: 
East-West Center, 2007. 
———, and Jason Stone. "Jathika Hela Urumaya and Ethno-Religious Politics in Sri 
Lanka." Pacific Affairs 81, no. 1 (2008): 31-51. 
Dewaraja, Lorna. The Muslims of Sri Lanka: One Thousand Years of Ethnic Harmony 
900-1915.  Colombo, Sri Lanka: The Lanka Islamic Foundation, 1994. 
Dharmadasa, K.N.O. "The People of the Lion: Ethnic Identity, Ideology, and 
Historical Revisionism in Contemporary Sri Lanka." Sri Lanka Journal of the 
Humanities 15 (1989). 
Dharmapala, Anagarika. "The Western Invastion and the Decline of Buddhism." In 
Return to Righteousness: A Collection of Speeches, Essays, and Letters of the 
Anagarika Dharmapala, edited by Ananda Gurugé. Colombo, Sri Lanka: 
Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, Government Press, 1965. 
Dialogues of the Buddha. Translated by T.W. Rhys Davis. 3 vols. Vol. 1, UK: Pali Text 
Society, 1995. 
Durkheim, Émile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.  London, UK: Allen and 
Unwin, 1915. 
Elshtain, J.B. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought.  
Oxford, UK: Martin Robertson, 1981. 
Engels, Friedrich. The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. 
Translated by Alec West.  New York, USA: International Publishers, 1975. 
1884. 
"Executive Presidency Should Remain." Daily Mirror, January 21, 2015. 
Fairclough, Norman. Discourse and Social Change.  Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1992. 
Fernando, Jude Lal. Religion, Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka: The Politics of the 
Interpretation of Nationhood.  Berlin, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2013. 
Fernando, Oshan. "Religion's 'State Effects:' Evangelical Christianity, Political 
Legitimacy and State Formation." Religion 44, no. 4 (2014): 573-91. 
Fierke, K.M. "The 'War on Terrorism:' A Critical Perspective." Irish Studies in 
International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2005): 51-64. 
"Full Text: Wirathu and Gnanasara Sign Agreement." Colombo Telegraph, October 1, 
2014. 
Funk, Nathan C., and Abdul Aziz Said. "Islam and the West: Narratives of Conflict 
and Conflict Transformation." International Journal of Peace Studies 9, no. 1 
(2004): 1-28. 
Galle, Mahinda P Liyanage. "Sangha Played Historic Role During War: Defence 
Secretary." Sri Lanka Daily News, March 11, 2013. 
Gangoli, Geetanjali. "Anti-Bigamy Bill in Maharashta: Wider Debate Needed." 
Economic and Political Weekly 31, no. 29 (1996): 1919-21. 
Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism.  Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1998. 
Gingrich, Andre. "Conceptualising Identities." In Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A 
Structural Approach, edited by Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich. New 
York, USA: Berghan Books, 2006. 
Gnanasara, Galagoda. Interviewed by Michael K. Jerryson (June 25, 2014). 
122 
 
———. "Muslims Pose a Threat in Sri Lanka." Interviewed by Pranay Sharma. 
Outlook India (August 25, 2014). 
Grant, Patrick. Buddhism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka.  New York, USA: State 
University of New York Press, 2009. 
Gunawardena, R.A.L.H. "The People of the Lion: the Sinhala Identity and Ideology in 
History and Historiography." In Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, 
edited by Jonathan Spencer. New York, USA: Routledge, 1990. 
Güvenç, Muna. "Constructing Narratives of Kurdish Nationalism in the Urban Space 
of Diyarbakir, Turkey." Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review 23, no. 
1 (2011). 
Hafez, Mohammed M. "Dying to be Martyrs: the Symbolic Dimension of Suicide 
Terrorism." In Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of 
Martyrdom, edited by Ami Pedahzur. New York, USA: Routledge, 2006. 
Hammack, Phillip, and Andrew Pilecki. "Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Political 
Psychology." Political Psychology 33, no. 1 (2012). 
"Hardline Lanka Buddhists to Launch Party, Say Inspired by BJP, RSS." Sri Lanka 
Mirror, January 20, 2015. 
Hayward, Susan. "The Spoiler and the Reconciler: Buddhism and the Peace Process 
in Sri Lanka." In Between Terror and Tolerance, edited by Timothy D. Sisk. 
Washington D.C., USA: Georgetown University Press, 2011. 
Hendon, David W., and Jason Hines. "Notes on Church-State Affairs." Journal of 
Church and State 55, no. 3 (2013): 598-611. 
Hibbard, Scott W. Religious Politics and Secular States.  Maryland, USA: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2010. 
Hoffman, Bruce. "Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Moticated by a 
Religious Imperative." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 18 (1995): 271-84. 
Holt, John Clifford. "The Persistence of Political Buddhism." In Buddhist 
Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka, edited by Tessa J. 
Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva. New York, USA: State University of 
New York Press, 1998. 
———. The Religious World of Kirti Sri: Buddhism, Art, and Politics in Late Medieval 
Sri Lanka.  Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
———, ed. Sri Lanka Reader: History, Culture, Politics. North Carolina, USA: Duke 
University Press, 2011. 
Van der Horst, Josine. Who is He, What is He Doing? Religious Rhetoric and 
Performances in Sri Lanka During R. Premadasa's Presidency (1989-1993).  
Amsterdam, Nederland: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Drukpers, 1995. 
Houtart, Francois. Religion and Ideology in Sri Lanka.  Bangalore, India: TPI, 1967. 
Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. The Politics of Secularism in International Relations.  New 
Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Hussain, Amir. "Confronting Misoislamia: Teaching Religion and Violence in Courses 
on Islam." In Teaching Religion and Violence, edited by Brian K. Pennington. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Irshad, Qadijah. "Buddhist Party for Ban on Halal Food." Khaleej Times, February 18, 
2013. 
Ismail, Qadri. Abiding By Sri Lanka: On Peace, Place, and Postcolonality.  Minnesota, 
USA: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
Jabbar, Zacki. "Govt. Rejects ACJU Call for Taking Over Issuance of Halal 
Certificates." The Island, February 28, 2013. 
Jayasekera, Rohan. "Narratives of Hate." Index on Censorship 42, no. 2 (2013): 110-
13. 
Jayewardene, J.R. Golden Threads.  Sri Lanka: Department of Government Printing, 
1986. 1984. 
123 
 
Jeffery, Patricia, Roger Jeffery, and Craig Jeffery. "Disputing Contraception: Muslim 
Reform, Secular Change and Fertility." Modern Asian Studies 42, no. 2/3 
(2008): 519-48. 
Jerryson, Michael K. Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand.  New 
York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
———. "Buddhists and Violence: Historical Continuity/Academic Inaccuracy." 
Religion Compass 9, no. 5 (2015): 141-50. 
Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: the Global Rise of Religious Violence.  
California, USA: University of California Press, 2003. 
Kapferer, Bruce. Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political 
Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia.  Washington, USA: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1988. 
———. Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture 
in Sri Lanka and Australia. New and Revised ed.  New York, USA: Berghahn 
Books, 2011. 
Keen, Suzanne. "Narrative Empathy." In Toward a Cognitive Theory of Narrative Acts, 
edited by Frederick Luis Aldama. Texas, USA: University of Texas Press, 
2010. 
Kemper, Steven. "J.R. Jayewardene, Righteousness and Realpolitik." In Sri Lanka: 
History and the Roots of Conflict, edited by Jonathan Spencer. New York, USA: 
Routledge, 1990. 
———. The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala Life.  
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Kent, Daniel. "Onward Buddhist Soliders." In Buddhist Warfare, edited by Michael K. 
Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2010. 
King, Pamela Ebstyne. "Religion and Identity: the Role of Ideological, Social, and 
Spiritual Contexts." Applied Developmental Science 7, no. 3 (2003): 197-204. 
Klem, Bart. "Islam, Politics and Violence in Eastern Sri Lanka." The Journal of Asian 
Studies 70, no. 3 (2011): 730-53. 
Knighton, William. The History of Ceylon from the Earliest Period to the Present Time.  
London, UK: Longman, Brown, Green, & Longman's, 1845. 
Kodikara, S.U. "Family Planning in Ceylon." In The Politics of Family Planning in the 
Third World, edited by T.E. Smith. London, UK: George Allen and Unwin, 
1973. 
Krishna, Sankaran. Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka and the Question of 
Nationhood.  Minnesota, USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
Laki, James. "Non-Traditional Security Issues: Securitisation of Transnational Crime 
in Asia." In IDSS Working Paper Series. Singapore: Institute of Defence and 
Security Studies, 2006. 
Lancaster, Roger N., and Micaela Di Leonardo. The Gender/Sexuality Reader: Culture, 
History, Political Economy.  New York, USA: Routledge, 1997. 
Mahadev, Neena. "Conversion and Anti-Conversion in Contemporary Sri Lanka: 
Pentecostal Christian Evangelism and Theravada Buddhist Views on the 
Ethics of Religious Attraction." In Proselytizing and the Limits of Religious 
Pluralism in Contemporary Asia, edited by J. Finucane and R.M. Feener. 
Singapore: Springer, 2014. 
The Mahavamsa: The Great Chronicle of Ceylon. Translated by Wilhelm Geiger.  
London, UK: The Pali Text Society, 1980. 
"Manifesto Will Affect SL: BBS." Daily Mirror, January 6, 2015. 
Marty, Martin E., and R. Scott Appleby, eds. Accounting for Fundamentalism. Chicago, 
USA: Chicago University Press, 1994. 
124 
 
Mason, Patrick Q. "Religious Violence and State Violence." In The Oxford Handbook 
of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, edited by R. Scott Appleby, Atalia 
Omer and David Little. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Matthews, Bruce. "Christian Evagelical Conversions and the Politics of Sri Lanka." 
Pacific Affairs 80, no. 3 (2007): 455-72. 
Millet, Kate. Sexual Politics.  London, UK: Hart-Davis, 1971. 
Mitchell, Claire. "Behind the Ethnic Marker: Religion and Social Identification in 
Northern Ireland." Sociology of Religion 66, no. 1 (2005): 3-21. 
Mohan, Rohini. "Sri Lanka's Violent Buddhists." The New York Times, 3rd January 
2015. 
Murty, K. Radhakrishna, and Susan De Vos. "Ethnic Differences in Family Planning in 
Sri Lanka." Studies in Family Planning 15, no. 5 (1984): 222-32. 
Nadarajah, Suthaharan, and Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah. "Liberation Struggle or 
Terrorism? The Politics of Naming the LTTE." Third World Quarterly 26, no. 
1 (2005): 87-100. 
"New Government, Old BBS." Tamil Guardian, February 13, 2015. 
Nissan, Elizabeth. "History in the Making: Anuradhapura and the Sinhala Buddhist 
Nation." Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural 
Practice 25 (1989). 
Obeyesekere, Gananath. "Buddhism, Ethnicity, and Identity: A Problem in Buddhist 
History." In Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, edited by 
Mahinda Deegalle. New York, USA: Routledge, 2006. 
———. "Dutthagamani and the Buddhist Conscience." In Religion and Political 
Conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, edited by Douglas Allen. 
Conneticut, USA: Greenwood Press, 1992. 
———. "The Myth of the Human Sacrifice: History, Story, and Debate in a Buddhist 
Chronicle." Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural 
Practice 25, no. 1 (1989): 78-93. 
———. "Religious Symbolism and Political Change in Ceylon." Modern Ceylon 
Studies 1, no. 1 (1970): 43-63. 
Osuri, Goldie. "Secular Intervention / Hinduized Sovereignty: (Anti) Conversion and 
Religious Pluralism in Jodhaa Akbar." Cultural Critique 81, no. 1 (2012): 70-
99. 
Premasiri, P.D. "A 'Righteous War' in Buddhism?" In Buddhism, Conflict and Violence 
in Modern Sri Lanka, edited by Mahinda Deegalle. London, UK: Routledge, 
2006. 
"Protect Buddhist Sasana, Buddhism: BBS to Authorities." Daily Mirror, November 1, 
2013. 
Prothero, Stephen. "Henry Steel Olcott (1832-1907) and the Construction of 
Protestant Buddhism." Harvard University, 1991. 
———. "Henry Steel Olcott and Protestant Buddhism." Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 63, no. 2 (1995). 
Rahula, Walpola. The Heritage of the Bhikkhu.  New York, USA: Grove Press, 1974. 
1946 (Sinhala edition). 
Rai, Alok. "Religious Conversions and the Crisis of Brahminical Hinduism." In Hindus 
and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today, edited by Gyanendra 
Pandey. New York, USA: Viking Books, 1993. 
"Rajapaksa is the Genuine Common Candidate: Bodu Bala Sena." Adaderana, 
October 28, 2014. 
Rhys Davis, T.W., and William Stede, eds. Pali-English Dictionary: Pali Text Society, 
2009. 
Ring, Jennifer. "The Pariah as Hero: Hannah Arendt's Political Actor." Political 
Theory 19, no. 3 (1991): 433-52. 
125 
 
Robbins, Thomas. "Religious Movements and Violence: A Friendly Critique of the 
Interpretive Approach." Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and 
Emergent Religions 1, no. 1 (1997): 13-29. 
Roberts, Michael. Exploring Confrontation: Sri Lanka, Politics, Culture and History.  
London, UK: Routledge, 1994. 
———. "For Humanity, For the Sinhalese: Dharmapala as Crusading Bosat." The 
Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 4 (1997). 
———. Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period, 1590s to 1815.  Colombo, Sri 
Lanka: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004. 
———. "Stimulants and Ingredients in the Awakening of Latter-Day Nationalisms." 
In Collective Identities, Nationalisms and Protest in Modern Sri Lanka, edited 
by Michael Roberts. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Marga, 1979. 
Roewer, Richard, and Amalie Weinrich. "The Symbolic Politics of Power – A 
Framework for Understanding the Strategy Behind Myanmar's 'Race and 
Religion Protection Laws' " In Asia Pacific Sociological Association 
Conference. Chiang Mai University, Thailand, 2014. 
Rogers, John D. "Historical Images in the British Period." In Sri Lanka: History and 
the Roots of Conflict, edited by Jonathan Spencer. New York, USA: Routledge, 
1990. 
———. "Post-Orientalism and the Interpretation of Premodern and Modern 
Political Identities: the Case of Sri Lanka." The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 
1 (1994): 10-23. 
Rösel, Jakob. "Discourse and Practice of Sinhalese Nationalism: Role of Local 
Knowledge and Decentralisation." Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 30 
(2002): 3111-18. 
The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sri Lanka. "Statement Regarding the Alleged 
Connection Between Bodu Bala Sena and Norway."  
http://www.norway.lk/News_and_events/News/Statement-regarding-the-
alleged-connection-between-Bodu-Bala-Sena-and-Norway/#.VgdSZRuqpBc. 
Sabaratnam, Lakshmanan. Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and 
Cultural Continuity.  New York, USA: Palgrave, 2001. 
Schalk, Peter, ed. Buddhism Among Tamils in Pre-Colonial Tamilakam and Ilam: Part 
One (Prologue), the Pre-Pallava and the Pallava Period. Uppsala: Uppsala 
Universitet, 2002. 
———. "Operationalising Buddhism for Political Ends in a Martial Context in Lanka: 
The Case of Sinhalatva." In Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and 
Practice, edited by John Hinnells and Richard King. London, UK: Routledge, 
2007. 
———. "Semantic Transformations of the Dhammadipa." In Buddhism, Conflict and 
Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, edited by Mahinda Deegalle. London, UK: 
Routledge, 2006. 
Schrikker, Alicia. Dutch and British Colonial Intervention in Sri Lanka c. 1780-1815: 
Expansion and Reform. PhD proefschrift, Leiden Universiteit. 2006. 
Schonthal, Benjamin. "Constitutionalising Religion: the Phyrric Success of Religious 
Rights in Postcolonial Sri Lanka." Journal of Law and Religion 29, no. 3 
(2014): 1-21. 
———. "The ‘Muslim Other’ in Myanmar and Sri Lanka." In Islam and the State in 
Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging, edited by 
Melissa Crouch. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2016. 
Scott, David. Formations of Ritual: Colonial and Anthropological Discourses on the 
Sinhala Yaktovil.  Minnesota, USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. 
Sen, Amartya. Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny.  London, UK: Penguin 
Books, 2006. 
126 
 
———. "Is Nationalism a Boon or a Curse?" Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 7 
(2008): 39-44. 
———. "Violence, Identity, and Poverty." Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 1 (2008): 
5-15. 
Seneviratne, H.L. Buddhism, Identity, and Conflict.  Colombo, Sri Lanka: International 
Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2002. 
———. "Identity and the Conflation of Past and Present." Social Analysis: The 
International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice 25 (1989). 
———. The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka.  Illinois, USA: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999. 
"Set Up Commission To Probe Foreign Interventions, BBS Tells President." Sri Lanka 
Mirror, January 6, 2015. 
De Silva, Chandra R. "The Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into 
Views Among Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka." In Buddhist Fundamentalism 
and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka, edited by Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and 
Chandra R. de Silva. New York, USA: State University of New York Press, 
1998. 
De Silva, K.M. A History of Sri Lanka.  Colombo, Sri Lanka: Vijatha Yapa Publications, 
2005. 
———. Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka.  London, 
UK: Penguin, 1998. 
Sluka, Jeffrey, Noam Chomsky, and David Price. "What Anthropologists Should 
Know About the Concept of Terrorism: a Response to David Price." 
Anthropology Today 18, no. 2 (2002): 22-23. 
Smart, Ninian. "Religion and Nationalism in India and Sri Lanka." Religious Studies 
Bulletin 4, no. 1 (1984). 
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the 
Religious Traditions of Mankind.  New York, USA: New American Library, 
1964. 
"Sobhitha Thero Suspects Moves to Stop Him." BBC Sinhala Online, October 7, 2010. 
Somers, Margaret. "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and 
Network Approach." Theory and Society 23 (1994): 605-49. 
Squires, J. Gender in Political Theory.  Massachusetts, USA: Polity Press, 1999. 
"Sri Lanka's Buddhist Extremists Vow to Remove Muslim Mosque in Kuragala." 
Colombo Page: Sri Lanka Internet Newspaper, March 18, 2013. 
"Sri Lanka's Hardline Sinhalese Buddhist Group Calls for Halal Boycott." Asian News 
International, February 18, 2013. 
"Sri Lanka Shaken by Religious Violence." Al Jazeera English, June 16, 2014. 
"Sri Lankan Buddhists Promise to Carry Out The Law." 2:29: Al Jazeera English, 
2014. 
Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill.  New York, 
USA: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003. 
Steuter, Erin, and Deborah Willis. "'The Vermin Have Struck Again:' Dehumanising 
the Enemy in Post 9/11 Media Representations." Media, War and Conflict 3, 
no. 2 (2010): 152-67. 
Stewart, James John. "Muslim-Buddhist Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka." South 
Asia Research 34, no. 3 (2014): 241-60. 
Subramanian, Narendra. "Legal Change and Gender Equality: Changes in Muslim 
Family Law in India." Law & Social Inquiry 33, no. 3 (2008): 631-72. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. "Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations." 
Journal of Modern History 73, no. 4 (2001). 
Tambiah, Stanley. Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka.  
Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
127 
 
Taylor, Charles. "Western Secularity." In Rethinking Secularism, edited by Craig 
Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan van Antwerpen. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Tennent, James Emerson. Ceylon: an Account of the Island Physical, Historical, and 
Topographical with Notices of Its Natural History, Antiquities, and 
Productions.  London: Spottiswoode & co., 1860. 
Theiler, Tobias. "Societal Security and Social Psychology." Review of International 
Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 249-68. 
"This is What Sri Lankan Monk Think About Muslim, Tamil Hindu, Dalit and White 
People." 7:06: FataasTV, 2014. 
Tilly, Charles. Stories, Identities, and Political Change.  Maryland, USA: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002. 
Touraine, Alain. "Sociology Without Society." Current Sociology 46, no. 2 (1998): 
119-43. 
Turnour, George. The Mahawanso in Roman Characters with the Translation 
Subjoined; and an Introductory Essay on Pali Buddhistical Literature. 2 vols. 
Vol. 1, Sri Lanka: Cotta Church Mission Press, 1837. 
Unethical Conversion Watch. "About Us."  
http://unethicalconversionwatch.org/about-us/. 
Wæver, Ole. "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and 
their Origins Between Core and Periphery." In International Studies 
Association. Montreal, 2004. 
———. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In On Security, edited by Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz. New York, USA: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
Weerawardana, I.D.S. Ceylon General Election 1956.  Colombo, Sri Lanka: M.D. 
Gunasena & Co. Ltd., 1960. 
Weissbrod, Lilly. "Religion as National Identity in Secular Society." Review of 
Religious Research 24, no. 3 (1983): 188-205. 
"Who is Behind Sri Lanka's Religious Violence?" 24:55: Al Jazeera English, 2014. 
Wickramasinghe, Nira. "Sri Lanka in 2013: Post-War Oppressive Stability." Asian 
Survey 54, no. 1 (2014): 199-205. 
———. "Sri Lanka in 2014: Cracks in the Edifice." Asian Survey 55, no. 1 (2015): 60-
66. 
———. Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities.  Colombo, Sri 
Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2006. 
Wickremeratne, Ananda. Buddhism and Ethnicity in Sri Lanka: A Historical Analysis.  
Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1995. 
———. "Historiography in Conflict and Violence." In Buddhism, Conflict and Violence 
in Modern Sri Lanka, edited by Mahinda Deegalle. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006. 
Wijsen, Frans. "Discourse Analysis in Religious Studies: The Case of Interreligious 
Worship in Friesland." Anthropos 105, no. 2 (2010): 539-53. 
Wilson, Erin K. After Secularism: Rethinking Religion in Global Politics.  London, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Withanage, Dilantha. Interviewed by Michael K. Jerryson (25th June 2014). 
Withanage, Dilanthe. "One Country, One Law: Let's Defeat the Conspiracies to 
Establish Sharia Law in Our Country Secretly." Bodu Bala Sena, 
http://www.bodubalasena.co/one-country--one-law-.html. 
Wriggins, Howard. "Ceylon's Time of Troubles, 1956-1958." Far Eastern Survey 28, 
no. 3 (1959): 33-39. 
 
